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This thesis seeks to assess the practical implications of equity analysts’ non-GAAP and 
GAAP earnings reporting to different capital market participants. It consists of three essays 
that are presented as chapters. 
 
The first empirical chapter uses hand collected data from analysts’ reports for large 
European banks and examines analysts’ actual and forecast GAAP and non-GAAP earnings 
per share (EPS). It finds that there is significant variation among sell-side analysts’ non-
GAAP actual earnings measures. These measures are not easily reconcilable to firms’ 
reported non-GAAP earnings, GAAP earnings or to street earnings reported by I/B/E/S. By 
contrast, reported measures of GAAP earnings in analysts’ reports rarely differ from one 
another or from firms’ reported GAAP earnings. When evaluated against analysts’ own 
actual non-GAAP earnings measures, forecasts appear more accurate and more biased than 
those based on I/B/E/S. This chapter suggests that although non-GAAP earnings measures 
are more persistent, GAAP earnings are less vulnerable to measurement ambiguity across 
analysts. Therefore, whether non-GAAP or GAAP earnings are superior involves a trade-
off of persistence and measurement uncertainty. 
 
The second empirical chapter studies the relative informativeness at the earnings 
announcement date and post earnings announcement drift (PEAD) associated with GAAP 
and non-GAAP earnings surprises. Previous studies misalign GAAP actual earnings with 
non-GAAP forecasts to measure GAAP earnings surprises. This chapter overcomes this 
measurement error problem by aligning the measurement bases of both forecast and actual 
GAAP earnings. It finds that investors still perceive non-GAAP earnings to be more 
informative than GAAP earnings at the earnings announcement date. However, previously 
identified GAAP earnings surprises downwardly bias market responses to GAAP earnings. 
In addition, after correcting the measurement error, the evidence suggests that the GAAP-
based PEAD is higher than the non-GAAP based PEAD, indicating that investors may not 
use the information contained in GAAP earnings as efficient as non-GAAP earnings. 
 
The third empirical chapter explores analysts’ disagreement on GAAP earnings forecasts, 
forecast exclusions and their relationship with future stock returns. In this chapter, the non-
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GAAP forecasts are separated into two components: GAAP forecasts and forecast 
exclusions. It finds that both analysts’ disagreement on non-GAAP forecasts and 
disagreement on GAAP forecasts are negatively associated with future stock returns. 
However, a higher level of disagreement on forecast exclusions is associated with higher 
future stock return. Further evidence suggests that dispersion in forecast exclusions reflects 
the firm idiosyncratic risk and the uncertainty of fundamental firm value. 
 
Overall, the thesis extends the literature on analysts’ non-GAAP reporting by demonstrating 
that analysts disagree significantly on how actual non-GAAP earnings are measured. It also 
complements the literature on market reactions to analysts’ forecasts and the literature on 
analyst dispersion anomaly by provides additional evidence on the implications of analysts’ 
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  1.1       Motivation 
Sell-side analysts act as a link between investors and companies as well as influencing the 
trajectory of the market (Clatworthy and Lee, 2018– e.g. on impact of forecast revisions on 
the market). The earnings measures generated and used by analysts are often considered to 
be the archetypal non-GAAP or street earnings (e.g. Baik et al., 2009; Bradshaw et al, 
2018b). Because analysts can decide which components of GAAP earnings are to be 
excluded based on their own judgements (Baik et al., 2009) and they may face conflicts of 
interests that may bias their earnings measures, (Michaely and Womack, 1999; Kadan et al., 
2009), more attention is being paid by researchers to the treatment of non-recurring items 
by analysts (e.g. Bratten et al., 2020). Such research seeks to assess the nature and 
consequences of analysts’ non-GAAP and GAAP earnings measures. Despite such research, 
the measurement of earnings by analysts remains poorly understood.  
The current thesis addresses the following issues, aiming to improve our 
understanding of analysts’ earnings measures and their capital market consequences: (i) 
analysts’ disagreement surrounding non-GAAP earnings measures and how this affects 
inferences on analysts’ forecast rationality and overreaction; (ii) how the stock market reacts 
to non-GAAP and GAAP earnings surprises, and (iii) the links between analysts’ 
disagreement on earnings forecasts and future stock returns. 
Regarding the first issue, prior research typically measures analysts’ expectations 
and earnings outcomes using I/B/E/S data as a proxy for non-GAAP earnings (e.g. Bradshaw 
and Sloan, 2002; Bhattacharya et al., 2003). For each firm year or firm quarter, I/B/E/S 
provides one single actual earnings figure based on a ‘majority rule’, where the respective 
earnings figure is meant to represent the definition that most analysts agree on (see I/B/E/S, 
2015).  However, Brown and Larocque (2013) challenge this notion by introducing a method 
of inferring individual analysts’ actual earnings. They find that analysts’ measures often 
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differ from I/B/E/S reported figures. They show that quarterly actual earnings provided by 
I/B/E/S can differ from inferred actual earnings up to 50% of the time, and that failure to 
recognize this phenomenon may understate the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts and result in 
erroneous inferences. Bradshaw et al. (2018a) further compare the differences in the 
properties of analysts’ forecasts between forecasts recorded in I/B/E/S and forecasts 
provided by Thomson Reuters. They conclude that the latter are more accurate and less 
biased. Nevertheless, little attention has been devoted to the actual earnings reported in 
analysts’ reports, or how they relate to the same individual analyst’s previous forecasts. As 
noted by Bratten et al. (2020), observed differences in analysts’ forecasts may represent not 
just differences in expected performance, but also differences in the way that performance 
is measured by different analysts. Thus, Chapter 2 investigates the variation across 
individual analysts in the treatment of excluding items. My study therefore differs from prior 
research by focusing not only on analysts’ earnings forecasts, but also their actual earnings 
realisations.   
In terms of the second issue, due to the lack of availability of GAAP forecast data 
before 2004, the properties of analysts’ GAAP forecasts are based on the difference between 
GAAP actuals and non-GAAP forecasts on I/B/E/S (Lougee and Marquardt, 2004; Black 
and Christensen, 2009). This creates a measurement error that misaligns GAAP actual 
earnings with non-GAAP forecasts. The measurement error problem has been identified as 
a major limitation that may have contaminated previous results (Lambert, 2004; Cohen et 
al., 2007; Helflin and Hsu, 2008). Consequently, Chapter 3 studies the short- and long-term 
market reactions to GAAP and non-GAAP earnings using ‘corrected’ measures of GAAP 
earnings surprises. In addition, the availability of GAAP forecast data allows me to study 
the relationship between stock returns and dispersion in analysts’ GAAP forecasts in 
Chapter 4. As analysts generally have more freedom in adjusting non-GAAP numbers, the 
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dispersion in their non-GAAP forecasts may be influenced analysts’ unique incentive 
structure. For instance, they may choose to converge to – or depart from - the consensus 
forecast number because of career concerns. The recent study by Bratten et al. (2020) reports 
that the variation in analysts’ forecast exclusions is associated with opportunism. This issue 
could partially be addressed by exploring the dispersion in analysts’ GAAP forecasts and 
dispersion in analysts’ forecast exclusions separately. 
 
1.2       Contribution 
This thesis contributes to four streams of literature. Chapter 2 extends the literature on sell-
side financial analysts’ earnings forecasts by demonstrating that analysts disagree 
significantly on how actual non-GAAP earnings are measured. Prior studies use a single 
earnings outcome provided by I/B/E/S to represent actual non-GAAP or ‘street’ earnings 
measures. This approach fails to reflect the significant variation in the treatment of excluding 
items by individual analysts in actual earnings realisations. In short, street earnings are 
variable, not constant, as assumed by many prior studies. I further show that using analysts’ 
own definition of actual earnings can change inferences of the properties of their forecasts. 
In contrast, GAAP earnings definitions are generally highly consistent across analysts, 
making them more suitable for performing the ‘disciplining role’ in evaluating analysts’ 
forecasts.  
Second, chapter 2 contributes to the non-GAAP literature building on the analysis of 
Bentley et al. (2018), who find that analysts’ definitions of non-GAAP earnings often differ 
from those of managers. I show that analysts often disagree amongst themselves about how 
non-GAAP earnings are measured and that these differences are not easily reconcilable to 
those reported by forecast data providers.  
Third, chapter 3 contributes to the long line of literature of market reactions to 
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analysts’ forecasts. Due to the lack of availability of GAAP earnings forecast data before 
2004, prior studies of the market reactions to different earnings definitions define GAAP 
earnings surprise as the difference between GAAP actual earnings and non-GAAP forecasts, 
which may give rise to substantial measurement errors (Berger, 2005; Cohen et al., 2007, 
Bradshaw et al., 2018b). After correcting this measurement error by aligning the 
measurement bases of both forecast and actual earnings, I reassess the short- and long-term 
market reactions to different definitions of earnings in an international setting in Chapter 3. 
I show that previously identified GAAP earnings surprises downwardly bias market 
responses to GAAP earnings. The error component (i.e., forecast exclusions) provide 
incrementally useful information, in addition to the information found in GAAP forecasts. 
In terms of longer run reactions to earnings surprises, I show that investors may not use the 
information contained in GAAP earnings as efficiently as non-GAAP earnings.  
Finally, Chapter 4 contributes the literature on the analyst dispersion anomaly and 
analysts’ non-GAAP reporting. I provide further evidence on the role of dispersion in 
analyst’ GAAP forecasts and dispersion in forecast exclusions in predicting the cross-
sectional future returns. I show that the dispersion in analysts’ GAAP forecasts is negatively 
associated with future stock returns. However, the levels of disagreement on exclusions from 
GAAP forecasts are positively associated with future stock return. Bratten et al. (2020) 
investigate individual analysts’ forecast exclusions and find that analysts’ exclusion 
behaviours are associated with opportunism. My study complements this by exploring 
whether and how investors respond to different opinions among analysts’ exclusions 
forecasts. 
Overall, my research indicates that although non-GAAP earnings measures are more 
persistent, the disagreement across analysts about how performance is measured introduces 
an additional dimension of uncertainty that GAAP earnings to not suffer from. Whether non-
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GAAP or GAAP earnings are superior involves a trade-off of persistence and measurement 
uncertainty. In addition, my research provides additional evidence on the implications of 
analysts’ GAAP forecasts and forecast exclusions for capital market participants.  
 
1.3       Thesis Structure 
The remainder of the thesis includes three self-contained chapters and a concluding chapter. 
Chapter 2 investigates analysts’ disagreement about the past non-GAAP earnings measures 
(actual non-GAAP EPS) and its impact on evaluation of individual analysts’ non-GAAP 
forecasts. Chapter 3 examines the relative informativeness and post earnings announcement 
drift (PEAD) for GAAP and non-GAAP earnings. Chapter 4 studies the dispersion in 
analysts’ GAAP forecasts, exclusions forecasts and their relationship with future stock 
return. Chapter 5 concludes with a summary of my main findings, an acknowledgement of 
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Prior research documents that analysts’ ‘street earnings’ exclude transitory items in 
order to facilitate security valuation. Based on an examination of analysts’ reports for 
large European banks, I document significant variation in sell side analysts’ non-GAAP actual (as 
opposed to forecast) earnings measures. These measures are not easily 
reconcilable to firms reported non-GAAP earnings, GAAP earnings or to street 
earnings reported by I/B/E/S. By contrast, reported measures of GAAP earnings in 
analysts’ reports rarely differ from one another or from firms’ reported GAAP earnings. 
When evaluated against analysts’ own actual non-GAAP earnings measures, forecasts 
appear more accurate and more biased than those based on I/B/E/S. Results for GAAP 
earnings are less conclusive. My results show that as well as disagreeing about future 





2.1       Introduction 
One of the primary functions of accounting information in capital markets is to confirm prior 
expectational information (Gigler and Hemmer, 1999). This ‘disciplining’ role of 
accounting is meant to enhance the accountability of managers and other information 
providers through an agreed-upon system of measurement whereby outcomes of previous 
forecasts of corporate performance can be evaluated ex post (Ball and Shivakumar, 2008). 
Regulators and standard setters view the recent proliferation of non-GAAP reporting as a 
significant threat to this role (e.g. Young, 2014; Guillamon-Saurin et al., 2017; Black et al., 
2018). 
Non-GAAP (or pro-forma or underlying) earnings measures are argued to be 
superior for predictive purposes because they exclude transitory or non-recurring items. 
Accordingly, investors find non-GAAP measures more informative than GAAP measures 
(e.g. Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; Gu and Chen, 2004). At the same time, the managerial 
discretion involved in preparing non-GAAP measures has led to concerns of managerial 
opportunism. Non-GAAP earnings are routinely higher than GAAP earnings (e.g., Leung 
and Veenman, 2018) and managers may select measures to meet targets and beat analyst 
expectations (Doyle et al., 2013), rather than to communicate companies’ true underlying 
performance.  
Prior research typically measures analysts’ expectations and earnings outcomes 
using I/B/E/S data as a proxy for ‘street’ earnings. Much of what we know about the 
properties of analysts’ forecasts is based on I/B/E/S forecast and actual earnings per share 
(EPS) data, typically measured on a non-GAAP basis. In this chapter, I show that a single 
reported ‘street’ earnings figure for a given company in a given period can mask significant 
underlying variation among equity analysts in how actual earnings outcomes are measured. 
I/B/E/S and other data providers recognize that measurement rules may differ between 
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analysts when they supply earnings forecasts, so they adopt a ‘majority rule’, where the 
respective earnings figure is meant to represent the definition that most analysts were 
forecasting at the time (Gu and Chen, 2004). Based on earnings figures taken from a sample 
of analysts’ reports for European banks, my evidence suggests that this process can be 
difficult to operationalize and that ‘street’ earnings is variable, not constant. Although it is 
widely recognised in the literature that analysts disagree about what earnings will be in the 
future, there has been limited appreciation of the extent to which they disagree about what 
firms’ earnings were in the past. After documenting substantial variation across analysts in 
the measurement of actual earnings, I assume that analysts themselves are best placed to 
ensure consistency in the measurement rules used in preparing their forecast and reported 
earnings. This enables us to examine whether the application of consistent measurement 
rules affects the properties of analysts’ forecast accuracy, bias and efficiency. 
This study is not the first to examine analysts’ actual earnings measurement 
practices. Brown and Laroque (2013) introduce a method of inferring actual earnings and 
find that these often differ from I/B/E/S reported figures. They show that quarterly actual 
earnings provided by I/B/E/S can differ from inferred actual earnings up to 50% of the time, 
and that failure to recognize this phenomenon may understate the accuracy of analysts’ 
forecasts and result in erroneous inferences. Although they infer analyst actuals, Brown and 
Laroque (2013) do not study the actual earnings figures reported by analysts themselves in 
their research reports. Bradshaw et al. (2018b) find that analysts’ forecasts provided by 
Thomson Reuters via their analysts’ reports service are more accurate and less biased than 
other I/B/E/S forecasts. However, although Bradshaw et al. (2018b) focus on differences in 
the properties of analysts’ forecasts, they nevertheless employ I/B/E/S actual earnings 
outcomes in their analysis.  
In a major recent development in the analyst forecast literature, Bradshaw et al. 
10 
 
(2018b) show that the subjectivity in the measurement of analysts’ non-GAAP earnings 
forecasts can be mitigated through the use of GAAP earnings forecasts. They find that 
investors still respond more to non-GAAP earnings than GAAP earnings, but they report 
that analysts’ GAAP earnings forecasts can be useful to investors by increasing the 
credibility of non-GAAP earnings metrics. This study builds on this literature by examining 
the variation in both GAAP and non-GAAP earnings measures across analysts. 
To study the levels of (dis)agreement across analysts in measuring actual earnings, 
I focus on equity analysts’ reports on European banks. Due to their scale and the nature of 
their activities in monitoring, financial intermediation and supplying credit, banks play a 
particularly important role in market economies. The majority of empirical accounting 
research tends to focus on banks’ balance sheets and asset/liability composition, rather than 
their income statements, on the grounds that these are used as the basis for prudential 
regulatory calculations, such as leverage and capital adequacy ratios (Beatty and Liao, 
2014).1 Nevertheless, the income statement remains relevant in this context due to the 
importance of retained earnings in constituting equity for regulatory purposes. In addition, 
the scale of the European banking sector means that banks are heavily represented in 
investors’ portfolios, so the valuation of their quoted securities – which typically requires 
performance-based information – remains important as well. 
Because they hold non-traded assets (i.e., non-marketable loans), and routinely use 
financial instruments (particularly derivatives) in their hedging and trading activities, banks 
are informationally opaque (Beatty and Liao, 2014)2 and are often complex to analyze and 
evaluate, even for experienced analysts (Chang et al., 2016) and auditors (Bratten et al., 
2019). This complexity makes analysts’ measurement of banks’ earnings inherently 
   
1 An exception is the large literature that examines banks’ loan loss provisioning, which focuses only on a sub-
set of the income statement. 
2 Indeed, Beatty and Liao (2014) discuss the literature showing that banks’ main role makes them optimally 
opaque (Dang et al., 2017). 
11 
 
challenging. In addition to the innate complexity and opaqueness of banks, there are often 
substantial items in European banks’ income statements that analysts may find difficult to 
classify as either recurring or non-recurring. In several controversies, including the LIBOR 
scandal the mis-selling of interest rate swaps and payment protection insurance, EU banks 
have incurred significant regulatory penalties, leading to large financial settlements.3 Many 
banks’ earnings have recently included charges running into hundreds of millions of pounds. 
Determining whether such items should feature in analysts’ forecast and actual earnings is 
ultimately a subjective judgement, which may lead to different treatments across analysts. 
My focus on European banks reflects the less regulated nature of the non-GAAP reporting 
environment relative to the US (e.g. Guillamon-Saurin et al., 2017). 
I contribute to two streams of literature. First, I contribute to the literature on 
financial analysts by showing that analysts’ ‘street earnings’ are not well defined. Analysts 
disagree significantly and often about how actual earnings are measured, and these 
differences can affect the evaluation of individual analysts’ non-GAAP forecasts. In 
contrast, GAAP earnings definitions are generally highly consistent across analysts (and 
correspond closely to those reported by companies). This leads to a trade-off: although 
GAAP earnings are potentially contaminated by transitory items, they are also less prone to 
changes in definition ex post. This makes them more suitable for performing the disciplining 
role in forecast evaluation. Second, I contribute to the non-GAAP literature by building on 
the analysis of Bentley et al. (2018), who find that analysts’ definitions of non-GAAP 
earnings often differ from those of managers. My analysis shows that analysts often disagree 
amongst themselves about how non-GAAP earnings are measured and that these differences 
are not easily reconcilable to those reported by forecast data providers.  
   
3 For example, the FT (August 30th, 2019) points out: “[In the two decades beginning in the late 1990s], Lloyds 
has put aside £20bn to settle potential mis-selling claims, topping a list of UK lenders who collectively expect 




Despite the importance of banks and the relative lack of research on their income 
statements, I recognize that my findings may not generalize to the non-financial corporate 
sector. Moreover, earnings per share is not the only metric used in the evaluation of banks’ 
financial position and performance. In particular, regulatory capital and leverage are often 
used to assess the financial status of banks (e.g. Beattie and Liao, 2014). Nevertheless, I 
expect earnings to remain an important metric to evaluate bank performance in equity 
markets.  
In the next section, I first provide a brief overview of the literature on non-GAAP 
earnings measures as reported by managers and as used by analysts. I then outline my data 
and sample in section 2.3. My main findings follow in section 2.4, while section 2.5 
concludes. 
 
2.2       Companies’ and Analysts’ Non-GAAP Earnings Measures 
In a recent and comprehensive review of the literature, Black et al. (2018) document a 
proliferation in non-GAAP reporting in the last two decades. They report that a large amount 
of evidence supports the idea that non-GAAP figures are informative to capital market 
participants, and several studies (e.g. Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; Bhattacharya et al., 2003) 
show non-GAAP earnings measures are often more useful than GAAP earnings for security 
valuation. While this evidence supports an information, rather than an opportunistic role, for 
non-GAAP earnings, such measures can also be reported with more strategic aims, (e.g. by 
excluding recurring expenses), so that they are biased upwards. This has led some to see 
non-GAAP reporting as a threat to the integrity of the GAAP financial reporting system (e.g. 
Black et al., 2018; Young, 2014). However, GuillamonSaurin et al. (2017) suggest that 
investors are aware of the potential for biased non-GAAP communication by managers and 
discount it when it is too aggressive. 
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Until recently, researchers treated the non-GAAP earnings figures produced by 
managers as equivalent to those produced by analysts, proxied by I/B/E/S data. But Bentley 
et al. (2018) show that although managers’ and analysts’ non-GAAP figures overlap, they 
are not always the same. In particular, I/B/E/S data exclude manager’s low-quality 
adjustments and thus underestimate the aggressiveness of managers’ reporting. What is less 
well understood from existing evidence is the extent to which I/B/E/S data fully represents 
the non-GAAP measurement and adjustment processes of analysts.  
In a recent study, Bradshaw et al. (2018a) document that the properties of earnings 
forecasts vary according to the channel used to disseminate the research. Based on a large 
sample of US companies, they find that analysts’ forecasts distributed via a premium 
channel (i.e., via research reports distributed through Thomson Reuters Research) are less 
biased and more accurate than those sent through the ‘standard channel’ of I/B/E/S. In their 
analysis, accuracy and bias are measured as the difference between analysts’ forecasts (as 
reported in research reports) and I/B/E/S actual earnings. Interestingly, they document 
significant variation in dissemination arrangements, where different clients have different 
levels of access (e.g., different metrics, different time delays and differences in access to 
data) depending on contractual terms and restrictions on availability imposed by 
contributing brokers. 
A distinguishing feature of I/B/E/S data – both GAAP and non-GAAP – is that actual 
earnings per share are constant for each firm-year (or quarter). According to I/B/E/S, 
company actual figures are collected from multiple newswire feeds, press releases, company 
websites and public filings. While prior research contends that the I/B/E/S definitions of 
forecast EPS and actual EPS measures are consistent (e.g. Capstaff et al., 2001), little is 
known about how the data are actually compiled.  
In an assessment of inclusions and exclusions made by analysts as part of the First 
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Call database (which has subsequently been acquired by Thomson Financial, the then owner 
of I/B/E/S), Gu and Chen (2004) find that included items are more persistent and have higher 
valuation multiples than exclusion items, suggesting that ‘street’ earnings are of higher 
quality than GAAP earnings. Recognizing that analysts vary in their treatment of recurring 
items, they report that exclusions are typically made on a ‘majority rule’ basis and point out 
(2004, p. 133) that earnings exclusion decisions are complex and ad hoc, with a risk that 
analysts may choose an earnings figure that provides the closest match to their forecasts. 
Because analysts may make numerous adjustments to earnings at different stages in 
the forecasting cycle, it is likely to be very difficult for forecast data providers to distil 
corporate performance measures across multiple analysts into a single measure. Hence, a 
single earnings outcome may fail to reflect the variation in the treatment of non-recurring 
items by individual analysts, not just in earnings forecasts, but also in realisations. As 
pointed out by Brown and Laroque (2013), I/B/E/S data are often used to judge the accuracy 
and bias of analysts’ forecast ex post, yet a failure to recognize that I/B/E/S figures do not 
always represent those analysts were using when issuing their forecasts may result in 
unreliable inferences.  
Because of the limited existing empirical evidence in this area, my aims are partly 
exploratory. Building on prior literature on the properties of analysts’ forecasts and ‘street’ 
earnings, I study the actual earnings per share data reported by individual analysts in their 
research reports, and compare these figures across analysts and to those recorded by I/B/E/S. 
My first research question is:  
RQ2.1: To what extent do analysts’ non-GAAP actual earnings figures differ from 
each other and those reported by I/B/E/S? 
With the exception of Bradshaw et al. (2018b), prior research on analysts’ forecasts 
focuses on non-GAAP earnings measures, treating them as a surrogate for ‘street’ earnings. 
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Because the non-GAAP earnings measures may not be well-defined – even ex post – the 
extent to which earnings can indeed perform a disciplining role for other information sources 
is unclear. This role may be better suited to GAAP measures, although there is limited 
understanding of the extent to which analysts’ earnings measures conform precisely to those 
prepared under a strict GAAP regime. To investigate the disciplining role of the audited 
GAAP regime in confirming analysts’ forecasts, I am therefore also interested in the 
comparative variation across analysts in GAAP actual earnings figures. My second research 
question is: 
RQ2.2: To what extent do analysts’ GAAP actual earnings figures differ from each 
other and those reported by I/B/E/S? 
After documenting that there is significant variation across analysts and between 
analysts and I/B/E/S for non-GAAP earnings, but limited variation for GAAP earnings, I 
match the forecasts and actual earnings across research reports produced by the same 
analysts to evaluate whether using analysts’ own definition of actual earnings changes 
inferences of the properties of their forecasts. My final research question is therefore: 
RQ2.3: Does using analysts’ own actual earnings figures change inferences of the 
properties of their forecasts compared with I/B/E/S data? 
 
2.3       Data and Sample 
2.3.1    Data 
I obtain a sample of analysts’ reported actual and forecast EPS from analysts’ reports taken 
from Investext. Because this study is intended to investigate the ways in which analysts cope 
with complex and opaque companies’ reporting items that may be hard to classify, I select 
a sample of 4 large UK banks and 5 European banks from the STOXX600 index and collect 
a sample of analysts’ reports for them over the period 2010 to 2017. In order to keep the 
16 
 
data collection task manageable and to focus on analysts’ forecasts around the earnings 
announcement date, I restrict my sample to analysts’ reports issued 60 days before and 60 
days after the earnings announcement date for each bank. 
From the reports, I record information the earnings announcement date, broker name, 
analysts’ names, stock price, price target, recommendation, analyst report date, description 
of GAAP EPS and non-GAAP EPS, actual EPS reported for the previous fiscal year (FY0) 
and the year before previous fiscal year (FY-1), as well as forecast EPS reported for the 
current fiscal year (FY1) and for the next fiscal year (FY2).  
Figure 2.1 presents the timeline for the data collection process, taking Barclays’ 
earnings announcement date of 23/02/2017 as an example. In this example, for analysts’ 
reports issued 60 days before 23/02/2017, I record actual EPS for 2014 and 2015, and 
forecast EPS for 2016 and 2017. For analysts’ reports issued 60 days after 23/02/2017, I 
record actual EPS for 2015 and 2016, and forecast EPS for 2017 and 2018. 
Insert Figure 2.1 about here 
I identify the current fiscal year according to each analyst report as they indicate “A” 
next to the year headings for previous years to indicate actual EPS, and “F” or “E” for the 
current fiscal year to represent forecast or expected EPS. EPS actual and EPS forecasts are 
typically obtained from the first page of analysts’ reports, which supports the idea that EPS 
is an important performance metric for the banks in this study. In the rare cases where EPS 
figures do not appear on the first page of the report, I obtain them from the financial 
summary chart elsewhere in the report. GAAP EPS is reported as ‘Reported EPS’, ‘EPS 
(stated)’ and ‘Statutory EPS’ in analysts’ reports, whereas non-GAAP EPS is reported as 
‘Adjusted EPS’ or ‘Underlying EPS’. 
Once all reports are collected, I manually adjust the EPS actuals, forecasts and share 
prices where there are stock splits in order to ensure consistency through time and with the 
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I/B/E/S adjusted data. Specifically, I adjust the relevant data for Royal Bank of Scotland 
(RBS) for its one-for-ten consolidation of ordinary shares, which took effect in June 2012. 
I use the ratio of the company restated EPS to the company reported EPS before restatement 
as the adjustment factor. For a subsample of analysts’ reports, I also collect data on 
reconciliations between GAAP and non- GAAP data, where available. 
For comparative purposes, I obtain both non-GAAP and GAAP EPS measures from 
the Detailed History I/B/E/S files from WRDS. GAAP EPS figures have been available on 
I/B/E/S since 2004 (Bradshaw et al., 2018b). To be consistent with the hand-collected data, 
I require the I/B/E/S forecasts to be issued between 60 days before and 60 days after the 
earnings announcement date. Each I/B/E/S EPS forecast is matched to the I/B/E/S stock 
price from the month before the forecast date for scaling purposes. 
 
2.3.2    Sample 
My initial hand-collected sample comprises 1,362 analysts’ reports for 9 European banks. 
In 47 cases, analysts report their forecast EPS after the earnings announcement date. I 
exclude these, which reduces the sample to 1,315 reports. Because I can sometimes obtain 
more than one figure from each report, the final hand-collected sample comprises 2,021 
analysts reported non-GAAP actual EPS figures, 1,842 analyst reported GAAP actual EPS 
figures, 1,209 non-GAAP forecasts and 1,105 GAAP forecasts for the next accounting year. 
The data collected from I/B/E/S comprises 2,924 non-GAAP forecasts, 1,961 GAAP 
forecasts, 81 GAAP actual EPS figures and 81 non-GAAP actual EPS figures. 
The focus here is principally on the disagreement between analysts on the 
measurement of GAAP and non-GAAP actual EPS. When assessing this, it is important to 
examine the extent to which analysts report reconciliations between the two measures. This 
is because any variation in non-GAAP measurement can be overcome via adjustments by 
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users of analysts’ reports. To explore this issue, I hand collect detailed reconciliations in 
annual reports and analysts reports from between 2010 and 2013. 
Analysts’ reports are divided into three categories: no reconciliation, limited 
reconciliation, and detailed reconciliation. Analysts’ reports are considered as ‘no 
reconciliation’ if no information on GAAP and Non-GAAP reconciliations can be found in 
the reports. In some cases, the reports contain a limited reconciliation, including items such 
as ‘Other exceptionals’ and ‘Goodwill impairment’; however, the information in these cases 
does not allow clear identification of which items are excluded from GAAP net income to 
arrive at the non-GAAP actual EPS. In other cases, a detailed reconciliation is disclosed in 
the reports.4 Because analysts’ ability to supply detailed reconciliations may depend on the 
disclosure level of the banks they are following, I also report results by bank disclosure 
levels.5 
Table 2.1 reports the descriptive statistics for the GAAP and non-GAAP 
reconciliations. Overall, almost half of the analyst reports contain no reconciliations at all. 
This suggests that for a significant proportion of analyst reports, it is not possible to fully 
ascertain what adjustments are being made to GAAP EPS to arrive at the non-GAAP 
measures. When banks provide GAAP and non-GAAP reconciliations in their annual 
reports, analysts seem more likely to provide detailed reconciliations than when banks do 
not provide them (22.30% versus 12.82%). The likelihood of analysts not providing GAAP 
and non-GAAP reconciliations is also higher when banks do not provide reconciliation 
information (55.13% versus 46.71%). Nevertheless, a chi-squared test (not reported in the 
table) indicates that the differences are not significant (p = 0.147). 
Insert Table 2.1 about here 
   
4 Examples of excluded items in these detailed reconciliations include ‘Own credit spread’, ‘Acquisitions, 
disposals & dilutions’, ‘UK customer redress programs’, ‘fines & penalties’, ‘UK pension credit’, 
‘Restructuring & other related costs’. 
5 Two banks do not provide any reconciliations during this period. 
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2.4       Results 
2.4.1    Differences between analysts’ EPS and I/B/E/S actual EPS  
Since I/B/E/S reports only one actual earnings figure based on the majority rule, and because 
it is often used to represent ‘street earnings’, I begin by using I/B/E/S EPS as a benchmark 
to investigate the consistency of analysts’ actual earnings figures. If actual earnings 
measurements are consistent across analysts and are well-represented by the I/B/E/S figures, 
I should find that the difference between analysts’ actual EPS and I/B/E/S reported number 
is insignificantly different from zero and that there is limited variation around the mean for 
analysts’ own EPS. Prior to presenting the results of the empirical analysis, I provide an 
example to illustrate the degree of variations in analysts’ non-GAAP actual earnings and 
how these figures differ from those reported by I/B/E/S. 
I select HSBC for this illustration – a bank which reports the use of non-GAAP 
measures and provides a reconciliation of non-GAAP financial measures for the 2012 and 
2011 fiscal year (HSBC, 2012, p.24-28). In 2012, HSBC reports GAAP EPS of $0.74, 20% 
lower than for the previous year ($0.92), while dividends per share increase from $0.39 in 
2011 to $0.41 in 2012 and the Tier 1 ratio improves from 11.5% to 13.4%. I/B/E/S reports 
non-GAAP EPS for HSBC in 2012 as $0.74, the same as the GAAP EPS in the HSBC annual 
report. This implies no significant adjustments were made by analysts. In contrast, using 
data from analysts’ reports on HSBC collected from within 30 days after the earnings 
announcement date, I find significant variation in analysts’ actual non-GAAP EPS. 
Table 2.2, Panel A reports individual analysts’ actual GAAP and non-GAAP EPS. 
Column (3) of Table 2.2 presents the various GAAP EPS measures, while column (4) shows 
non-GAAP EPS. Actual non-GAAP EPS ranges from $0.76 (UBS) to $1.94 (Deutsche 
Bank). This is important to note that the average of these figures deviate significantly from 
the I/B/E/S actual non-GAAP EPS. The average of these figures is $1.003, 35% higher than 
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the I/B/E/S figure of $0.74. Indeed, none of the non-GAAP EPS figures in the sample 
corresponds to the I/B/E/S figure. Even if I remove the Deutsche Bank observation as an 
outlier, the average actual non-GAAP EPS is still significantly higher than the I/B/E/S figure 
($0.88 versus $0.74, or 18.9% higher). In other words, analysts’ actual non-GAAP EPS 
differs significantly from I/B/E/S actual non-GAAP EPS, as well as from firm reported EPS. 
I do not observe such a pattern for GAAP EPS. Most of the analysts’ report a GAAP EPS 
very close to (or equal to) $0.74. 
To investigate the sources of the disagreement across analysts, I explore what 
adjustments create the disagreement in actual non-GAAP EPS figures. Table 2.2, Panel B 
presents the detailed reconciliation of GAAP net profits and non-GAAP adjusted net profits 
(pre- and after tax) based on data collected from analysts’ reports. Analysts’ major 
adjustments include fair value movements arising from changes in own credit spreads, 
acquisitions, disposals and dilutions, regulatory related charges (UK customer redress 
programs, US fines & penalties, UK pension credit), and restructuring costs. There are also 
smaller adjustments, such as non-qualifying hedges and gains/losses on sales of Ping An 
business in China and non-core investment in India. 
Insert Table 2.2 about here 
While analysts tend to agree highly on adjustments related to fair value movements 
arising from changes in own credit spreads, they disagree about regulatory-related charges 
and the gains/losses on sales of businesses. The outlier of Deutsche Bank can be explained 
by an abnormally high adjustment of extraordinary and other items. These figures show how 
it can be extremely difficult to apply one majority rule, as outlined by I/B/E/S, in this 
situation. There seems to be no clear majority view regarding which items to be adjusted, or 




2.4.2    Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2.3 present the summary statistics of the differences between the non-GAAP actual 
EPS obtained from analysts’ reports and those from I/B/E/S across the nine banks in the 
sample. I scale the differences between analysts’ EPS and I/B/E/S EPS by the stock price 
reported in analysts’ reports, which are the most recent stock prices available before analysts 
write their reports.  
Insert Table 2.3 about here 
Table 2.3 shows that the mean and median difference between non-GAAP actual 
EPS obtained from analysts’ reports and I/B/E/S actual EPS (DIFFACT_P) are significantly 
different from zero. The standard deviation of 0.099 also points to significant variations 
around the mean for most banks. Comparing with the case of GAAP EPS, the mean of 
DIFFACT_P in the non-GAAP EPS sample is 4 times higher (0.0458 compared to 0.0136) 
and the standard deviation is around twice as high (0.099 compared to 0.053). The median 
of DIFFACT_P for GAAP EPS is very close to zero, suggesting a high level of agreement 
between analysts. However, I still observe a significant level of disagreement (almost 2 
percent of stock price for non-GAAP EPS). In other words, there is considerable 
disagreement between analysts about past non-GAAP EPS, while there some limited 
disagreement for GAAP EPS. The average actual GAAP EPS obtained from analyst reports 
is much closer to the I/B/E/S actual GAAP EPS, while the average actual non-GAAP EPS 
obtained from analyst reports deviates significantly -and often - from I/B/E/S figures.  
 
2.4.3    Bank fixed effect regressions 
I complement the summary statistics of Table 2.3 with a regression analysis where I regress 
the differences between the actual EPS obtained from analysts’ reports and from I/B/E/S on 
bank fixed effects. If analysts consistently apply similar adjustments to actual non-GAAP 
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EPS across banks, I should find that most of the coefficients on bank dummy variables, 
including the constant term which captures the baseline bank, are insignificantly different 
from zero.  
Insert Table 2.4 about here 
Panel A of Table 2.4 reports the results from regressing analyst-I/B/E/S differences 
in non-GAAP actual EPS on bank fixed effects, while Panel B shows the results for GAAP 
actual EPS. Colum (1) reports the results scaled by stock prices, while column (2) presents 
results for differences deflated by the absolute value of I/B/E/S EPS. The coefficients for 
most banks in Table 2.4, Panel A are significantly different from zero, and the constant term 
is significantly positive in both columns. Barclays is (arbitrarily) chosen as the baseline bank 
in this analysis. The coefficients on KBC and the constant term are significantly positive, 
confirming that, on average, analysts tend to issue non-GAAP actual EPS figures higher 
than I/B/E/S figure for these banks. The other coefficients are all significantly negative, and 
most of them are significantly larger (in absolute terms) than the constant term, implying 
that on average, these banks tend to be associated with analysts’ non-GAAP actual EPS 
below the I/B/E/S figure. These statistics confirm the findings from Table 2.3 that analysts’ 
actual non-GAAP EPS measures deviate significantly from I/B/E/S non-GAAP actuals.  
In contrast to the (non-GAAP) results in Panel A of Table 2.4, Panel B (GAAP EPS) 
shows that most of the coefficients on bank fixed effects are insignificantly different from 
zero, including the constant term. The exceptions are Deutsche Bank, KBC and Royal Bank 
of Scotland (RBS). For RBS, the difference is significant at the 10 percent level, while the 
significance (and sign for KBC) depends on the scaling variable used. These statistics also 
confirm the findings from Table 2.3 that analysts are far more consistent when reporting the 
GAAP actual EPS, leading to fewer departures from I/B/E/S actual numbers. 
Overall, the results in Tables 2 - 4 indicate that the GAAP reporting regime leads to 
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much higher consistency between analysts in their measurement of actual GAAP EPS, 
illustrating the disciplining role of the audited GAAP regime. By contrast, the non-GAAP 
reporting regime allows more discretion for individual analysts, there is significant 
disagreement about banks’ past performance, and these figures are not easily reconcilable 
to GAAP figures in a large number of cases.   
 
2.4.4    Broker fixed effect regressions 
I next examine the extent to which broker fixed effects explain analyst-I/B/E/S differences 
in actual EPS. This analysis investigates the possibility that brokerage firms have certain 
preferences for particular non-GAAP adjustments. As a result, their non-GAAP actual EPS 
figures may deviate systematically from the I/B/E/S figures. I have no predictions for the 
direction or magnitude of specific coefficients in this analysis; the aim is to explore whether 
certain brokers deviate in a particular direction. 
Insert Table 2.5 about here 
Table 2.5, Panel A reports the results of regressions of analyst-I/B/E/S differences 
in non-GAAP actual EPS on brokerage firm fixed effects. In column 1, I report the results 
with the analyst- I/B/E/S difference in non-GAAP actual EPS scaled by stock price, while 
column (2) shows estimates deflated by absolute I/B/E/S non-GAAP actual EPS. I find 
significant deviations of many brokerage firms from the baseline brokerage firm (Barclays), 
implying that brokerage firms have different methods of adjusting non-GAAP EPS. 
Panel B of Table 2.5 reports the estimation results of regressing analyst-I/B/E/S 
difference in GAAP actual EPS on brokerage firm fixed effects. Although some brokerage 
firm fixed effects are different from zero, the number of coefficients statistically different 
from zero in Panel A is more than twice as high as the number in the Panel B (14 compared 
to 6 for the case of DIFFACT_P). 
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These findings again show that there is significantly more disagreement between 
analysts regarding non-GAAP actual EPS compared to GAAP figures, illustrating how the 
GAAP reporting regime allows less discretion for analysts in choosing the relevant earnings 
measures for valuation purposes. Even though GAAP EPS figures may be less useful for 
forecasting because they include more transitory items (Bentley et al., 2018; Black et al., 
2018; Gu and Chen, 2004; Young, 2014), the GAAP reporting regime seems better suited 
to fulfilling the confirmatory role of accounting information due to its consistency across 
preparers and across analysts. In the case of GAAP reports, there is a lower risk that the 
measurement basis of actual earnings will be ambiguous ex post, making it more suitable 
for forecast evaluation.   
 
2.4.5    Broker size effect  
Next, I explore whether broker size, a proxy for the resources analysts have access to 
(Clement, 1999; Bilinski et al., 2013), can explain part of the analyst-I/B/E/S difference in 
non-GAAP actual EPS. Clement (1999) argues that analysts employed by large brokerage 
firms may have better access to research facilities, administrative support, and managers’ 
private information. It is therefore possible that analysts with access to a larger pool of 
resources and expertise in accounting adjustments may choose to deviate from the majority 
in order to signal their private information. 
Insert Table 2.6 about here 
Table 2.6 Panel A reports the results of tests for variation in the level of analyst-
I/B/E/S differences in non-GAAP actual EPS across top brokers and non-top brokers. An 
analyst is deemed a top broker analyst if his/her employer is classified as such by the 
Financial Times. Using the analyst-I/B/E/S difference in non-GAAP actual EPS scaled by 
stock price (DIFFACT_P), I find that the mean of  DIFFACT_P is positive in the top broker 
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sample but negative in the smaller broker sample, and the difference is statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level. I find similar results when the analyst-I/B/E/S difference 
in non-GAAP actual EPS is scaled by absolute I/B/E/S non-GAAP actual EPS 
(DIFFACT_IBES). These findings suggest that, on average, analysts working for top brokers 
tend to exclude more income decreasing items, leading to non-GAAP actual EPS being 
higher than I/B/E/S actual EPS. This further confirms the findings regarding the lack of 
consistency across brokerage firms in non-GAAP EPS adjustments I find above. However, 
I do not find that large brokers make more adjustments.  
Panel B of Table 2.6 reports the test results for the analyst-I/B/E/S difference in 
GAAP actual EPS across top and non-top brokers. Interestingly, using the measure scaled 
by stock prices, I find that the level of analyst-I/B/E/S differences in GAAP actual EPS in 
the top broker sample is very similar to that in the non-top broker sample. When the 
differences is deflated by the absolute I/B/E/S GAAP actual EPS, there are some differences 
between top brokers and smaller brokers, nevertheless, these differences are statistically 
insignificant. There are, however, large outliers in the GAAP distribution. These findings 
suggest that the GAAP reporting regime limits analysts’ opportunities to make discretionary 
adjustments, regardless of whether the adjustments are for signalling skills or to cater to 
opportunistic incentives. 
Returning to my research questions, the findings point to non-GAAP actual EPS 
measures differing significantly across analysts and compared with I/B/E/S actuals; 
however, this variation is far less problematic for GAAP EPS, where the degree of 
consistency across analysts is much higher. 
 
2.4.6    Evaluating Forecast Properties using Non-GAAP and GAAP EPS 
Most prior studies evaluating the properties of analysts’ forecasts rely on I/B/E/S measures 
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for both forecasts and actual earnings (e.g. DeBondt and Thaler, 1990; Keane and Runkle, 
1998; Capstaff et al., 2001; Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; Basu and Markov, 2004; Abarbanell 
and Lehavy, 2007). An important implication of my findings that analysts’ own EPS often 
differ substantially from I/B/E/S actuals is that I/B/E/S data may not represent the measure 
of earnings used by analysts when they formed their forecasts. To address the RQ 3, I 
examine analysts’ own actual and forecast data to align the measure of earnings analysts 
were using when they issued their forecasts. This analysis requires collection of EPS 
forecasts from analysts’ reports at time t and actual earnings in a subsequent report by the 
same analyst at time t+1. 
Table 2.7 reports the results for forecast accuracy (Panel A) and bias (Panel B) for 
non-GAAP EPS forecasts. To prevent the results from being unduly influenced by outliers, 
I eliminate observations where the forecast error is more than 400%, 300%, 200% and 100% 
of the denominator of forecast error variables. This is because prior research on the 
properties of European analysts’ forecasts indicates that forecast properties are sensitive to 
different outlier treatments (Capstaff, et al., 2001). I report the full sample results, together 
with results where the sample is trimmed to eliminate outliers at different points in the 
distribution.6 
Insert Table 2.7 about here 
Panel A of Table 2.7 shows the forecast error for non-GAAP EPS calculated from 
analysts’ report data using two different measures of forecast error. This reflects the fact that 
in some instances, there are different measures of actual GAAP EPS for the same analyst 
for the same bank year. Analyst_minnonGAAPFE is based on the minimum forecast error 
for the different actual EPS measures, while Analyst_nonGAAPFE is based on the actual 
   
6 The number of observations is lower in this analysis because I require both a forecast and an actual value by 
the same analyst for the same bank-year and these are not always available in Investext.  
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EPS figure immediately after the earnings announcement date (i.e., the earliest available 
actual EPS figures). For comparison with the sample, I also report forecast errors based on 
I/B/E/S actual and forecast data (IBESnonGAAPFE). All data in Panel A are deflated by the 
absolute value of I/B/E/S actual EPS. 
In the full sample, I find that the mean forecast error based on analysts’ own actual 
EPS is larger than that obtained from I/B/E/S. However, there are large outliers in analysts’ 
data, particularly a maximum absolute forecast error for both Analyst_minnonGAAPFE and 
Analyst_nonGAAPFE of 36.667.7 Since the patterns in the trimmed samples are generally 
similar, I focus the discussion on the 100% trimmed sample. 
Both Analyst_minnonGAAPFE and Analyst_nonGAAPFE have lower means than 
IBESnonGAAPFE (0.172 and 0.193 compared to 0.263). The medians and standard 
deviations of Analyst_minnonGAAPFE and Analyst_nonGAAPFE are also larger for 
IBESnonGAAPFE (the medians are 1.5 to 1.8 times higher for I/B/E/S). Moreover, the 
differences are not attributable to outliers in either sample. These findings indicate that, when 
matched to analysts’ own actual EPS, the forecasts obtained from analysts’ reports are more 
accurate than those from I/B/E/S. In other words, based on the sample of European banks, 
using I/B/E/S data may lead to an underestimation of the precision of analysts’ non-GAAP 
forecasts. 
Panel B of Table 2.7 presents the forecast bias of non-GAAP EPS, which is the 
signed version of the forecast error in Panel A. Consistent with a wealth of prior literature, 
the results for the full sample show that analysts’ earnings forecasts are optimistically 
biased: all means and medians are negative, i.e. actual non-GAAP EPS is lower than analyst 
non-GAAP forecasts. The mean and median bias obtained from analysts’ reports 
   





(Analyst_nonGAAPbias_min and Analyst_nonGAAPbias) are significantly lower than 
I/B/E/S data (IBESnonGAAPbias) in the full sample. Nevertheless, similar to the case of 
forecast accuracy above, these statistics are affected by outliers: the minimum 
Analyst_nonGAAPbias_min and Analyst_nonGAAPbias is -36.667, over 8 times the 
minimum value of IBESnonGAAPbias (-4.204). 
Eliminating a small number of outliers reduces the bias of non-GAAP analyst 
forecasts calculated from analysts’ own data significantly. The mean of 
Analyst_nonGAAPbias_min changes dramatically, from -0.422 in the full sample to -0.057 
in the 100% trimming sample. I find a similar pattern for Analyst_nonGAAPbias. After 
eliminating the outliers, I still find that analyst optimism bias in non-GAAP EPS calculated 
from analysts’ own data remains higher than when it is based on I/B/E/S data. This finding 
is not affected by the treatment of outliers or by the use of share price as a deflator. 
Insert Table 2.8 about here 
Table 2.8, Panel A presents the GAAP EPS forecast accuracy measures calculated 
from analyst reports (Analyst_minGAAPFE and Analyst_GAAPFE) and I/B/E/S data 
(IBES_GAAPFE). I further compare GAAP forecasts from analyst reports and I/B/E/S 
forecasts with the actual GAAP EPS reported in banks’ annual reports (GAAPFE_AnaCom 
and GAAPFE_IBESCom). There are notable differences between the means of these 
variables in the full sample. Specifically, the means and standard deviations of 
IBES_GAAPFE and GAAPFE_IBESCom are significantly higher than the comparable 
figures calculated from analysts’ reports. However, the differences are influenced by the 
very large outliers of IBES_GAAPFE and GAAPFE_IBESCom (1080.70), which shows that 
the difference between forecast and actual EPS can be over one thousand times larger than 
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the denominator.8 When the outliers are eliminated, the distributions of these variables in 
the 100% trimming sample are very similar. However, the means and medians of 
IBES_GAAPFE and GAAPFE_IBESCom are marginally higher than the variables based on 
analysts’ own EPS figures. 
I find similar patterns in Panel B of Table 2.8, which shows the GAAP EPS forecast 
bias obtained from analyst report data and I/B/E/S data (Analyst_GAAPbias_min, 
Analyst_GAAPbias and IBES_GAAPbias respectively). I also calculate the bias of forecasts 
compared to GAAP EPS reported from company annual reports (GAAPbias_AnaCom and 
GAAPbias_IBESCom). Although forecasts based on I/B/E/S data are more optimistically 
biased in the full sample, the findings are again influenced by very negative outliers. When 
I remove these, the differences narrow, so that the distributions of all GAAP measures look 
very similar. 
Overall, the findings in Tables 7 and 8 indicate that non-GAAP forecast accuracy 
and bias measures calculated with analysts’ own actual EPS measures differ significantly 
from those obtained from the I/B/E/S dataset. These differences may affect the conclusions 
of studies using non-GAAP earnings forecasts from I/B/E/S to assess forecast accuracy. 
Specifically, the level of bank analyst forecast accuracy is higher than the I/B/E/S data 
indicates, although the level of bias is also higher based on analysts’ own actual earnings 
per share. 
In contrast to the findings for non-GAAP forecasts, however, the descriptive 
statistics on GAAP forecast accuracy and bias show no evidence of significant differences 
between measures calculated from the  hand collected data and those obtained from I/B/E/S 
– and with those reported by the respective bank itself.  
   
8 Such extreme negative values in analysts’ forecast errors using data from several commercial data providers 
are also documented by Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003), who refer to a significant ‘tail asymmetry’ in the 




2.4.7    Analyst forecast rationality tests: Non-GAAP and GAAP EPS 
After examining the univariate statistics on analyst forecast accuracy and biases, I then study 
whether analysts rationally forecast non-GAAP and GAAP earnings in a bivariate regression 
analysis. In the first tests, actual EPS (denoted A) is regressed on forecast EPS (denoted F) 
using data obtained from both analyst reports and from I/B/E/S (e.g. Holden and Peel, 1990; 
Keane and Runkle, 1990; 1998). 
        0 1 ,t t t h tA F  −= + +   (2.1) 
If forecasts are rational, and assuming analysts have a quadratic loss function,9 I 
expect α0 = 0 and α1 = 1 (i.e., E e t( ) = 0). Table 2.9 reports the results of these tests, where 
both At and Ft,t-h are deflated by the most recent stock price at the time of the forecast. Panel 
A reports the results for non-GAAP forecasts, while Panel B reports the estimates for GAAP 
forecasts. I follow Capstaff, Paudyal and Rees (2001) by reporting results for both the full 
sample and trimmed samples. 
Insert Table 2.9 about here 
The estimates of α0 using analysts’ own actual earnings figures are negative in the 
full sample, but only weakly different from zero in both the full sample and the trimmed 
samples. In contrast, the estimates for α0 based on I/B/E/S data are significant and positive 
in all non-GAAP EPS regressions. The coefficient for α1 is significantly below one in Panel 
A, Table 2.9, using both analysts’ own actual EPS and the I/B/E/S sample. Importantly, 
however, the estimates of α1 based on I/B/E/S data depart substantially from their 
hypothesised value of one, the closest being 0.531 where the distribution is trimmed at 100% 
of share price. Based on analysts’ own data, the estimates of α1 are around 0.90 regardless 
of outlier treatment. Overall, I reject the hypothesis that analysts’ forecasts of non-GAAP 
   
9 Prior research suggests this assumption should be made with caution (Basu and Markov, 2004; Clatworthy, 




EPS are rational using both sets of data. However, forecasts appear to be much closer to 
their hypothesized values when using analysts’ own EPS measures compared with those 
supplied by I/B/E/S. 
Panel B of Table 2.9 reports the estimates for model (2.1) for GAAP EPS forecasts. 
I reject the hypothesis that analysts’ GAAP EPS forecasts are rational using both sets of data: 
α0 is significantly different from zero and α1 is significantly different from one. However, 
with the exception of the full sample, where α1 is 0.446, the results for the two samples are 
very similar and α1 is much closer to 1 in all other regressions. This again shows that both 
I/B/E/S and analysts’ own data yield economically similar results regarding analyst 
unbiasedness in forecasting GAAP EPS. The estimates are also much closer to their 
hypothesised values for both data sets. 
 
2.4.8    Analyst over-reaction tests 
I complement the tests in Table 2.9 with tests of over or under reaction (De Bondt and 
Thaler, 1990; Capstaff, Paudyal and Rees, 2001), by regressing the actual change in earnings 
on the forecast change for both GAAP and non-GAAP forecasts: 
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Again, the null hypotheses are that g 0  = 0 and g 1  = 1. Capstaff, Paudyal and Rees 
(2001) interpret a positive g 0  as evidence of pessimistic bias, while a negative g 0  implies 
an optimistic bias. De Bondt and Thaler (1990) and Capstaff, Paudyal and Rees (2001) 
suggest that analysts overreact (underreact) when g 1  is smaller (larger) than 1 because the 
actual change in EPS is higher (lower) than the forecast change. 




Table 2.10, Panel A reports the estimates for equation (2.2) using non-GAAP 
forecasts and analysts’ own actual EPS compared with I/B/E/S. Consistent with prior 
research, the coefficient g 1 is significantly lower than one in Panel A, implying that analysts 
overreact to earnings information when forecasting non-GAAP earnings. However, for all 
regressions except where I trim at 100% of stock price, the extent of over-reaction is lower 
(and significant in two out of three cases) when using analysts’ own earnings measures.  
The estimates of g 0  in Panel A of Table 2.10 mainly differ from zero only for the 
I/B/E/S sample, suggesting that analysts are pessimistically biased when forecasting non-
GAAP EPS changes. This stands in contrast to prior research on (non-financial) European 
samples using I/B/E/S data, which reports a negative intercept (Capstaff et al., 2001). The 
evidence from Table 2.10, Panel B also leads to us rejecting the hypothesis that analysts can 
forecast GAAP EPS changes rationally: g 0  is generally significantly different from zero, 
and is negative for stricter outlier treatments. When outliers are trimmed at (at least) twice 
the level of share price, forecast changes are closest to (and sometimes statistically 
indistinguishable from) actual earnings changes. This suggests that the level of analyst 
overreaction is less pronounced for GAAP EPS forecasts. 
Overall, the findings from Tables 9 and 10 lead to us rejecting the argument that 
analysts can rationally forecast levels of and changes in GAAP and non-GAAP EPS. 
However, the estimated coefficients are typically closer to their hypothesized values when 
analysts’ own actual EPS data are used. Moreover, as shown in prior research, estimates are 
sensitive to the outlier trimming rules employed. 
 
2.4.9    The relation between analyst non-GAAP adjustments and future forecast errors 
In this section, using I/B/E/S non-GAAP actual EPS as a benchmark, I explore whether 
individual analysts’ adjustments to non-GAAP EPS measures are reflected in their forecast 
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accuracy. The level of analyst-I/B/E/S differences in past actual non-GAAP EPS may reflect 
two possible sets of information. First, it may reflect useful information conveyed by skilful 
analysts with private information about banks they cover who choose to exclude certain 
expenses which they consider transitory from past earnings. Second, analyst-I/B/E/S 
differences may reflect analysts’ strategic biases. As Gu and Chen (2004) note, when given 
full discretion over their measurement of earnings, analysts may strategically choose an 
actual earnings figure that closely matches their previous forecast. Some analysts may thus 
opportunistically exclude some items which are not necessarily transitory, from both non- 
GAAP EPS forecasts and actuals. In both ways, some analysts’ actual non-GAAP EPS may 
deviate significantly from the actual non-GAAP EPS based on the majority rule of I/B/E/S. 
If all analysts can see through these signals, they will discount the information 
appropriately into their current forecasts and thus there should be no relation between the 
analyst-I/B/E/S differences about past non-GAAP actual EPS and their future forecast 
errors. However, if some analysts fail to see through this information, there should be a 
relation between current analyst-I/B/E/S differences about past non-GAAP actual EPS and 
future forecast errors. 
Similar in spirit to Bradshaw, Richardson and Sloan (2001), who test whether 
analysts use information from accruals appropriately by regressing future forecast errors on 
accruals rank, I regress future non-GAAP EPS forecast errors on the current analyst-I/B/E/S 
differences in past non-GAAP actual EPS: 
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Table 2.11, Panel A reports the results of this test. Column (1) shows the OLS 
estimation of Eq. (2.3) without including fixed effects, column (2) controls for broker fixed 
effects, while column (3) includes both broker and bank fixed effects. The constant term in 
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column (1) reflects the average forecast error for the case of zero analyst-I/B/E/S differences 
regarding past non-GAAP actual EPS. The main interest lies in the coefficient for 
PREACT_DIFF, which is significantly negative. This implies that when analysts’ actual EPS 
at time t is higher than the consensus, their subsequent forecasts are more accurate. However, 
I am unable to determine whether the information contained in analyst-I/B/E/S differences 
about past non-GAAP actual EPS reflects analysts’ skill or optimistic bias. 
Insert Table 2.11 about here 
To substantiate the test above, I expect that the relation between analyst-I/B/E/S 
differences about past actual EPS only exists in the non-GAAP reporting regime, where 
analysts have discretion over adjustments they can make to the non-GAAP actuals. With the 
GAAP regime, analysts are disciplined by auditors and by adherence to agreed accounting 
standards. They are therefore unable to convey the skills or opportunistic biases via the 
analyst-I/B/E/S differences. Table 2.11, Panel B shows that the coefficient on the analyst-
I/B/E/S differences about past GAAP actual EPS (PREACT_DIFF) is insignificantly 
different from zero. 
Overall, the findings of the Table 2.11 suggest that analyst-I/B/E/S differences about 
past non-GAAP actual EPS contain useful information about either analysts’ skills or 
opportunistic biases and this information has not been appropriately incorporated into future 
forecasts. 
While it is difficult to evaluate whether the analyst-I/B/E/S differences about past 
non-GAAP actual EPS contain information about biases or not, it is possible to test whether 
the construct contains information about analyst skills. If some analysts possess superior 
skills in forecasting future earnings, and they signal the skills via their adjustments in non-
GAAP EPS, then they should perform better in forecasting future GAAP EPS. As I show in 
previous tests, the GAAP reporting regime tends to discipline analysts and prevent them 
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from strategically reporting their GAAP actual earnings figures. Furthermore, analysts’ 
strategic biases related to excluding items from GAAP figures are unlikely to be related to 
GAAP forecasts. Therefore, analysts with superior forecasting skill are likely to produce 
more accurate GAAP forecasts and choose to convey information about their skills through 
larger adjustment in the non-GAAP forecast and actual EPS. This reasoning points to 
analysts with larger analyst-I/B/E/S non-GAAP differences being associated with higher 
GAAP forecast accuracy.  
To test this prediction, I regress future GAAP forecast error on analyst-I/B/E/S 
differences about past non-GAAP actual EPS. According to the predictions, I expect the 
relationship between future GAAP forecast errors and analyst-I/B/E/S non-GAAP 
differences to be negative. Table 2.12 presents the results of this analysis. Consistent with 
the prediction, when I do not control for bank and broker fixed effects, the coefficient of 
PREACT_DIFF_NonGAAP is negative and significant at the 10 percent level. When I 
control for broker or bank fixed effects, the coefficient is still negative but not statistically 
significant. Overall, the findings of this test provide weak support for the argument that 
analyst-I/B/E/S differences about past non-GAAP actual EPS reflect analyst ability. 
 
2.4.10 The persistence of analyst-I/B/E/S differences in past actual non-GAAP EPS 
In this section, I examine the persistence of analyst-I/B/E/S differences in past actual non-
GAAP EPS. Laurion (2020) suggests that non-GAAP-reporting firms tend to repeat their 
restructuring activities and related accounting choices year-after-year, resulting in more 
persistent special-item expenses which are typically excluded from their non-GAAP 
earnings. If analysts tend to consistently exclude these special-item expenses, I expect that 
the analyst-I/B/E/S differences in past actual non-GAAP EPS to be persistent across years. 
To test this expectation, I regress analyst-I/B/E/S differences in actual non-GAAP EPS on 
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the past differences:   
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Table 2.13, Panel A presents the results for these tests. Column (1) shows the OLS 
estimation of Eq. (2.5) without controlling for any fixed effects, column (2) controls for 
broker fixed effects, while column (3) includes both broker and year fixed effects. The 
coefficient I am interested in is DIFFACT_Pt-1, which is positive and significant in all 
columns. This reflects my expectation about the persistence of analyst-I/B/E/S differences 
in past actual non-GAAP EPS and implies that analysts consistently exclude at least part of 
certain special-item expenses throughout the years. This finding does not indicate whether 
analysts’ decisions to exclude those items are driven by their skills or opportunistic biases. 
Nevertheless, if the special items tend to be persistent through time, these items are actually 
recurring by nature and questions the notion that these items are excluded because they are 
transitory (Black et al., 2018). Furthermore, the persistence of analyst-I/B/E/S differences 
in past actual non-GAAP EPS also implies that the persistence of these special items drives 
the persistent disagreement between analysts regarding whether companies should exclude 
these items from their core earnings. In other words, when companies disclose their non-
GAAP earnings, the additional disclosure does not necessarily resolve uncertainty regarding 
future performance because analysts and market participants may still disagree about 
whether certain recurring special items should be excluded. 
To complement these tests above, I examine the GAAP earnings forecasts sample. I 
expect that the persistence in analyst-I/B/E/S differences about past actual earnings only 
exists in the non-GAAP reporting regime due to the disciplining roles of auditors and GAAP 
standards. Since analysts are unable to convey the skills or opportunistic biases via the 
analyst-I/B/E/S differences about past GAAP actual EPS in the GAAP reporting regime, I 
expect there to be no persistence in analyst-I/B/E/S differences about past actual EPS. Table 
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2.13, Panel B shows that the coefficient of the main variable of interest, DIFFACT_Pt-1, is 
significant when no fixed effects are included, but becomes insignificant when control for 
fixed effects.  
Overall, the findings of Table 2.13 suggest that analyst-I/B/E/S differences about 
past non-GAAP actual EPS are persistent and are likely be driven by analysts consistently 
excluding special-item expenses – at least in part. However, this persistence test, similar to 
the previous test, cannot distinguish whether analysts’ decision to consistently exclude 
certain items from GAAP earnings signal their skills or behavioural biases. 
 
2.5 Conclusions 
One of the main roles of accounting information is to confirm prior expectations and to 
discipline and evaluate forecasts made by firms and information intermediaries. Knowledge 
of the properties of equity analysts’ forecasts is valuable to assess their usefulness in 
fundamental investment strategies and in the estimation of cost of equity. Prior conclusions 
in the literature on the levels of accuracy and bias inherent in analysts’ earnings forecasts 
are based on actual and forecast data from commercial data providers such as I/B/E/S, which 
report a single actual earnings figure for each firm year.  
Based on a sample of large European banks, which are economically important, 
complex and opaque institutions, this study shows that there is significant disagreement 
about what companies’ non-GAAP earnings were, as well as what they are expected to be. 
It is therefore difficult to condense the various earnings measurement bases used by analysts 
into one single ‘street’ earnings figure. Importantly, the results also show that the GAAP 
system does not permit analysts such discretion. 
My results indicate that analysts’ forecasts appear more accurate and more biased 
when using analysts’ own measurement bases, compared to when I/B/E/S actuals are used. 
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However, I am unable to ascertain whether analysts are using their preferred measure of 
actual EPS strategically ex post to justify earlier forecasts of a particular magnitude. My 
results are partly contingent on the treatment of outliers and there seem to be no systematic 
patterns across banks or brokers. These findings contribute to the literature on non-GAAP 
reporting by revealing that not only are there differences between analysts and managers 
over the definition of non-GAAP earnings (Bentley et al., 2018), there are also significant 
differences across analysts. This creates uncertainty about the extent to which forecasts have 
been met ex post and thus potentially undermines the disciplining role of accounting. 
However, the consistency across analysts (and managers) with respect to GAAP earnings 
definitions indicates that although they are more likely to contain transitory items (Young, 
2014; Black et al., 2018), GAAP earnings are less vulnerable to the measurement ambiguity 
across analysts. 
Although they are large and important institutions, the focus on the earnings of 
banks comes at the expense of generalizability to other sectors. Further research will be 
necessary to determine the extent of disagreement between analysts about the prior 
earnings of less complex companies. In addition, the sample of this study consists of both 
European banks and UK banks. Future research could further analyse the difference 
between UK and European banks given the difference in institutional environment. 
Estimation procedures that take account of correlated errors across analysts will also 
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Figures of Chapter 2 
















This figure presents the timeline to illustrate the data collection procedure using Barclays’ earnings 
announcement date of 23/02/2017 as an example. I obtain analysts’ reports issued 60 days before 
and 60 days after the earnings announcement date for each bank. I record information on the current 
fiscal year (FY1), the earnings announcement date, broker name, analyst(s) name(s), stock price, 
price target, recommendation, analyst report date, previous fiscal year (FY0), description of GAAP 
EPS and non-GAAP EPS, actual EPS reported for the previous fiscal year (FY0) and the year before 
previous fiscal year (FY-1), as well as forecast EPS reported for the current fiscal year (FY1) and 

























Previous Fiscal Year FY0 (2016) Previous Fiscal Year FY0 (2015) 
60 Days before the 
EAD 
60 Days after the 
EAD 
Data collected: 
2014 (FY-1) Actual EPS 
2015 (FY0) Actual EPS 
2016 (FY1) Forecast EPS 
2017 (FY2) Forecast EPS 
 
Data collected: 
2015 (FY-1) Actual EPS 
2016 (FY0) Actual EPS 
2017 (FY1) Forecast EPS 






Tables of Chapter 2 
Table 2.1 Reconciliations of GAAP and non-GAAP EPS in analysts’ reports 
 
This table reports the GAAP and non-GAAP reconciliations in analysts’ reports. Column (1) shows the results for pooled sample. Columns 2 and 3 show 
the results for the samples with and without detailed GAAP and non-GAAP reconciliations in banks’ annual reports, respectively. The pooled sample consists 
of 4 large UK banks and 5 European banks between 2010 and 2013. The sample without reconciliations in banks’ annual reports comprises Credit Agricole 
and BNP Paribas. The sample with detailed reconciliation in annual reports consist of the remaining 4 large UK banks and 3 European banks between 2010 
and 2013. Analysts’ reports are coded as ‘No reconciliation’ if no information on GAAP and non-GAAP reconciliations can be found in the reports. Analysts’ 
reports are coded as ‘Limited reconciliation’ if a partial reconciliation between GAAP and non-GAAP are disclosed in analysts’ reports. Analysts’ reports 
are coded as ‘Detailed reconciliation’ if comprehensive information on GAAP and non-GAAP reconciliations are disclosed in the reports. 
 
 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
 
Pooled sample 
 Sample with detailed reconciliation in 
annual reports 
 Sample without reconciliation in annual 
reports 
 




Number of analysts’ reports Percentage 
 





















10     12.82% 






Table 2.2 Illustrative example – HSBC  
 
This table provides the illustrative example for the case of GAAP and non-GAAP actual EPS 
variations. Panel A provides the variations of GAAP and non-GAAP actual EPS across analyst 
reports while panel B reports the detailed reconciliation information. 
 
  Panel A. GAAP and Non-GAAP EPS variations 
Broker Report date GAAP EPS Non-GAAP EPS 
UBS 4-Mar-13 0.74 0.76 
Deutsche Bank 5-Mar-13 0.75 1.94 
Morgan Stanley 5-Mar-13 0.75 0.9 
RBC Capital 4-Mar-13   
Societe Generale 5-Mar-13 0.75 0.9 
RBC Capital 5-Mar-13  0.89 
Edison 15-Mar-13 0.74  
Credit Suisse 25-Mar-13 0.73 1.06 
Macquarie 26-Mar-13 0.74 0.8 
Liberum 12-Apr-13 0.736 0.854 






  Table 2.2 (continued) 


































































UBS 4-Mar-13   -5215 9048 -2300 -1900 0 -900         20649 13454 
Deutsche Bank 5-Mar-13 35473     -969 -20911          21618 13593 
Morgan Stanley 5-Mar-13  24710 -5220 6690 -5240         20650 14030 
RBC Capital 4-Mar-13  24271 -5215 7024 -4259 -876   -300 -104     20649 14027 
Societe Generale 5-Mar-13 16404 24213 -5215 7024 -4200 -876   -296      20650 13454 
RBC Capital 5-Mar-13  23446 -5215 7849 -4259 -876   -296      20649 13454 
Edison 15-Mar-13  22623 -5215 9479 -2338   -876   -296  -553 314 -472 -96 20649 14027 
Credit Suisse 25-Mar-13 16679 23199 -5215 9479 -2338 -1921  -876  -335 -296    -472  21121 13454 
Macquarie 26-Mar-13 14647 22255        -1606 -296      20649 14027 
Liberum 12-Apr-13                 20649 13454 














This table reports the summary statistics of the differences between the Non-GAAP actual EPS 
obtained from analysts’ reports and those from I/B/E/S across the nine banks in the sample 
(DIFFACT_P). I scale the differences between analysts’ EPS and I/B/E/S EPS by the stock price 
reported in analysts’ reports. 
 
 
Variable N Mean Median Std P1 P99 
       
Non-GAAP       
DIFFACT_P 2019 0.0458 0.0170 0.0992 0.0000 0.4650 
       
GAAP       
DIFFACT_P 1840 0.0136 0.0016 0.0531 0.0000 0.1670 







































Table 2.4 Regression Results: Bank Fixed Effects 
 
This table reports the regression results of differences between analysts’ actual EPS and I/B/E/S 
actual EPS on bank fixed effects. Column (1) shows the results using stock price as a deflator, while 
column (2) shows results deflated by the absolute value of I/B/E/S actual EPS. Panel A presents the 
regression results for non-GAAP actual EPS differences. Panel B presents the regression results of 
GAAP actual EPS differences. All variable definitions are presented in Appendix A2.1. Robust t-
statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance levels (two-sided) at 10%, 5% 
and 1%, respectively. 
 
Panel A Non-GAAP EPS actual difference between analysts and I/B/E/S (bank fixed effect) 
 (1) (2) 
Variables DIFFACT_P DIFFACT_IBES 
   
BNP Paribas -0.0150*** -0.1870*** 
 (-5.15) (-6.29) 
Credit Agricole -0.0449*** -0.2850*** 
 (-5.68) (-4.87) 
Deutsche Bank -0.0452*** -0.3330*** 
 (-5.70) (-5.92) 
HSBC -0.0045* -0.0263 
 (-1.80) (-0.83) 
ING -0.0181*** -0.2590*** 
 (-5.78) (-6.07) 
KBC 0.1080*** 0.8030*** 
 (5.70) (11.25) 
Lloyds -0.0365*** -0.4920*** 
 (-6.53) (-11.56) 
RBS -0.0668*** -0.5500*** 
 (-10.39) (-10.57) 
Barclays 0.0093*** 0.1350*** 
 (4.07) (5.30) 
   
Observations 2,019 2,021 




  Table 2.4 (continued) 































 (1) (2) 
Variables DIFFACT_P DIFFACT_IBES 
   
BNP Paribas 0.0028 1.0250 
 (1.09) (1.46) 
Credit Agricole 0.0019 -0.1010 
 (0.80) (-1.13) 
Deutsche Bank   0.0054** 0.0942 
 (1.98) (0.98) 
HSBC 0.0006 -0.0391 
 (0.27) (-0.41) 
ING 0.0009 -0.0671 
 (0.33) (-0.74) 
KBC    0.0305*** -5.8050** 
 (4.35) (-2.56) 
Lloyds  -0.007 -0.1160 
 (-1.19) (-1.15) 
RBS   0.0128* -0.1800* 
 (1.87) (-1.84) 
Barclays 0.0005 0.1240 
 (0.21) (1.40) 
   
Observations 1,840 1,842 
R-squared 0.032 0.033 
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Table 2.5 Regression Results: Broker Fixed Effects 
 
This table reports the regression results of differences between analysts’ own actual EPS and I/B/E/S 
actual EPS on broker fixed effects. Column (1) shows results using stock price deflation, while 
column (2) shows results using the absolute value of I/B/E/S actual EPS as a denominator. Panel A 
presents the regression results of non-GAAP actual EPS difference between analysts and IBES. 
Panel B presents the results for GAAP actual EPS. All variable definitions are presented in Appendix 
A2.1. *, **, *** indicate significance levels (two-sided) of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 







ABN AMRO 0.0115 0.0798 
BNP Paribas 0.0116 0.0769 
Berenberg -0.0518*** -0.2650** 
Canaccord -0.0508 -0.5710 
Cheuvreux 0.0526*** 0.5540** 
Collins Stewart 0.0199** 0.2000** 
Commerzbank -0.0744 -0.3390 
Credit Suisse -0.0071 -0.0790 
Davy Research -0.0839*** -0.7570*** 
Deutsche Bank 0.0253** 0.2520*** 
EQUITA 0.0140 0.1110* 
ESN -0.0563*** -0.3560** 
Evolution -0.0012 -0.0968 
HSBC 0.0084 0.3140** 
ING 0.2060*** 0.8730*** 
Investec -0.0256 -0.2990* 
JP Morgan 0.0031 0.0129 
Jefferies 0.0081 0.0504 
KBC -0.0053 -0.2850 
Kepler 0.0041 0.0712 
Liberum 0.0242*** 0.2570*** 
Macquarie 0.0295** 0.2680*** 
MainFirst 0.0098 0.0797 
Mediobanca 0.1310*** 0.9790*** 
Morgan Stanley 0.0331*** 0.2110*** 
Natixis -0.0569** -0.3800*** 
Numis 0.0154 0.0982 
Petercam 0.0135 0.1030* 
RBC -0.0093 -0.0928 
RBS 0.0200 0.368** 
Santander 0.0207* 0.1450 
Societe Generale -0.0064 0.0455 
UBS 0.0050 0.0722 
Warburg 0.0299*** 0.2900*** 
Barclays -0.0135 -0.1030* 
   
Observations   2,019 2,019 
R-squared   0.090 0.097 
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  Table 2.5 (continued) 













































Variables DIFFACT_P DIFFACT_IBES 
 (3) (4) 
ABN AMRO  0.0096*   0.1530* 
BNP Paribas -0.0025 0.1130 
Berenberg -0.0032 -3.1510 
Canaccord 0.0084 0.2320 
Cheuvreux 0.0108** 0.0664 
Collins Stewart 0.0077 0.0176 
Credit Suisse -0.0007 -0.0282 
DBS -0.0035 -0.0548 
Deutsche Bank 0.0035    -2.5680** 
EQUITA -0.0019 -0.0372 
ESN 0.0063     0.1980** 
HSBC 0.0049 0.1730 
ING 0.0273***      0.5930*** 
Investec -0.0019 -0.0565 
JP Morgan -0.0006 -0.0034 
Jefferies -0.0033 -0.0871 
KBC -0.0024 -0.0366 
Kepler 0.0091**        0.2450*** 
Liberum -0.0042 -0.0631 
Macquarie 0.0018 -1.7100 
MainFirst 0.0002       0.6540** 
Mediobanca 0.0202**    0.2330* 
Morgan Stanley -0.0003 1.1140 
Natixis -0.0031 -0.0357 
Numis -0.0029 -0.0099 
Petercam -0.0041 -0.0590 
RBC -0.0056 -0.0746 
RBS 0.0059 0.0075 
Santander 0.0104 0.1160 
Societe Generale 0.0047 1.3700 
UBS -0.0027 -0.4290 
Warburg 0.0131***       0.1380*** 
Barclays 0.0038 0.0577 
   
Observations 1,840 1,842 
R-squared 0.008 0.017 
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Table 2.6 Descriptive statistics for actual EPS difference between analysts and I/B/E/S: Broker 
Size Effect 
 
This table reports broker effects on actual EPS differences between analysts and I/B/E/S. The actual 
EPS difference between analysts and IBES is scaled by stock price taken from analysts’ reports or 
the absolute value of I/B/E/S actual EPS. Panel A reports results for non-GAAP data. Panel B reports 
results for GAAP data. All variable definitions are presented in Appendix A2.1. *, **, *** indicate 
significance levels (two-sided) of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
Panel A Non-GAAP EPS actual difference between analysts and I/B/E/S (by broker 
characteristics) 
 






Top Broker  Top Broker  
     Yes     No   Total  Yes    No    Total  
N      791     1228    2019  791    1230     2021  
Mean 0.002 -0.013 -0.007 -0.0148*** 0.019 -0.066 -0.033 -0.0845*** 
S.d. 0.112 0.107 0.109  0.653 0.703 0.685  
Min -0.473 -0.559 -0.559  -2.798 -3.966 -3.966  
Max 1.576 1.212 1.576  3.344 3.151 3.344  
Median 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000  
 
 
Panel B GAAP EPS actual difference between analysts and I/B/E/S (by broker characteristics) 
 






Top Broker  Top Broker  
     Yes     No     Total      Yes     No    Total  
N      696     1144     1840       696    1146    1842  
Mean 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.0004 -0.679 -0.202 -0.382 0.4769 
S.d. 0.060 0.051 0.055  11.473 8.070 9.500  
Min -0.874 -0.852 -0.874  -130.333 -129.667 -130.333  
Max 0.779 1.176 1.176  71.000  107.667 107.667  




Table 2.7 Descriptive Statistics for Forecast Accuracy and Bias: Non-GAAP EPS 
 
Panel A Non-GAAP Forecast Accuracy 
 
Absolute value of Actual EPS Scaling 
 Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max Median 
Min FE matching Analyst_minnonGAAPFE 921 0.585 2.427 0.000 36.667 0.124 
Earliest matching Analyst_nonGAAPFE 921 0.661 2.456 0.000 36.667 0.150 
 IBESnonGAAPFE 2924 0.399 0.538 0.000 4.831 0.217 
 
Trimming 400% 
      
 Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max Median 
Min FE matching Analyst_minnonGAAPFE 897 0.274 0.456 0.000 3.571 0.119 
Earliest matching Analyst_nonGAAPFE 893 0.331 0.546 0.000 3.636 0.142 
 IBESnonGAAPFE 2922 0.396 0.527 0.000 3.934 0.217 
 
Trimming 300% 
      
 Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max Median 
Min FE matching Analyst_minnonGAAPFE 892 0.257 0.394 0.000 2.946 0.116 
Earliest matching Analyst_nonGAAPFE 883 0.297 0.445 0.000 2.969 0.140 
 IBESnonGAAPFE 2899 0.372 0.458 0.000 2.994 0.215 
 
Trimming 200% 
      
 Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max Median 
Min FE matching Analyst_minnonGAAPFE 882 0.232 0.320 0.000 1.932 0.115 
Earliest matching Analyst_nonGAAPFE 864 0.252 0.324 0.000 1.932 0.138 
 IBESnonGAAPFE 2856 0.341 0.378 0.000 1.992 0.207 
 
Trimming 100% 
      
 Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max Median 
Min FE matching Analyst_minnonGAAPFE 837 0.172 0.182 0.000 0.985 0.103 
Earliest matching Analyst_nonGAAPFE 820 0.193 0.198 0.000 0.987 0.121 
 IBESnonGAAPFE 2667 0.263 0.236 0.000 0.997 0.185 
Stock Price Scaling 
 Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max Median 
Min FE matching Analyst_minnonGAAPFE_sp 921 0.024 0.045 0.000 0.812 0.011 
Earliest matching Analyst_nonGAAPFE_sp 921 0.029 0.054 0.000 0.812 0.013 
 IBESnonGAAPFE_sp 2924 0.041 0.062 0.000 0.511 0.021 
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  Table 2.7 (continued) 
Panel B Non-GAAP Forecast Bias 
 
Absolute value of Actual EPS Scaling 
 Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max Median 
Min FE matching Analyst_nonGAAPbias_min 921 -0.422 2.399 -36.667 3.571 -0.048 
Earliest matching Analyst_nonGAAPbias 921 -0.510 2.492 -36.667 7.540 -0.069 
 IBESnonGAAPbias 2924 -0.075 0.665 -4.204 4.831 -0.010 
 
Trimming 400% 
      
 Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max Median 
Min FE matching Analyst_nonGAAPbias_min 897 -0.140 0.521 -3.440 3.571 -0.038 
Earliest matching Analyst_nonGAAPbias 893 -0.192 0.609 -3.469 3.636 -0.065 
 IBESnonGAAPbias 2922 -0.075 0.655 -3.789 3.934 -0.010 
 
Trimming 300% 
      
 Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max Median 
Min FE matching Analyst_nonGAAPbias_min 892 -0.130 0.461 -2.946 2.261 -0.038 
Earliest matching Analyst_nonGAAPbias 883 -0.173 0.506 -2.969 1.404 -0.058 
 IBESnonGAAPbias 2899 -0.059 0.587 -2.989 2.994 -0.009 
 
Trimming 200% 
      
 Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max Median 
Min FE matching Analyst_nonGAAPbias_min 882 -0.110 0.390 -1.932 1.404 -0.037 
Earliest matching Analyst_nonGAAPbias 864 -0.125 0.391 -1.932 1.404 -0.054 
 IBESnonGAAPbias 2856 -0.048 0.506 -1.992 1.979 -0.008 
 
Trimming 100% 
      
 Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max Median 
Min FE matching Analyst_nonGAAPbias_min 837 -0.057 0.267 -0.988 0.928 -0.026 
Earliest matching Analyst_nonGAAPbias 820 -0.073 0.267 -0.987 0.928 -0.041 
 IBESnonGAAPbias 2667 -0.038 0.351 -0.997 0.981 -0.005 
Stock Price Scaling 
 Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max Median 
Min FE matching Analyst_nonGAAPbias_min_sp 921 -0.012 0.050 -0.812 0.17 -0.004 
Earliest matching Analyst_nonGAAPbias_sp 921 -0.015 0.059 -0.812 0.332 -0.006 
 IBESnonGAAPbias_sp 2924   0.003 0.075 -0.511 0.492 -0.001 
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This table provides descriptive statistics for non-GAAP forecast accuracy and bias based on different 
measurements and matching methods. I first present the forecast accuracy and bias, scaled by the 
absolute value of actual EPS. I further report the forecast accuracy and bias scaled by stock price. 
Panel A presents non-GAAP forecast accuracy. Analyst_minnonGAAPFE identifies analysts’ own 
minimum non-GAAP forecast error. Analyst_nonGAAPFE identifies analysts’ own non-GAAP 
forecast error calculated using the earliest analysts’ unique actual after the earnings announcement 
date. IBESnonGAAPFE identifies non-GAAP forecast error calculated using I/B/E/S data for the 
same banks and forecast announcement periods. Panel B presents non-GAAP forecast bias. 
Analyst_nonGAAPbias_min identifies analysts’ unique non-GAAP bias using the same sample with 
the minimum non-GAAP forecast error. Analyst_nonGAAPbias identifies analysts’ unique non-
GAAP forecast bias calculated using the earliest analysts’ unique actual I can identify. 
IBESnonGAAPbias identifies non-GAAP forecast bias calculated using I/B/E/S data for the same 
banks and forecast announcement periods. All variable definitions are presented in Appendix A2.1. 
Samples are trimmed with alternative rules to exclude extreme forecasts changes. 
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Table 2.8 Descriptive Statistics for Forecast Accuracy and Bias: GAAP EPS 
 
Panel A GAAP Forecast Accuracy 
 
Absolute value of Actual EPS Scaling 
 Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max Median 
Min FE matching Analyst_minGAAPFE 843 2.452 9.274 0.000 148.000 0.284 
Earliest matching Analyst_GAAPFE 843 2.612 9.468 0.000 148.000 0.307 
 GAAPFE_AnaCom 1105 2.618 8.151 0.000 81.143 0.333 
 IBES_GAAPFE 1961 6.664 40.649 0.000 1080.700 0.405 
 GAAPFE_IBESCom 1961 3.730 26.211 0.000 1080.700 0.392 
 
Trimming 400% 
      
 Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max Median 
Min FE matching Analyst_minGAAPFE 741 0.631 0.875 0.000 4.000 0.226 
Earliest matching Analyst_GAAPFE 734 0.635 0.860 0.000 4.000 0.236 
 GAAPFE_AnaCom 957 0.716 0.951 0.000 4.000 0.248 
 IBES_GAAPFE 1653 0.726 0.922 0.000 3.954 0.284 
 GAAPFE_IBESCom 1654 0.727 0.948 0.000 3.993 0.274 
 
Trimming 300% 
      
 Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max Median 
Min FE matching Analyst_minGAAPFE 718 0.535 0.698 0.000 3.000 0.210 
Earliest matching Analyst_GAAPFE 714 0.551 0.706 0.000 3.000 0.226 
 GAAPFE_AnaCom 917 0.586 0.736 0.000 3.000 0.231 
 IBES_GAAPFE 1584 0.605 0.731 0.000 3.000 0.268 
 GAAPFE_IBESCom 1573 0.582 0.715 0.000 3.000 0.250 
 
Trimming 200% 
      
 Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max Median 
Min FE matching Analyst_minGAAPFE 681 0.425 0.522 0.000 2.000 0.191 
Earliest matching Analyst_GAAPFE 672 0.428 0.516 0.000 2.000 0.202 
 GAAPFE_AnaCom 853 0.443 0.530 0.000 2.000 0.196 
 IBES_GAAPFE 1466 0.454 0.516 0.000 2.000 0.236 
 GAAPFE_IBESCom 1468 0.446 0.515 0.000 2.000 0.220 
 
Trimming 100% 
      
 Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max Median 
Min FE matching Analyst_minGAAPFE 569 0.218 0.218 0.000 1.000 0.145 
Earliest matching Analyst_GAAPFE 563 0.227 0.225 0.000 1.000 0.152 
 GAAPFE_AnaCom 703 0.225 0.222 0.000 1.000 0.149 
 IBES_GAAPFE 1210 0.245 0.232 0.000 1.000 0.168 
 GAAPFE_IBESCom 1215 0.238 0.231 0.000 1.000 0.164 
Stock Price Scaling 
 Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max Median 
Min FE matching Analyst_minGAAPFE_sp 842 0.049 0.076 0.000 0.812 0.024 
Earliest matching Analyst_GAAPFE_sp 842 0.049 0.075 0.000 0.812 0.024 
 GAAPFE_AnaCom_sp 1103 0.051 0.073 0.000 0.804 0.026 
 IBES_GAAPFE_sp 1961 0.069 0.126 0.000 2.937 0.032 
 GAAPFE_IBESCom_sp 1961 0.070 0.128 0.000 2.937 0.031 
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  Table 2.8 (continued) 
Panel B GAAP Forecast Bias 
 
 Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max Median 
Min FE matching Analyst_GAAPbias_min 843 -2.329 9.306 -148.000 9.600 -0.242 
Earliest matching Analyst_GAAPbias 843 -2.482 9.503 -148.000 9.600 -0.261 
 GAAPbias_AnaCom 1105 -2.490 8.191 -81.143 5.333 -0.283 
 IBES_GAAPbias 1961 -5.949 40.760 -1080.700 127.000 -0.328 
 GAAPbias_IBESCom 1961 -3.592 26.230 -1080.700 8.185 -0.322 
 
Trimming 400% 
      
 Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max Median 
Min FE matching Analyst_GAAPbias_min 741 -0.533 0.938 -4.000 3.529 -0.178 
Earliest matching Analyst_GAAPbias 734 -0.539 0.924 -4.000 3.529 -0.188 
 GAAPbias_AnaCom 957 -0.579 1.040 -4.000 3.729 -0.188 
 IBES_GAAPbias 1653 -0.577 1.022 -3.954 3.714 -0.229 
 GAAPbias_IBESCom 1654 -0.587 1.041 -3.993 3.714 -0.211 
 
Trimming 300% 
      
 Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max Median 
Min FE matching Analyst_GAAPbias_min 718 -0.443 0.760 -3.000 2.000 -0.167 
Earliest matching Analyst_GAAPbias 714 -0.462 0.767 -3.000 2.000 -0.182 
 GAAPbias_AnaCom 917 -0.460 0.821 -3.000 2.429 -0.176 
 IBES_GAAPbias 1584 -0.477 0.820 -3.000 3.000 -0.215 
 GAAPbias_IBESCom 1573 -0.457 0.801 -3.000 2.875 -0.188 
 
Trimming 200% 
      
 Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max Median 
Min FE matching Analyst_GAAPbias_min 681 -0.328 0.588 -2.000 2.000 -0.139 
Earliest matching Analyst_GAAPbias 672 -0.334 0.582 -2.000 2.000 -0.148 
 GAAPbias_AnaCom 853 -0.338 0.602 -2.000 1.954 -0.149 
 IBES_GAAPbias 1466 -0.346 0.595 -2.000 2.000 -0.178 
 GAAPbias_IBESCom 1468 -0.331 0.595 -2.000 2.000 -0.158 
 
Trimming 100% 
      
 Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max Median 
Min FE matching Analyst_GAAPbias_min 569 -0.128 0.280 -1.000 0.955 -0.092 
Earliest matching Analyst_GAAPbias 563 -0.141 0.287 -1.000 0.955 -0.105 
 GAAPbias_AnaCom 703 -0.144 0.281 -1.000 0.956 -0.100 
 IBES_GAAPbias 1210 -0.153 0.300 -1.000 1.000 -0.115 
 GAAPbias_IBESCom 1215 -0.138 0.301 -1.000 0.999 -0.096 
Stock Price Scaling 
 Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max Median 
Min FE matching Analyst_GAAPbias_min_sp 842 -0.042 0.080 -0.812 0.449 -0.020 
Earliest matching Analyst_GAAPbias_sp 842 -0.042 0.079 -0.812 0.449 -0.021 
 GAAPbias_AnaCom_sp 1103 -0.043 0.077 -0.804 0.449 -0.022 
 IBES_GAAPbias_sp 1961 -0.062 0.130 -2.937 0.389 -0.027 
 GAAPbias_IBESCom_sp 1961 -0.063 0.131 -2.937 0.388 -0.026 
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This table provides descriptive statistics for GAAP forecast accuracy and bias based on different 
measurements and matching methods. I first present the forecast accuracy and bias, scaled by the 
absolute value of the actual. I further report the forecast accuracy and bias scaled by stock price. 
Panel A presents GAAP forecast accuracy. Analyst_minGAAPFE identifies analysts’ unique 
minimum GAAP forecast error. Analyst_GAAPFE identifies analysts’ unique GAAP forecast error 
calculated using the earliest analysts’ unique actual I can identify. GAAPFE_AnaCom identifies 
GAAP forecast error calculated using unique’ forecast and company reported actual EPS. 
IBES_GAAPFE identifies GAAP forecast error calculated using I/B/E/S data for the same banks and 
forecast announcement periods. GAAPFE_IBESCom identifies GAAP forecast error calculated using 
I/B/E/S forecast data and company reported actual EPS. Panel B presents GAAP forecast bias. 
Analyst_GAAPbias_min identifies analysts’ unique GAAP bias using the same sample with the 
minimum GAAP forecast error. Analyst_GAAPbias identifies analysts’ unique GAAP forecast bias 
calculated using the earliest analysts’ unique actual I can identify. GAAPbias_AnaCom identifies 
GAAP forecast bias calculated using unique’ forecast and company reported actual EPS. 
IBES_GAAPbias identifies GAAP forecast bias calculated using I/B/E/S data for the same banks and 
forecast announcement periods. GAAPbias_IBESCom identifies GAAP forecast error calculated 
using I/B/E/S forecast data and company reported actual EPS. All variable definitions are presented 
























Table 2.9 Tests of Forecast Rationality 
 
Panel A Non-GAAP EPS (Stock price scaling) 
 

















Analyst_own  -0.006* -1.87 0.896*** -3.44 48.79% 921 
651.8*** 530.37*** IBES  0.086*** 48.29 0.165*** -55.60 3.98% 2924 
Trimming 
400% 
Analyst_own -0.005 -1.51 0.903*** -3.20 49.94% 893 
621.6*** 533.39*** 
IBES 0.086*** 48.07 0.166*** -55.29 3.99% 2922 
Trimming 
300% 
Analyst_own -0.006* -1.85 0.920*** -2.63 51.23% 883 
600.9*** 514.19*** IBES 0.084*** 45.78 0.188*** -51.76 4.73% 2899 
Trimming 
200% 
Analyst_own -0.005 -1.45 0.927** -2.49 53.73% 864 
506.3*** 434.57*** IBES 0.078*** 40.02 0.255*** -44.02 7.34% 2856 
Trimming 
100% 
Analyst_own -0.001 -0.52 0.958** -2.55 80.26% 820 
314.8*** 283.44*** IBES 0.050*** 26.73 0.531*** -28.28 27.83% 2667 
 
Panel B GAAP EPS (Stock price scaling) 
 

















Analyst_own -0.039*** -12.23 0.930** -2.32 53.22% 842 
13.22*** 117.58*** IBES -0.020*** -6.68 0.446*** -24.86 17.01% 1961 
Trimming 
400% 
Analyst_own -0.036*** -10.49 0.979 -0.67 56.80% 733 
3.57* 1.02 
IBES -0.045*** -14.02 0.932** -2.38 38.81% 1653 
Trimming 
300% 
Analyst_own -0.036*** -10.92 1.019 0.61 60.07% 713 
3.67* 0.37 IBES -0.046*** -14.31 0.991 -0.33 42.42% 1584 
Trimming 
200% 
Analyst_own -0.035*** -10.18 1.034 1.06 60.91% 671 
3.32* 0.24 IBES -0.045*** -13.25 1.010 0.35 43.75% 1466 
Trimming 
100% 
Analyst_own -0.019*** -12.53 1.085*** 6.64 92.73% 562 
13.77*** 6.50** 





This table reports the results of regressions of actual EPS on analysts’ forecast EPS using different data sets. The equation is specified in Eq. (2.1). The Chow 
test is used to test whether the coefficients α0 and α1 are significantly different for split data sets (hand-collected data and I/B/E/S dataset). Panel A reports 
the regression results on non-GAAP forecast rationality using stock price scaling. Panel B reports the regression results on GAAP forecast rationality using 
stock price scaling. The non-GAAP data from analysts’ reports has in total 921 observations and I/B/E/S GAAP data has 2,924 observations without 
trimming. The GAAP data from analysts’ reports has in total 842 observations and I/B/E/S non-GAAP data has 1,961 observations without trimming. The 
samples are trimmed with alternative trimming rules to exclude extreme forecasts errors. The results are presented in different rows for different outlier 
trimming rules. All variable definitions are presented in Appendix A2.1. Specifically, t-statistics for coefficients α1 are based on the null hypothesis H0=1. 
















Table 2.10 Analysis of Bias and Overreaction 
 
Panel A Regression results for Non-GAAP forecast overreaction 
 























Analyst_own -0.001 -0.01 0.627*** -45.29 86.34% 918 
0.04 3.39* 
IBES 0.018 1.41 0.518*** -28.93 24.91% 2924 
Trimming 
400% 
Analyst_own 0.060 0.37 0.628*** -44.80 86.58% 890 
0.20 3.35* 
IBES 0.018 1.42 0.521*** -28.73 25.01% 2922 
Trimming 
300% 
Analyst_own 0.063 0.39 0.628*** -44.60 86.62% 880 
0.20 2.06 
IBES 0.022* 1.72 0.542*** -27.11 26.28% 2899 
Trimming 
200% 
Analyst_own 0.099 0.59 0.628*** -44.15 86.66% 861 
0.61 0.23 
IBES 0.025** 2.05 0.598*** -23.80 30.58% 2856 
Trimming 
100% 
Analyst_own 0.277* 1.65 0.629*** -44.76 87.63% 817 
6.90*** 4.85** 
IBES 0.028*** 2.96 0.780*** -15.77 54.12% 2667 
 
Panel B Regression results for GAAP forecast overreaction 
 























Analyst_own  0.15 0.79 0.340*** -73.87 63.47% 836 
1.92 669.5*** 
IBES  0.76*** 2.74 -0.140 -153.29 15.29% 1961 
Trimming 
400% 
Analyst_own  0.46** 2.17 0.345*** -69.81 65.13% 727 
0.00 140.76*** 
IBES  0.428 1.37 0.060*** -51.30 0.66% 1653 
Trimming 
300% 
Analyst_own  0.51** 2.32 0.345*** -68.95 65.20% 707 
5.28** 73.9*** 
IBES -0.413 -1.64 0.546*** -22.00 30.74% 1584 
Trimming 
200% 
Analyst_own -0.47*** -9.11 1.011* 1.85 97.59% 665 
1.69 12.87*** 
IBES -0.78*** -4.87 0.915*** -5.87 73.22% 1466 
Trimming 
100% 
Analyst_own -0.22*** -4.96 1.015*** 3.22 98.73% 557 
0.81 2.17 
IBES -0.31*** -4.58 0.999 -0.02 96.17% 1210 
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This table reports the regression results of actual changes in EPS on analysts’ forecast change in EPS. The equation is specified in Eq. (2.2). The Chow test is 
used to test whether the coefficients γ0 and γ1 are significantly different for split data sets (analyst report data and I/B/E/S dataset). Panel A reports the 
regression results for non-GAAP forecast overreaction. The non-GAAP data from analysts’ reports has in total 918 observations and I/B/E/S non-GAAP 
data has 2,924 observations without trimming. Panel B reports the regression results for GAAP forecasts. The GAAP data from analysts’ reports has in total 
836 observations and I/B/E/S GAAP data has in total 1,961 observations without trimming. The samples are trimmed with alternative trimming rules to exclude 
extreme forecasts errors. The results are presented in different rows using different outlier trimming rules. All variable definitions are presented in Appendix 






























Table 2.11 Forecast errors and actual EPS difference between analysts and I/B/E/S 
 
Panel A Non-GAAP forecast errors and actual EPS difference between analysts and IBES 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 


















Bank. FE N Y Y 
Brokers. FE N N Y 
Observations 918 918 918 
R-squared 0.057 0.0917 0.119 
 
Panel B GAAP forecast errors and actual EPS difference between analysts and IBES 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 












Constant   0.049***    
(18.48) 




Bank. FE N Y Y 
Brokers. FE N N Y 
Observations 836 836 836 
R-squared 0.0008 0.1117 0.1411 
 
 
This table reports the regression results of forecast accuracy on actual EPS difference between 
analysts and IBES for the previous fiscal year. The forecast accuracy is measured by the absolute 
value of difference between analysts’ actual EPS and forecast EPS, scaled by stock price taken from 
analysts’ reports. The actual EPS difference between analysts and IBES for the previous fiscal year 
is scaled by stock price taken from analysts’ reports as well. The equation is specified in Eq. (2.3). 
Panel A reports the regression results for non-GAAP data. Panel B reports the regression results for 
GAAP data. Column (1) shows the results without considering any fixed effects. Column (2) shows 
the results with bank fixed effects and column (3) shows the results with both bank and brokers fixed 
effects. All variable definitions are presented in Appendix A2.1. t-statistics are reported in 










Table 2.12 GAAP Forecast errors and actual Non-GAAP EPS difference between analysts 
and I/B/E/S 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 



















Bank. FE N Y Y 
Brokers. FE N N Y 
Observations 756 756 756 
R-squared 0.0458 0.1231 0.1532 
 
 
This table reports the regression results of GAAP forecast accuracy on non-GAAP actual EPS 
difference between analysts and IBES in the previous fiscal year. The forecast accuracy is measured 
by the absolute value of difference between analysts’ actual GAAP EPS and forecast GAAP EPS, 
scaled by stock price taken from analysts’ reports. The actual non-GAAP EPS difference between 
analysts and IBES for the previous fiscal year is scaled by stock price taken from analysts’ reports 
as well. Column (1) shows the results without considering any fixed effects. Column (2) shows the 
results with bank fixed effects and column (3) shows the results with both bank and brokers fixed 
effects. All variable definitions are presented in Appendix A2.1. Standard errors are clustered at the 
bank level. t-statistics are reported in parentheses *, **, *** indicate significance levels (two-sided) 



























Table 2.13 Persistence test of analyst-I/B/E/S differences in actual EPS 
 
Panel A Non-GAAP EPS difference between analysts and I/B/E/S 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 





   (10.47) 
 
0.132*** 
    (4.20) 
 
0.120*** 




     (-3.38) 
0.120*** 
      (6.51) 
Year. FE N N Y 
Brokers. FE N Y Y 
Observations 635 635 635 
R-squared 0.035 0.035 0.155 
 
Panel B GAAP EPS difference between analysts and I/B/E/S 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 










     0.015 







Year. FE N N Y 
Brokers. FE N Y Y 
Observations 586 586 586 
R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.037 
 
This table reports the regression results of actual EPS difference between analysts and IBES on the 
actual EPS difference for the previous fiscal year. The actual EPS difference between analysts and 
IBES is scaled by stock price taken from analysts’ reports. The equation is specified in Eq. (2.4). 
Panel A reports the regression results for non-GAAP data. Panel B reports the regression results for 
GAAP data. Column (1) shows the results without considering any fixed effects. Column (2) shows 
the results with brokers fixed effects and column (3) shows the results with both year and brokers 
fixed effects. All variable definitions are presented in Appendix A2.1. t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses *, **, *** indicate significance levels (two-sided) of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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 Appendices of Chapter 2 
 Appendix A2.1 Variable Definitions 
 
Variables Definition  Measurement 
DIFFACT_P 
Difference between analysts’ unique actual EPS and I/B/E/S actual EPS scaled by stock 







Difference between analysts’ unique actual EPS and I/B/E/S actual EPS scaled by the 








The analysts’ non-GAAP forecast error measured by the absolute value of the 
difference between analysts’ non-GAAP actual EPS and analysts’ non-GAAP forecast 
EPS over the unique non-GAAP actual EPS. The analysts’ non-GAAP actual EPS here 
is the actual non-GAAP EPS that minimizes the forecast error when analysts in the 








|    
Analyst_nonGAAPFE 
The analysts’ non-GAAP forecast error measured by the absolute value of the 
difference between analysts’ unique non-GAAP actual EPS and non-GAAP forecast 
EPS over the analysts’ non-GAAP actual EPS. The analysts’ non-GAAP actual EPS 
here refers to the actual non-GAAP EPS that analysts report just after the earnings 






𝐴𝑛𝑎 |    
IBESnongaapFE 
The I/B/E/S analysts’ non-GAAP forecast error measured by the absolute value of the 
difference between analysts’ non-GAAP actual EPS and non-GAAP forecast EPS over 







|    
Analyst_nonGAAPbias_min 
The analysts’ non-GAAP forecast bias measured by the difference between analysts’ 
non-GAAP actual EPS and non-GAAP forecast EPS over the absolute value of 
analysts’ non-GAAP actual EPS. The analysts’ non-GAAP actual EPS here refers to 
the actual non-GAAP EPS that minimizes the forecast error when analysts in the same 








The analysts’ non-GAAP forecast bias measured by the difference between analysts’ 
non-GAAP actual EPS and non-GAAP forecast EPS over the absolute value of 
analysts’ non-GAAP actual EPS. The analysts’ non-GAAP actual here refers to the 
actual non-GAAP EPS that analysts report just after the earnings announcement date 










The I/B/E/S analysts’ non-GAAP forecast bias measured by the difference between 
analysts’ non-GAAP actual EPS and non-GAAP forecast EPS over the absolute value 









The analysts’ GAAP forecast error measured by the absolute value of the difference 
between analysts’ GAAP actual EPS and analysts’ GAAP forecast EPS over the unique 
GAAP actual EPS. The analysts’ GAAP actual EPS here is the actual GAAP EPS that 
minimizes the forecast error when analysts in the same broker report multiple actual 








|    
Analyst_GAAPFE 
The analysts’ GAAP forecast error measured by the absolute value of the difference 
between analysts’ unique GAAP actual EPS and GAAP forecast EPS over the analysts’ 
GAAP actual EPS. The analysts’ GAAP actual EPS here refers to the actual GAAP 
EPS that analysts report just after the earnings announcement date of the bank. It is the 






𝐴𝑛𝑎 |    
GAAPFE_AnaCom 
The analysts’ GAAP forecast error measured by the absolute value of the difference 
between company reported GAAP actual EPS and analysts’ forecast GAAP EPS over 






𝑐𝑜𝑚 |    
IBES_GAAPFE 
The I/B/E/S analysts’ GAAP forecast error measured by the absolute value of the 
difference between analysts’ GAAP actual EPS and GAAP forecast EPS over the 







|    
GAAPFE_IBESCom 
The analysts’ GAAP forecast error measured by the absolute value of the difference 
between company reported GAAP actual EPS and analysts’ GAAP forecast from the 






𝐶𝑜𝑚 |    
Analyst_GAAPbias_min 
The analysts’ GAAP forecast bias measured by the difference between analysts’ GAAP 
actual EPS and GAAP forecast EPS over the absolute value of analysts’ GAAP actual 
EPS. The analysts’ GAAP actual EPS here refers to the actual GAAP EPS that 
minimizes the forecast error when analysts in the same broker report multiple actual 








The analysts’ GAAP forecast bias measured by the difference between analysts’ GAAP 
actual EPS and GAAP forecast EPS over the absolute value of analysts’ GAAP actual 
EPS. The analysts’ GAAP actual here refers to the actual GAAP EPS that analysts 
report just after the earnings announcement date of the bank. It is the earliest analysts’ 








The analysts’ GAAP forecast bias measured by the difference between company 
reported GAAP actual EPS and analysts’ GAAP forecast over the absolute value of 










The I/B/E/S analysts’ GAAP forecast bias measured by the difference between 
analysts’ GAAP actual EPS and GAAP forecast EPS over the absolute value of GAAP 










The analysts’ GAAP forecast bias measured by the difference between company 
reported GAAP actual EPS and analysts’ GAAP forecast from the I/B/E/S database 







AC Actual change measured by the difference between actual EPS for bank j year t and 





Forecast change measured by as the difference between analysts’ forecast EPS for bank 
j year t and actual EPS for bank j year t-1 over the absolute value of actual EPS for 




FE Analysts forecast error measured by the absolute value of difference between analysts’ 







Analysts forecast error measured by the absolute value of difference between analysts’ 







PREACT_DIFF Difference between analysts’ unique actual EPS and I/B/E/S actual EPS for year t-1, 






PREACT_DIFF_NonGAAP Difference between analysts’ unique actual non-GAAP EPS and I/B/E/S actual non-



























Assessing information content and post earnings announcement drift 










This study investigates the market reactions to various definitions of earnings surprises including 
GAAP earnings surprises, non-GAAP earnings surprises and GAAP earnings surprises with 
measurement error in both short-term and long-term in an international setting. I find that investors 
perceive non-GAAP earnings to be more informative than GAAP earnings at the earnings 
announcement date. However, previously identified GAAP earnings surprises with measurement 
error downwardly bias market responses to GAAP earnings. The error component (forecast 
exclusions) provides incremental useful information in addition to the information captured in 
GAAP forecasts. After correcting the measurement error, my analyses of PEAD reveals that 
investors may not utilise the information captured by GAAP earnings efficiently compared to that 



















  3.1       Introduction 
Sell-side analyst reported earnings tracked by the Institutional Brokers Estimate System 
(I/B/E/S) are often considered as archetypal non-GAAP earnings. These non-GAAP 
earnings are modified by excluding items from GAAP measures. Exclusion items may be 
non-recurring (i.e., transitory) items, such as restructuring costs, or recurring items such as 
stock-based compensation (Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002). Whether certain components of 
GAAP earnings are subject to exclusions is based on individual analyst’ judgements (Baik 
et al., 2009). Though non-GAAP earnings are arguably metrics of companies’ ‘core 
performance’ and hence more useful for predicting future performance (Lougee and 
Marquardt, 2004), critics allege that analysts’ self-interest and economic incentives underlie 
analysts’ selective treatment of excluding items (Lambert, 2004; Gullapalli, 2005). Given 
that non-GAAP earnings are not consistently defined, close attention is needed when 
interpreting forecast surprises and forecast errors are derived from non-GAAP earnings 
(Lambert, 2004). 
Earlier studies explored the relative informativeness of non-GAAP earnings 
compared to GAAP earnings in response to the substantial increase in analysts’ emphasis 
on non-GAAP earnings (Bentley et al., 2018). Evidence generally suggests that non-GAAP 
earnings are more strongly associated with short-term cumulative abnormal returns than 
GAAP earnings (Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Bradshaw et al., 
2018). However, because GAAP earnings forecasts have not been historically available on 
I/B/E/S, prior studies measure GAAP earnings surprises as the difference between actual 
GAAP earnings per share (EPS) and forecast non-GAAP EPS (e.g., Bradshaw, 2003; Berger, 
2005; Cohen, Hann and Ogneva, 2007). According to Bradshaw et al. (2018), this traditional 
way of identifying GAAP forecast error is subject to significant measurement error. This 
raises concerns about possible bias in prior conclusions that investors perceive non-GAAP 
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earnings to be more informative than GAAP earnings (Berger, 2005; Cohen, Hann and 
Ogneva, 2007). When correcting for this type of measurement error, Bradshaw et al. (2018) 
find that the GAAP forecast error measured with noise biases downward the market reaction 
to GAAP earnings, however, investors still show a greater response to non-GAAP earnings 
compared to GAAP earnings.  
The inference about the relative informativeness of non-GAAP and GAAP earnings 
forecasts using samples of U.S. firms cannot directly be generalised to other institutional 
settings. This is because analysts’ forecast and analysts’ disclosure of non-GAAP measures 
vary with the forecast environment and the accounting practice in each institutional 
environment (Capstaff et al., 2001, Marques, 2006), thus analysts’ forecast accuracy are 
affected by these factors. For example, analysts’ forecast accuracy can be affected by the 
quality of accounting disclosures (Baldwin, 1984). When comparing the financial disclosure 
effectiveness across the UK, the US and four European countries, Saudagaran and Biddle 
(1992) find that the UK exhibits the highest quality of disclosure. Therefore, in this chapter, 
I first explore the relative informativeness of non-GAAP and GAAP earnings using the 
corrected measurement of GAAP earnings surprises in European sample.  
In addition to short window market reactions to earnings surprises, studies also 
explore long-term post earnings announcement abnormal returns. Post earnings 
announcement drift (PEAD) refers to the tendency for stock prices to continue to drift in the 
direction of earnings surprises for the subsequent weeks after an earnings announcement 
and is one of the most robust market anomalies (Fama, 1998). According to Livnat and 
Mendenhall (2006), understanding which form of earnings surprises provides the greatest 
drift is crucial for examining market anomalies.  
Prior studies have examined the magnitude and patterns of PEAD using analysts’ 
non-GAAP forecast errors, time series models and Compustat earnings surprises (Doyle, 
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Lundholm and Soliman, 2003; Livnat and Mendenhall, 2006). Livnat and Mendenhall 
(2006) show that the drift is larger when using analysts’ non-GAAP forecast error compared 
to a time-series forecast error. Nevertheless, most results are based on U.S. samples. A study 
by Huang, Li and Wang (2015) provides insights on PEAD in the international setting. Using 
the 2005 mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) as an 
exogenous information shock, they find that PEAD, calculated using analysts’ non-GAAP 
earnings surprises, declines after the information shock.  
In this chapter, I correct the measurement error identified by Bradshaw et al. (2018) 
by using I/B/E/S analysts’ GAAP forecast and actual data. I then provide a comparison 
between non-GAAP based and GAAP based short term market reaction and long-term drift 
in an international setting. 
My analysis reveals that the previously identified GAAP earnings surprises tend to 
overestimate the magnitude of GAAP earnings surprises by 20% compared to the correctly 
measured GAAP earnings surprises. When I recalibrate the measurement in forecast error 
in prior studies of investors’ preference for GAAP and non-GAAP earnings, my findings 
suggest that investors still find non-GAAP earnings to be more informative than GAAP 
earnings at the earnings announcement date. Thus, this type of measurement error does not 
result in biased or incorrect inferences in assessing investors’ preference for non-GAAP 
earnings. However, further investigation of investors’ responses to different definitions of 
GAAP earnings surprises indicates that using previously defined GAAP earnings surprises 
results in an underestimation of investors’ attention to GAAP earnings. In summary, when 
more precisely measured, GAAP earnings are more influential than prior research 
concludes, but are still not as important as non-GAAP earnings. 
By decomposing GAAP earnings surprises with measurement error into two 
components—the corrected GAAP earnings surprise and the forecast exclusions (i.e., the 
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error part), I find that the forecast exclusions are positively associated with short-term 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR). This indicates that the error component provides 
incrementally useful information, in addition to the information found in GAAP forecasts. 
This result corroborates Whipple’s (2015) argument that exclusion items are informative 
and indicates that previously identified investor preference for non-GAAP earnings is partly 
explained by the measurement error component. 
I then turn to longer run reactions to earnings surprises. My investigation of post 
earnings announcement drift (PEAD) using different measures of earnings surprises reveals 
that the corrected GAAP-based PEAD is higher than the non-GAAP based PEAD. 
Specifically, the subsequent quarter return of a hedge portfolio based on GAAP earnings 
surprise is on average 25% higher than that based on non-GAAP earnings surprise, 
indicating that investors may not use the information contained in GAAP earnings as 
efficiently as non-GAAP earnings. This result supports Doyle, Lundholm and Soliman’s 
(2003) finding that markets price the information contained in exclusion items over a long 
period. 
In additional tests, I examine the effect of GAAP losses and the effect of exclusion 
items on the market reaction to different measures of earnings surprise. GAAP loss-making 
firms are associated with greater uncertainty (Konstantinidi and Pope, 2016), investors may 
demand for supplemental information from other sources (Healy and Palepu, 2001). 
However, analysts are more likely to inflate non-GAAP forecasts when firms report a GAAP 
loss, considering their incentives to curry favour with managers (McNichols and O`Brien, 
1997) and to attract investment banking business (Lin and McNichols, 1998). Leung and 
Veenman (2018) find that non-GAAP earnings are particularly informative about loss-
making firms and thus are highly valued by investors. They derive to the results by 
comparing firms which report both GAAP and non-GAAP earnings to those report only 
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GAAP loss. I directly compare market reactions to non-GAAP earnings for profit-making 
and loss-making firms. My findings suggest that market reactions to non-GAAP earnings at 
the earnings announcement date are significantly stronger for profit-making firms compared 
to loss-making firms. One possible explanation for this finding is that investors may perceive 
non-GAAP reporting to be more aggressive and opportunistic (Kolev, Marquardt, and 
McVay, 2008; Barth, Beaver, and Landsman, 2012) for GAAP loss firms.  
In subsample tests, I partition the sample into firms with positive, zero or negative 
exclusion items. I find that markets react most strongly to non-GAAP earnings when actual 
GAAP EPS is larger than actual non-GAAP EPS at the earnings announcement. Baik et al. 
(2009) argue that analysts have incentives to strategically exclude more income-decreasing 
items. My findings suggest that the market seems to consider this potentially opportunistic 
behaviour when reacting to the earnings surprises and value non-GAAP earnings more when 
analysts exclude income-increasing items. In terms of long-run (i.e., three months) stock 
returns, I find that investors misprice GAAP earnings on average, while my results are 
inconclusive with regards to non-GAAP based drift.  
My study contributes to the long line of literature on market reactions to analysts’ 
GAAP and non-GAAP forecasts in three ways. First, this chapter complements the study of 
Bradshaw et al. (2018) by examining the interested market reactions beyond US sample. I 
analyse an international sample consisting of firms from the UK and ten Eurozone countries. 
Because different institutional environments might affect analysts’ disclosure of non-GAAP 
financial measures (Marques, 2006) and investors’ response to non-GAAP earnings (Yi, 
2007), my study provides further evidence of market reactions to non-GAAP and GAAP 
earnings surprises in an international setting. Second, I adopt an adjusted measure of GAAP 
earnings surprises that overcomes limitations of the currently widely-used measure. Due to 
the lack of availability of GAAP forecast data before 2004, prior studies on the 
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informativeness of different earnings definitions and PEAD define GAAP earnings surprise 
as the difference between GAAP actuals and non-GAAP forecasts, which is now known to 
give rise to substantial measurement errors. This problem has been extensively identified as 
a major limitation that may potentially contaminate existing results (Lambert, 2004; Cohen 
et al., 2007). I overcome this by measuring GAAP earnings surprises as the difference 
between GAAP actuals and GAAP forecasts from I/B/E/S. Finally, my study provides 
insight into how the magnitude of post earnings announcement drift varies with GAAP and 
non-GAAP earnings surprises. Prior research focuses mainly on the time series Compustat- 
based drift and I/B/E/S-based non-GAAP drift using the US sample (Doyle, Lundholm, and 
Soliman, 2003; Livnat and Mendenhall, 2006), and there is little evidence on the GAAP 
based drift and post earnings announcement drift in an international setting. According to 
Huang, Li and Wang (2015), different institutional environment can affect PEAD in 
opposite directions, leading to an unclear portrait of PEAD in global studies. For example, 
countries with better financial reporting environments can facilitate the information 
processing and therefore lead to lower PEAD. My findings suggest that investors misprice 
GAAP earnings and market may not fully incorporate information contained in exclusion 
items at the earnings announcement date.  
Section 3.2 reviews the literature related to non-GAAP and GAAP reporting. Section 
3.3 develops the hypotheses on both short-term and long-term market reactions to non-
GAAP and GAAP earnings. Section 3.4 describes the sample and research design. Section 
3.5 provides the descriptive details and results of empirical tests, and section 3.6 concludes.  
 
3.2       Literature Review 
In response to the debate about the proliferation of ‘non-GAAP’ earnings metrics, the relative 
informativeness of non-GAAP and GAAP earnings has been widely explored. On the one 
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hand, discretion in non-GAAP earnings allows analysts to exclude certain items that are 
considered as ‘transitory’ and ‘less persistent’ from GAAP earnings. According to Barth et 
al. (2012), unlike managers who opportunistically inflate earnings by excluding expenses, 
analysts reportedly exclude extraordinary items to arrive at non-GAAP earnings that better 
depict firm performance. Thus, they may provide investors with more value relevant 
information.10 On the other hand, as non-GAAP earnings are typically unaudited and are 
subject to inconsistent treatment across firms and over time (Shane and Stock, 2006), critics 
of non-GAAP earnings and regulators are concerned that the selective information can be 
misleading to investors.11 In particular, managers may opportunistically report non-GAAP 
earnings for purposes including benchmark beating (Doyle, Lundholm, and Soliman 2003; 
Christensen, Drake, and Thornock, 2014), while analysts may exclude more income-
decreasing items to curry favour with managers. 
Prior studies generally find that non-GAAP earnings are more informative compared 
to GAAP earnings at the earnings announcement date (Bhattacharya et al. 2003). 
Importantly, however, due to the lack of availability of GAAP forecast data before 2004, 
the GAAP earnings forecasts surprise here, like other studies (Lougee and Marquardt, 2004; 
Black and Christensen, 2009), are calculated using the difference between GAAP actuals 
and non-GAAP forecasts. This measurement error problem has been identified as a major 
limitation that could contaminate existing results (Lambert, 2004; Cohen et al., 2007; Helflin 
   
10 Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) first compare GAAP and non-GAAP earnings in detail and find that street 
earnings become the primary determinants of stock prices. Using hand-collected manager reported pro forma 
earnings and I/B/E/S non-GAAP forecasts, Bhattacharya et al. (2003) further confirm that non-GAAP earnings 
are better than GAAP earnings in explaining the short-window cumulative return [-1, +1] around the earnings 
announcement.  
11  In response to concerns about the potential mis-usage of non-GAAP earnings, increasing regulatory 
requirements of non-GAAP reporting standards have been released. For example, section 401(b) of Sarbanes-
Oxley (SOX) (Regulation G), issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 2003, require 
managers to reconcile non-GAAP figures to the most directly comparable GAAP measure. In 2005, the 
Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) issued a set of recommendations for the non-GAAP 
earnings measures, suggesting firms should report these figures ‘in a way that is appropriate and useful for 
investors’ decision making’. 
75 
 
and Hsu, 2008).  
Bradshaw et al. (2018) first document that the ‘traditionally identified GAAP 
forecast error’ is subject to a 37% measurement error on average. The misalignment of 
forecast and actual EPS leads to misclassification of firms that attempt to exclude recurring 
items to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts, and the measurement error further biases previous 
evidence on firm characteristics associated with meet-or-beat behaviour (Bradshaw et al., 
2018). Regarding the informativeness of GAAP earnings using corrected measures of 
GAAP earnings surprises, their results indicate that whilst the measurement error 
downwardly biases the coefficient on traditional GAAP earnings surprises, investors still 
respond more to non-GAAP earnings. In addition, market reactions to non-GAAP earnings 
surprises are significantly larger when GAAP forecasts are available. Although this study 
represents a major step forward in the literature, conclusions are based on a U.S sample and 
short-window market reactions.   
The key difference between the previously identified GAAP earnings surprises 
(SUE_GAAP_Error) and the corrected GAAP earnings surprise (SUE_GAAP) can be shown 












                           (3.2) 




          (3.3) 
 
𝐴𝑗,𝑡
𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃 is firm j's actual GAAP earnings per share in period t. 𝐹𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃is analyst i’s 
forecast of firm j's period t GAAP earnings per share. 𝐹𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝑁𝑜𝑛−𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃 is analyst i’s forecast of 
firm j's period t non-GAAP earnings per share. 𝐹𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 is analyst i’s forecast of firm j's 
period t earnings per share for exclusion items. The equation shows that the difference 
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between the previously identified GAAP earnings surprises with measurement error 
(SUE_GAAP_Error) and the corrected GAAP earnings surprise (SUE_GAAP) is implicitly 
the forecast exclusions scaled by stock price (𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠). Proponents of non-GAAP 
earnings argue that excluding certain items, especially special items (one-time items such as 
litigation charge), can create a ‘core’ performance measure (Elliott et al., 2015) and hence a 
more informative earnings metric (Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; Brown and Sivakumar 2003; 
Heflin et al. 2015). These exclusion items are often related to non-cash items (Whipple, 
2015) and thus, are potentially less value relevant.12 In addition, unlike managers who 
opportunistically exclude expenses to increase and smooth earnings (Barth, Gow and 
Taylor, 2012), analysts are often less aggressive (Bentley et al., 2018) and they exclude 
items in consideration of the earnings predictive ability for firm future performance. Some 
skeptics of non-GAAP reporting, however, argue that analysts exclude more income-
decreasing items in accordance with their own incentives such as generating more 
investment banking business (Michaely and Womack, 1999) and currying favour with 
managers (Baik et al., 2009). By decomposing the exclusions into special items (one-off 
items) and other exclusions (recurring items such as amortization of goodwill and stock-
based compensation), Doyle et al. (2003) find that other exclusions are stongly predictive of 
negative future cash flows. They further explore whether the stock market can fully 
anticipate this relation and find that investors do not fully incorporate information contained 
in exclusion items at the earnings announcement date. Other studies also confirm that 
recurring items excluded are not easily justifiable (Black and Christensen, 2009) and can 
mislead investors (Landsman et al., 2007). Collectively, these studies suggest that there 
remains an important debate on the informativeness of forecast exclusions. Whether the 
   
12 Although this is not necessarily clear ex ante. For instance, see Callen and Segal (2004) for evidence that 
the accruals (i.e., non-cash) component of earnings is more important than the cash component. 
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market reaction to previously identified GAAP earnings surprises is partly explained by the 
forecast exclusions remains an open question. 
Most prior studies focus on short-term market reaction to earnings surprises, with 
fewer studies exploring post earnings announcement abnormal returns in long-term period. 
Post earnings announcement drift (PEAD), defined as the tendency for stock prices to 
continue to drift in the direction of earnings surprises for several weeks following an 
earnings announcement, has been identified as one of the most pervasive capital markets 
anomalies (Bernard and Thomas, 1990; Mendenhall, 2004). Ball and Brown (1968) evaluate 
the value of accounting and initially provide empirical evidence that earnings are positively 
correlated with abnormal stock return, indicating they are informative to investors. 
However, accounting incomes numbers cannot be transmitted in time and it takes months 
until the information is fully incorporated into stock prices. They replicate their seminal 
study in 2019 and find that although the reporting lag has shortened in most countries over 
the years, and the information environment has improved, this widely acknowledged market 
anomaly continues in contemporary stock markets around the world (Ball and Brown, 2019).  
Livnat & Mendenhall (2006) argue that understanding how different specifications 
of earnings surprises affect the magnitude and pattern of the drift is essential for 
understanding the nature of the anomaly. They compare the PEAD for different definitions 
of earnings surprise and find that the drift is consistently and significantly larger when using 
analyst forecast errors from I/B/E/S instead of times-series earnings surprises calculated 
using Compustat data. The analyst forecast error here, like other drift studies (Liang, 2003; 
Francis et al., 2007), is calculated using the difference between non-GAAP actual and 
forecast EPS from I/B/E/S. In addition to times-series earnings surprises and I/B/E/S non-
GAAP earnings surprises, Doyle, Lundholm and Soliman (2003) focus on the predictive 
value of expenses excluded from non-GAAP earnings. They find that a profitable one-year, 
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two-year and three-year hedge portfolio can be formed based on decile ranks of exclusion 
items. Specifically, a hedge portfolio taking a long position in firms in the lowest decile of 
total exclusions (i.e., non-GAAP is less than GAAP earnings) and a short position in firms 
in the highest decile of total exclusions (i.e., non-GAAP is more than GAAP earnings) earns 
on average 11.3% three-year hedge return. They conclude that the initial market reactions 
to exclusion items (the difference between non-GAAP and GAAP earnings) are far more 
complete. Nevertheless, the pattern and magnitude of PEAD for earnings surprise measured 
by GAAP earnings numbers remains an interesting question. As GAAP earnings are more 
regulated and they perform the disciplining role in forecast evaluation better, understanding 
GAAP based drift is crucial for understanding the nature of the PEAD.  
 
3.3       Hypotheses Development 
Non-GAAP earnings measures are generated when analysts adjust and exclude certain 
transitory items (such as gains and losses on disposals) from GAAP earnings when 
forecasting earnings. They can appear in the form of forecasts or earnings realisations. On 
one hand, because non-GAAP earnings are typically unaudited items and are subject to 
inconsistent treatment across firms and over time (Shane and Stock, 2006), critics allege that 
non-GAAP earnings are selective measures and can be misleading to investors (Weil, 2001). 
Thus, investors may perceive non-GAAP reporting to be more aggressive and opportunistic 
(Kolev, Marquardt, and McVay, 2008; Barth, Beaver, and Landsman, 2012). GAAP 
earnings, however, are under audited regime and may play a disciplining’ role of accounting. 
Analysts are less likely to strategically report their GAAP earnings figures, and these GAAP 
earnings can enhance the comparability of earnings metrics across firms and over time.  On 
the other hand, by their nature, non-GAAP earnings are meant to improve accounting 
measurement for assessing firm value (Bray, 2001), and by reducing noise in earnings 
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metrics by removing transitory or non-recurring items. They have long been found to be 
more persistent than GAAP earnings (Bhattacharya et al., 2003) and in some cases, more 
useful for valuation purposes (Brown and Sivakumar, 2003). In addition, research in 
decision making has widely documented the intentional cognitive effects on information 
processing (Tan et al., 2002). That is, individuals may consciously involve a stimulus in 
their judgement (Frederickson & Miller, 2004).  Due to intentional cognitive effects, 
investors, especially nonprofessional investors, may infer the importance of non-GAAP 
earnings information (Maines and McDaniel, 2000) given their prominence in earnings 
announcements (e.g. Plitch, 2002). Thus, investors are predicted to respond more to non-
GAAP earnings surprises around the earnings announcement date as they are more 
prominently featured in earnings announcements (Weil, 2001; Bhattacharya et al., 2003) 
and may depict a clearer picture of ‘core earnings’. To test this prediction, my first 
hypothesis, stated in the null form is:  
H3.1: There is no difference in the short-term market reaction to GAAP and non-
GAAP earnings surprises 
My second hypothesis focuses on exclusion items. In fact, the difference between 
the previously identified GAAP earnings surprises with measurement error 
(SUE_GAAP_Error) and the corrected GAAP earnings surprise (SUE_GAAP) is implicitly 
the forecast exclusions scaled by stock price. There has been considerable debate over the 
persistence of, and motivation for, exclusion items. On the one hand, analysts may be 
reluctant to communicate private information truthfully, especially negative news, due to 
their incentives to curry favour with managers (McNichols and O`Brien, 1977). In addition, 
because exclusion items are often transitory (i.e., less persistent), Gu and Chen (2004) find 
that there is no evidence showing the pricing differential between included items and 
exclusion items could lead to abnormal future returns. On the other hand, analysts also have 
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incentives to provide reliable and informative earnings measure as their performance is 
intimately entwined with the incentive of maximizing the value of their forecast to investors. 
Studies find evidence on analysts excluding certain items to increase their predictive abilities 
(Barth et al., 2012), and these exclusion items are informative (Whipple, 2015).  
Exclusion items can be useful to investors for three reasons. First, exclusion items 
provide a reconciliation between GAAP and non-GAAP earnings metrics, highlighting the 
less value-relevant components of earnings. This disaggregated earnings guidance is 
associated with a richer information environment (Lansford, Lev and Tucker, 2013) that 
enables investors to better evaluate firm performance. Second, when both GAAP and non-
GAAP earnings metrics are available, analysts are less likely to opportunistically adjust non-
GAAP earnings forecasts as the disaggregation constrains their ability to do so. As Merkley 
et al. (2013) state, this could enhance the credibility of the forecast measure. Third, research 
on decision making demonstrates that individuals make different judgements when 
additional information is provided (Hoffman and Patton, 1997). Regardless of the relevance 
to the decision, the presence of information about exclusion items can have unintentional 
effect on investors’ information processing. Frederickson and Miller (2004) find that 
nonprofessional investors assess a higher stock price when both GAAP and non-GAAP 
disclosures are available than when only GAAP disclosure is accessible. Thus, the forecasts 
of exclusion items may provide incrementally useful information over and above that 
contained in GAAP forecasts. To test this prediction, my second hypothesis, stated in the 
null form is:  
H3.2: Forecasts of exclusion items are not related to short-window cumulative 
abnormal returns. 
Hypothesis 3.1 and 3.2 focus on the short-term market reaction to different 
definitions of earnings surprises. Despite research showing that non-GAAP earnings 
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measures are widely used for valuation purposes, there are also reasons to expect that the 
opportunistic use and disclosure of such measures may impede their usefulness to stock 
market participants. Non-GAAP numbers are typically unaudited and transitory items that 
are not subject to consistent treatment across firms or over time (Shane and Stock, 2006; 
Baik et al., 2009). Though investors may not assimilate the GAAP earnings surprise signals 
at the date of the earnings announcement, they may eventually give more weight to the 
information implicit in these measures when making decision over longer periods following 
the announcement. I therefore examine the post earnings announcement drift for both GAAP 
and non-GAAP earnings surprises. The central difference between GAAP and non-GAAP 
earnings are exclusion items. According to Doyle, Lundholm and Soliman (2003), certain 
exclusion items are predictive of long-term future cash flows. Indeed, they recur and 
consume cash just as regularly as the non-GAAP earnings amounts themselves, which have 
long been claimed to reflect the ‘true performance’ of firms. For instance, stock-based 
compensation is a commonly excluded recurring item that can be used to explain the 
potential effect of exclusion items on firm value. The options granted to managers can help 
to reduce the moral hazard problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), aligning managers’ 
incentives with the interest of shareholders. Thus, stock-based compensation can positively 
affect firm value (Hanlon et al., 2003; Cordeiro, Veliyath & Romal, 2007). Alternatively, 
higher stock-based compensation may negatively affect firm performance as it can be 
viewed as an opportunity cost (Bodie and et al., 2003). Regardless of the positive or negative 
effect, this excluded item may still have power in forecasting firm future value. Stock market 
participants, however, may not fully and promptly incorporate this information. In addition, 
as shown in the previous chapter, analysts often provide limited explanations of how they 
arrive at their non-GAAP forecasts.  
Based on Bayesian decision theory research (e.g., DeGroot, 1970), investors may 
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place less weight on vague and uncertain information initially, leading to a more muted 
initial market reaction to the GAAP earnings surprise. Though, in the longer term, as the 
information environment is enriched and investors digest information from various sources, 
investors may place more weight on the more regulated GAAP earnings metrics, leading to 
a higher upward or downward drift in stock prices. Thus, my third hypothesis is stated as 
follows: 
H3.3: The magnitude of post earnings announcement drift associated with non-GAAP 
earnings surprises is not different from that associated with GAAP earnings surprises 
 
3.4       Data and Sample 
My sample covers EU firms for the sample period between Jan 2004 and December 2018. 
My sample starts in 2004 as I/B/E/S began tracking both GAAP earnings forecasts and 
GAAP earnings actual in 2003. To determine the sample, I first obtain Fiscal year 1 (FY1) 
non-GAAP forecast earnings per share (EPS) from the Detail History, Unadjusted I/B/E/S 
files from WRDS between 2004 and 2018. I then select the UK and 10 Eurozone countries 
with the greatest number of firm-year observations. Studies have mainly focused on the U.S. 
market (Bhattacharya et al. 2003; Livnat and Mendenhall, 2006) with less evidence on the 
investors’ responses to different measures of earnings surprises in an international setting.  
The unique institutional environment in the U.S. may limit the generalisation of 
previous findings to an international setting. For example, new non-GAAP earnings 
disclosure rules implemented by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 
2003 have led to a decline in non-GAAP disclosure and an increased focus on GAAP 
earnings (Heflin and Hsu, 2008). The implementation of regulation G has also lessened the 
opportunism in excluding expenses from GAAP earnings (Kolev et al., 2008) and improved 
the information quality of non-GAAP earnings disclosures in the U.S. (Yi, 2007). Thus, the 
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selection of a sample from European countries and the UK enable me to shed light on 
investors’ perceptions of non-GAAP and GAAP earnings figures in international markets.  
I obtain earnings announcement dates from the Detail History Actuals, Unadjusted 
I/B/E/S files. The median estimates of FY1 non-GAAP and GAAP EPS are obtained from 
Summary Statistics, Unadjusted IBES files. The FY0 actual values of non-GAAP and GAAP 
EPS, and stock price are from the Summary History Actuals, Pricing and Ancillary, 
Unadjusted I/B/E/S file. I use individual stock return index and market return index for each 
country from Thomson Reuters Datastream to compute daily stock returns and market index 
returns. Market capitalization and book value of shareholders’ equity are also obtained from 
Datastream.  
Next, I use I/B/E/S ticker and RIC code to match the I/B/E/S data to the data from 
Thomson Reuters Datastream. As RIC code identifies each quote of a company in a specific 
exchange and currency level, one I/B/E/S ticker could match to multiple RIC codes. In this 
case, I require the following three criteria to be satisfied to pick up the most favourable RIC 
code: 1) The main trading market is in the same country as the company is headquartered 
in; 2) The data availability date in Datastream is the earliest among duplicated I/B/E/S ticker; 
and 3) The trading volume is the highest for 2018. 13  I then compute all the required 
variables.  
For the dependent variables, the short window CAR is either the equally weighted 
(EW_CAR) or value-weighted (VW_CAR) cumulative abnormal return for the three-day 
window [-1, 1] centred on the earnings announcement date. The subsequent quarter CAR 
(EW_PEAD and VW_PEAD) is either the equally weighted or value-weighted cumulative 
abnormal return on a stock, cumulated from 2 trading days following the announcement to 
   
13 I find the same results using the average trading volume per year during the sample period 2004-2018. 
Criteria 1) and 2) can eliminate the majority of duplicated I/B/E/S tickers, though 74 firm RIC codes are picked 




64 trading days following the announcement (Hung, Li, & Wang, 2015). For the 
independent variables, earnings surprises (SUE) are calculated as the difference between 
actual EPS and analysts’ median forecast EPS, scaled by the stock price no more than 30 
days prior to the earnings announcement date. Specifically, I calculate measures of earnings 
surprise: 1) SUE_NonGAAP is defined as the difference between I/B/E/S actual non-GAAP 
EPS and I/B/E/S forecast non-GAAP EPS, scaled by the stock price no more than 30 days 
prior to the earnings announcement date; 2) SUE_GAAP is defined as the difference between 
I/B/E/S actual GAAP EPS and I/B/E/S forecast GAAP EPS, scaled by the stock price no 
more than 30 days prior to the earnings announcement date; 3) SUE_GAAP_Error is defined 
as the difference between I/B/E/S actual GAAP EPS and I/B/E/S forecast non-GAAP EPS, 
scaled by the stock price no more than 30 days prior to the earnings announcement date. 
This variable is designed to capture the previously identified GAAP earnings surprises with 
measurement error. 
In the analysis of post earnings announcement drift, earnings surprises are further 
ranked into 10 portfolios and scaled between 0 and 1. Consistent with Livnat et al. (2006), 
the decile rank is further subtracted by 0.5 for a zero median. Following Hung, Li, & Wang 
(2015) and Leung and Veenman (2018), I use firm size, market to book ratio and beta as 
control variables. These three controls are frequently labelled ‘risk factors’ and are 
documented determinants of stock returns (Leung and Veenman, 2018). Firm size (Size) is 
the natural logarithm of market capitalization in millions of Euros at the end of the fiscal 
year and market to book ratio (MTB) is the ratio of market capitalisation to book value of 
shareholders’ equity at the end of the fiscal year. The measure of the volatility of a stock 
(Beta) is the estimated coefficient on the market index return in a CAPM model regression 
for firm with daily returns in the 90 trading days before the earnings announcement date. 
Appendix A3.1 provides a detailed definition for these variables.  
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The sample consists of 20,059 firm-years observations (2,757 firms) with non-
missing data required for the equally weighted short-window CARs.14 For the non-missing 
data required for the equally weighted subsequent-quarter CARs, the sample consists of 
19,492 firm-years observations (2,738 firms).15 The final sample, as shown in Table 3.1, 
consists of 2,757 firms from 12 countries. The United Kingdom, France and Germany has 
the greatest number of firm-year observations, occupying nearly 62% of the whole sample. 
Portugal, Ireland and Austria have the smallest numbers of unique firms during the sample 
period. 
Insert Table 3.1 about here 
 
3.5       Results 
3.5.1    Descriptive Statistics and univariate analysis  
Table 3.2 presents the descriptive statistics of main variables. All continuous variables are 
winsorised at the top and bottom 1% of each distribution to minimize the influence of 
outliers. On average, non-GAAP earnings surprises (SUE_NonGAAP) is higher than the 
GAAP earnings surprises (SUE_GAAP), with the mean values of -1.2% and -3%, 
respectively.16 Both the mean and median value of SUE_GAAP_Error (-3.6% and -0.2%) 
are lower than those of SUE_GAAP (-3% and -0.1%, respectively), indicating that the 
previously identified GAAP forecast error with measurement error tends to overestimate the 
magnitude of GAAP earnings surprise. I employ two alternative measures of the dependent 
   
14 Due to missing data to calculate weights, the number of firm-years observations is 19,369 (2,702 firms) with 
non-missing data required for the value-weighted short-window CARs.  
15 The number of firm-years observations is 18,130 (2,684 firms) with non-missing data required for the value-
weighted subsequent-quarter CARs. 
16 Earnings surprises are calculated as signed value of the difference between actual EPS and forecast EPS. 
However, analysts forecast accuracy should be investigated by examining the absolute value of SUE_GAAP 
and SUE_NonGAAP. In further untabulated analyses, the mean values of the absolute value of SUE_GAAP 
and SUE_NonGAAP are 2.5% and 4.5% respectively. This is not surprising as GAAP forecasts include the 




variable, short window CAR [-1, +1], namely equally-weighted CAR (EW_CAR) and value-
weighted CAR (VW_CAR). Table 3.2 shows that EW_CAR and VW_CAR have a similar 
pattern, with the mean value of 0.8% and median value of 0.5%. The mean and median 
values of subsequent quarter CAR (EW_PEAD and VW_PEAD) are 3.6% and 3.3%, 
respectively.  
Insert Table 3.2 about here 
Table 3.3 reports the results of a country level short-window CAR and subsequent 
quarter CAR regression. The dependent variables are EW_CAR, EW_PEAD, VW_CAR and 
VW_PEAD, respectively for columns (1) to (4) of every country-year. The highest mean 
value of EW_CAR is 2.08% in Ireland, while the lowest value is -0.47% in Spain, both 
significant at 1% level. Similar inferences are drawn using VW_CAR. The mean values of 
EW_CAR and VW_CAR, however, are insignificant in Belgium, Finland, Greece and 
Netherlands. Columns (2) and (4) shows the post earnings announcement drift (PEAD) in 
all 12 countries. The highest subsequent quarter equally weighted CAR amounts to 6.05% 
in Italy, while the lowest is 1.39% in Spain. The mean value of VW_PEAD for each country 
varies between 1.6% and 5.77%, consistent with the country-level PEAD analysis of Hung, 
Li, & Wang (2015). 
Insert Table 3.3 about here 
3.5.2    The relative informativeness of Non-GAAP earnings and GAAP earnings 
In this section, using short-term market reaction to measure informativeness, I examine 
whether investors perceive non-GAAP earnings to be more informative compared to GAAP 
earnings. Three measures of earnings surprise are calculated: 1) non-GAAP earnings 
surprise (SUE_NonGAAP) is defined as the difference between I/B/E/S actual non-GAAP 
EPS and I/B/E/S forecast non-GAAP EPS, scaled by the stock price no more than 30 days 
prior to the earnings announcement date; 2) GAAP earnings surprise (SUE_GAAP) is 
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defined as the difference between I/B/E/S actual GAAP EPS and I/B/E/S forecast GAAP 
EPS, scaled by the stock price no more than 30 days prior to the earnings announcement 
date; and 3) GAAP earnings surprise with error (SUE_GAAP_Error) is defined as the 
difference between I/B/E/S actual GAAP EPS and I/B/E/S forecast non-GAAP EPS, scaled 
by the stock price no more than 30 days prior to the earnings announcement date. This is 
also considered as the previously identified GAAP earnings surprise with measurement error 
(Christensen, 2007; Cohen et al. 2007; Doyle et al., 2013). I then regress the three-day 
window cumulative abnormal return CAR [-1, 1] surrounding the earnings announcement 
separately on each defined earnings surprise. Specifically, I estimate the following models:  
𝐶𝐴𝑅[−1,+1] = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑈𝐸_𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦/𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀1     (3.4) 
𝐶𝐴𝑅[−1,+1] = 𝛼2 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑈𝐸_𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦/𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀2            (3.5) 
𝐶𝐴𝑅[−1,+1] = 𝛼3 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑈𝐸_𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦/𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀3           (3.6) 
where 𝐶𝐴𝑅[−1,+1]  can be either cumulative equally weighted abnormal return 
(EW_CAR) or cumulative value weighted abnormal return (VW_CAR) for the three-day 
window [-1,1] centred on the earnings announcement, Controls represents a vector of 
control variables comprising Size, MTB and Beta to capture the effect of firm characteristics 
on the CAR. Country and year fixed effects are also included in each of the three regression 
models.  
Table 3.4 presents the results of regressing short-window CAR on different measures 
of earnings surprises. Columns (1) and (2) present the results from estimating specifications 
(1) and (2) using 𝑆𝑈𝐸_𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃  and  𝑆𝑈𝐸_𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃 , respectively. After correcting the 
measurement error, the estimated coefficient of 𝑆𝑈𝐸_𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃 (0.067) is still much higher 
than the estimated coefficient of 𝑆𝑈𝐸_𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃 (0.036), indicating that investors respond more 
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to non-GAAP earnings than to GAAP earnings.17 These results are robust to using the 
alternative measure of CAR, VW_CAR as shown in Column (4) and (5) of Table 3.4. All 
coefficients of 𝑆𝑈𝐸_𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃  and  𝑆𝑈𝐸_𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃 are statistically significant at 1% level. 
This result rejects hypothesis 3.1 and reinforces the findings of Bradshaw et al. (2018). Even 
after correcting for imprecision in the measures of GAAP earnings surprises employed in 
previous research, the inferences of these studies remain: investors find non-GAAP earnings 
to be more informative than GAAP earnings.  
To further investigate whether the measurement error leads to difference inferences 
in the investors’ response to GAAP earnings, Column (2) and (3) compares the results from 
estimating specifications (2) and (3) using 𝑆𝑈𝐸_𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃  and  𝑆𝑈𝐸_𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃_𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 , 
respectively. The chow test is used to test whether the coefficients on 𝑆𝑈𝐸_𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃  and 
𝑆𝑈𝐸_𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃_𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 are significantly different. The estimated coefficient of 𝑆𝑈𝐸_𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃 of 
0.036 is slightly higher than the coefficient on SUE_GAAP_Error (0.033), indicating that 
the previously identified GAAP earnings surprises with measurement error bias downwards 
market response to GAAP earnings. The chow test further shows that they are not 
significantly different. Nevertheless, prior studies using the difference between actual 
GAAP EPS and forecast non-GAAP EPS to measure GAAP forecast error underestimate 
investors’ attention on GAAP earnings. Compared to the coefficient on 𝑆𝑈𝐸_𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃_𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 
(0.034) in column (5), the estimated response to GAAP earnings surprise (0.039) is also 
increased by 14.7% in column (6). Though the magnitude is small, this result provides 
suggestive evidence on the validity of prior concerns on the measurement error (Heflin and 
Hsu, 2008; Doyle et al., 2013).  
Insert Table 3.4 about here 
   
17 In untabulated analysis, the chow test is used to test whether the coefficients on SUE_NonGAAP and 
SUE_GAAP are significantly different. The chow test statistics is 23.48, and it is significant at 1% level. 
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To further examine whether the market responds to the measurement error 
component, I take the difference between the previously identified GAAP earnings surprises 
with measurement error (SUE_GAAP_Error) and the corrected GAAP earnings surprise 
(SUE_GAAP), which captures the forecast exclusions, scaled by stock price, and estimate 
the following regression: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅[−1,+1] = 𝛼4 + 𝛽41𝑆𝑈𝐸_𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃 + 𝛽42𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓
𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 
+𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦/𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀4                     (3.7) 
The forecast exclusions 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠  is the difference between forecast GAAP 
EPS and forecast non-GAAP EPS.18 Table 3.5 presents the regression result of the short-
window CAR on corrected GAAP earnings surprises and forecast exclusions. Column (1) 
and (2) of Table 3.5 present the results from estimating specification (3.7) where the 
dependent variables are EW_CAR and VW_CAR. The coefficient on 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 is 1.6% 
in column (1), statistically significant at 1% level, and it is 1.1% in column (2) at 10% 
significance level. These results are inconsistent with hypothesis 3.2 and indicate that the 
measurement error component (forecast exclusions) provides incrementally useful 
information in addition to the information found in GAAP forecasts. The forecast exclusions 
are positively associated with the short-window CAR, indicating that investors react 
positively when the forecast GAAP EPS is higher than the forecast non-GAAP EPS.  
Although the exclusion items are typically claimed to be transitory and less persistent 
(Gu and Chen, 2004), my results corroborate Whipple’s (2015) argument that the exclusion 
items are informative. Merkley et al. (2013) and Lansford, Lev, and Tucker (2013) provide 
a possible explanation, namely that the disaggregated forecasts result in an enriched 
information environment and more credible analysts forecast, which in turn improves 
investors’ understanding of the firm. Even though correcting the measurement error of 
   
18 The forecast exclusions construct (𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠) is shown in equation (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3) 
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GAAP earnings surprise does not result in a different inference on the informativeness of 
non-GAAP earnings, the results in Table 3.5 show that previously identified investors’ 
preference for non-GAAP earnings is at least partly explained by the measurement error 
(i.e., forecast exclusions). 
Insert Table 3.5 about here 
 
3.5.3    Post earnings announcement drift using different definitions of earnings surprises 
Although investors may not assimilate GAAP earnings surprise signals immediately around 
the date of the earnings announcement, they may assign more weight to them over longer 
periods following the announcement, resulting in a stock return drift in the direction of 
earnings surprises. Therefore, to examine the association between long-term cumulative 
abnormal return and different definitions of earnings surprises, I estimate the following 
regression: models 
𝐶𝐴𝑅[+2,+64] = 𝛼5 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑈𝐸_𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃_𝑠𝑡𝑑 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦/ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀5                     
(3.8) 
 𝐶𝐴𝑅[+2,+64] = 𝛼6 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑈𝐸_𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃_𝑠𝑡𝑑 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦/𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀6  
(3.9) 
Where 𝐶𝐴𝑅[+2,+64]  is either cumulative equally weighted abnormal return 
(EW_CAR) or cumulative value weighted abnormal return (VW_CAR), cumulated from 2 
trading days following the announcement to 64 trading days following the announcement. 
Controls represents a vector of control variables comprising Size, MTB and Beta to capture 
the effects of firm characteristics on the CAR. Country and year fixed effects are also 
included in the regression. To reduce the effect of outliers, following previous post earnings 
announcement drift studies (Bernard and Thomas; 1989, Doyle, Lundholm, and Soliman; 
2003 and Narayanamoorthy, 2003), I classify firms into 10 portfolios based on calculated 
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earnings surprise. I subtract 0.5 from the respective SUE decile rank for a zero median. 
Thus, the coefficient on each independent variable in Equation (5) and (6) can be interpreted 
as the cumulative abnormal return to a hedge portfolio that takes a long position in the most 
positive earnings surprise decile rank and a short position in the most negative earnings 
surprise decile rank.  
Table 3.6 presents the regression results of subsequent quarter CAR following the 
earnings announcement date on standardised earnings surprises. The coefficients on 
standardised Non-GAAP earnings surprises (SUE_NonGAAP_std) are only 1.6% and 1.7% 
in columns (1) and (3), lower than the coefficients on standardised GAAP earnings surprises 
(SUE_GAAP_std) (2.0% and 1.9% respectively in column (2) and (4).19 The coefficients are 
all significant at 1% level, indicating that both current non-GAAP and GAAP earnings 
surprises are positively associated with subsequent quarter CAR. Nevertheless, the non-
GAAP drift is lower than the GAAP drift.  
While prior research focuses mainly on the time series Compustat-based drift and 
I/B/E/S-based non-GAAP drift (e.g. Doyle, Lundholm, and Soliman, 2003; Livnat and 
Mendenhall, 2006), using the corrected measure of GAAP earnings surprises, my results 
reject hypothesis 3.3 and indicates the superiority of the GAAP based earnings surprise 
relative to the non-GAAP earnings surprise in understanding the drift. As GAAP earnings 
contain exclusion items, this result provides additional evidence to support Doyle, 
Lundholm and Soliman’s (2003) finding that market delayed responding to information 
implicit in exclusion items.  
Insert Table 3.6 about here 
   
19 In untabulated analysis, the chow test is used to test whether the coefficients on SUE_NonGAAP_std and 
SUE_GAAP_std are significantly different. The chow test statistics for column (1) and (2) is 3.25, and it is 
significant at 10% level. The chow test statistics for column (3) and (4) is 1.03, and it is insignificant. 
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3.5.4    The effect of GAAP loss on market reactions to different earnings surprise measures 
Using more precisely measured GAAP earnings surprises, I further assess the relative 
informativeness and PEAD of GAAP and non-GAAP earnings in a unique setting where 
firms report negative actual GAAP EPS. This is to assess the possibility that investors 
perceive non-GAAP earnings to be particularly opportunistic and react less to the 
corresponding earnings surprises when firms report a GAAP loss. Because analysts are more 
likely to inflate non-GAAP forecasts for loss-making firms considering their incentives to 
curry favour with managers (McNichols and O`Brien, 1997) to attract investment banking 
business (Lin and McNichols, 1998). The whole sample is split into two groups— profit 
firms with positive or zero I/B/E/S actual GAAP EPS and loss firms with negative I/B/E/S 
actual GAAP EPS. I further estimate models (1), (2), (5) and (6) respectively for profit and 
loss firms. 
The two-way sort of decile rank on earnings surprises and profit/loss firms can be 
sensitive to different orders of sorting. Specifically, independent sorting means ranking on 
earnings surprises prior to differentiate profit and loss firms, while conditional sorting refers 
to ranking firms into 10 portfolios within each group of profit firms and loss firms. To see 
whether the sample distribution differs for the above two sorting methods, Table 3.7 presents 
the number of firm-year observations by portfolio ranks and profit/loss firms. The results 
show that the sample is not homogeneously distributed between portfolios 1 and 10. In 
particular, for loss firms, most observations are concentrated on portfolios 1 and 2 for both 
portfolios ranked by SUE_NonGAAP (35% and 16%) and portfolios ranked by SUE_GAAP 
(39% and 19%). This indicates that analysts may be more optimistic for loss firms, resulting 
in relatively large negative earnings surprises. Alternatively, as loss firms are usually 
associated with higher uncertainty compared to profit firms (e.g. Konstantinidi and Pope, 
2016), analysts may find it more difficult to forecast future performance of loss firms. Thus, 
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the distribution between portfolio 1 to 10 for loss firms are less even and mainly focused on 
portfolios 1, 2 and 10.  
Insert Table 3.7 about here 
Table 3.8 presents different market reactions to GAAP and non-GAAP earnings 
surprises for profit and loss firms. The earnings response coefficients (ERCs) on 
SUE_NonGAAP in columns (1) and (2) of Panel A are 18.2% and 2.7% respectively, 
indicating the market reaction to non-GAAP earnings is much stronger for profit-firms than 
loss firms. Similarly, the ERCs on SUE_GAAP is lower for loss firms (2.1%) in column (4) 
compared to profit firms (7.9%) in column (3). The same inferences can be drawn using 
vw_car. Leung and Veenman (2018) compare the market reactions to non-GAAP earnings 
and GAAP earnings only for loss firms, especially when firms convert a GAAP loss into a 
non-GAAP profit by excluding recurring expenses. My results directly compare the relative 
informativeness of non-GAAP and GAAP earnings for both profit and loss firms.  
In contrast to the argument that investors value non-GAAP earnings more for 
incremental information when firms report a GAAP loss (Leung and Veenman, 2018), my 
findings show that the ERCs on non-GAAP earnings (2.7%) do not differ substantially from 
ERCs on GAAP earnings (2.1%) for loss firms. This could be a result of investors’ 
perceptions and reactions to potential aggressive and opportunistic non-GAAP reporting 
(Kolev, Marquardt, and McVay, 2008; Barth, Beaver, and Landsman, 2012).20  
The results of Panel B and Panel C show that non-GAAP based drift does not exist 
for loss firms as the coefficients on SUE_NonGAAP_std in column (2) and (6) are 
statistically insignificant, regardless of independent sorting or conditional sorting. However, 
there are inconclusive results with regards to GAAP based drift. While the coefficients on 
   
20 Leung and Veenman (2018) compare firms which report both GAAP loss and non-GAAP earnings figures 
to those reporting only a GAAP loss. I directly compare market reactions to non-GAAP earnings surprises for 
profit-making and loss-making firms. 
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SUE_GAAP_std are significantly negative in column (4) and (8) of Panel B using 
independent sorting, this does not stand using conditional sorting in Panel C.  
Insert Table 3.8 about here 
3.5.5    The effect of exclusion items on reactions to different measures of earnings surprise 
In this section, I examine the effect of exclusion items on market reactions to GAAP and 
non-GAAP earnings surprises. As analysts may have incentives to inflate non-GAAP 
earnings by excluding income-decreasing items (Baik et al., 2009), whether markets are 
misled by potential analysts’ opportunistic non-GAAP adjustments become an important 
question and a concern of regulators. Thus, I investigate whether market reacts differently 
to two measures of earnings surprises for different exclusion items in both short-term and 
long-term. Specifically, I sort and categorise the whole sample into three groups based on 
the sign of exclusion items.  Exclusion items here are defined as the difference between 
I/B/E/S reported actual GAAP EPS and I/B/E/S reported actual non-GAAP EPS.21 Thus, 
positive exclusion items would indicate an actual GAAP EPS higher than the actual non-
GAAP EPS, while negative exclusion items represent excluded expenses in the definition 
of non-GAAP earnings. I then estimate equation (3.1) and (2) respectively within each group 
to compare earnings response coefficients (ERCs), and I estimate equation (3.5) and (3.6) 
within each group to compare the magnitude of drift for GAAP and non-GAAP earnings 
surprises.  
Table 3.9 first presents the number of firm-year observations by portfolio ranking 
and groups of exclusion items for independent sorting. Independent sorting here refers to 
ranking on earnings surprises prior to ranking on exclusion items. Although the number of 
observations of portfolio 10 (152) in column (1) is slightly lower than that of portfolio 1 
   
21 Note that this definition is different from Doyle, Lundholm and Soliman’s (2002) measure where Total 
Exclusions = Pro Forma Earnings – GAAP Earnings. They find a significantly negative coefficient on other 




(193) for SUE_NonGAAP, the proportion of SUE rank does not change much across groups 
of exclusion items for non-GAAP earnings surprises. In contrast, the number of observations 
of portfolio 10 (599) in column (4) is almost 8 times more than that of portfolio 1 (78) for 
SUE_GAAP, and the number of observations gradually declines from 1,131 of portfolio 1 
to 242 of portfolio 10 in column (6). As GAAP earnings surprise can be decomposed into 
non-GAAP earnings surprises and Exclusion surprises, this indicates that groups with 
positive actual exclusion items will have more positive exclusion surprises than the other, 
while groups with negative actual exclusion items will have more negative exclusion 
surprises than the other. This is not surprising as most exclusion items are deemed to be 
‘transitory items’, which are not expected to recur in the following periods. Thus, analysts 
tend to report forecast exclusion items as zero.22  
Insert Table 3.9 about here 
Table 3.10 presents the results of regressing short-term and long-term CAR on 
different earnings surprises by groups of exclusion items. The coefficients on 
SUE_NonGAAP in Panel A of Table 3.10 are 8.4%, 6.8% and 6.3%, respectively in column 
(1), (3) and (5), indicating that market reacts most strongly to non-GAAP earnings when 
actual GAAP EPS is larger than actual non-GAAP EPS at the earnings announcement. The 
coefficients on SUE_GAAP are 3.1%, 3.9% and 3.3% respectively in columns (2), (4) and 
(6), indicating that the market finds GAAP earnings to be most informative when exclusion 
items are equal to zero. By using an alternative measure of market reaction (cumulative 
value-weighted abnormal return), the estimates in column (7) to column (12) further support 
the above inferences. Prior studies show that certain analysts’ decisions to exclude selected 
items are potentially due to self-interest instead of benefiting investors (Lambert, 2004; 
   




Bratten et al., 2020). My results suggest that the market preference to non-GAAP earnings 
at the earnings announcement are subject to the consideration of possible opportunism 
behaviours. Specifically, GAAP earnings may play a disciplinary role and market 
appreciates non-GAAP earnings most when actual GAAP EPS is larger than the non-GAAP 
EPS. 
Panel B and Panel C of Table 3.10 present the results of post earnings announcement 
drift levels for subsample of exclusion groups using independent sorting and conditional 
sorting respectively. Independent sorting refers to ranking on earnings surprises prior to 
ranking on exclusion items, while conditional sorting refers to ranking firms into 10 
portfolios within each group of exclusion items. As panel B shows, the non-GAAP based 
drift only exists when the exclusion items equal to zero, and the magnitude of the drift is 
smaller than the GAAP based drift— 2% versus 2.9%. The coefficients on SUE_GAAP_std 
are all significant in column (2), (4), (6), (8), (10) and (12), indicating that the GAAP based 
drift exist for all exclusion groups and investors misprice GAAP earnings on average. The 
magnitude of GAAP-based drift is the lowest when firms have negative exclusions items, 
1.7% compared to 2.9% when exclusions items equal to zero. The results of panel C is 
slightly different when adopting conditional sorting. Specifically, non-GAAP based drift 
now exists when firms have income-increasing exclusion items. The coefficients on 
SUE_NonGAAP_std, however, are still insignificant in column (5) and (11), indicating that 
investors do not misprice non-GAAP earnings when analysts exclude income-decreasing 
exclusion items. Though there is inconclusive result with regards to non-GAAP based drift, 
according to Whipple (2015), whether investors misprice non-GAAP exclusions are subject 
to the persistence of exclusion items. Specifically, the information on more persistent 
exclusion items are not fully utilised at the earnings announcement date.  
Insert Table 3.10 about here 
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3.6       Conclusion 
This study examines the market reactions to various definitions of earnings surprises (GAAP 
earnings surprises, non-GAAP earnings surprises and GAAP earnings surprises with 
measurement error) in both short-term and long-term. Due to the unavailability of GAAP 
forecasts data before 2004, prior studies on the informativeness of different earnings 
definitions and PEAD calculate GAAP earnings surprise using the difference between 
GAAP actuals and non-GAAP forecasts. This measurement error problem is identified as a 
major limitation that may potentially contaminate existing results (Lambert, 2004; Cohen et 
al., 2007). This paper overcomes the issue by measuring GAAP earnings surprises as the 
difference between GAAP actuals and GAAP forecasts from I/B/E/S. In addition, I select 
an international sample consisting of firms from the UK and 10 Eurozone countries and 
contribute beyond prior studies using US sample. I first compare investors’ preference for 
different earnings measures at the earnings announcement date. I then explore the post 
earnings announcement abnormal returns in long-term period using different definitions of 
earnings surprises. As prior studies have examined the magnitude and patterns of PEAD 
using analysts’ non-GAAP forecast errors, time series model and Compustat earnings 
surprises (Doyle, Lundholm and Soliman, 2003; Livnat and Mendenhall, 2006), the pattern 
and magnitude of PEAD for GAAP based earnings surprise and its comparison to non-
GAAP based drift remains an interesting question.  
My investigation of three-day window abnormal returns around earnings 
announcement date after correcting for the prior measurement error is consistent with the 
argument that investors perceive non-GAAP earnings to be more informative than GAAP 
earnings. However, previously identified GAAP earnings surprises with measurement error 
downwardly bias market responses to GAAP earnings. My findings further reveal that the 
market responds positively to the measurement error component, indicating that forecast 
exclusions provides incremental useful information in addition to the information captured 
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in GAAP forecasts. Collectively, evidence suggests that previously identified investors’ 
preference for non-GAAP earnings is at least partly explained by the measurement error 
component (forecast exclusions). When separating the sample into profit-making and loss-
making firms, I find that the short-term market reaction to non-GAAP earnings is more 
pronounced for profit-making firms compared to loss-making firms. This result supports the 
view that capital market does not seem to be entirely misled by possible manipulation of 
earnings adjustments and non-GAAP earnings, because analysts are more likely to inflate 
non-GAAP forecasts when firms are likely to report a GAAP loss for self-interest and 
economic incentives. 
In addition to the short-term market reactions, I find that the GAAP-based PEAD 
after correcting the measurement error is higher than the non-GAAP based PEAD, 
indicating that investors may not utilise the information captured by GAAP earnings 
efficiently compared to that of non-GAAP earnings. This is consistent with the view that 
market may place less weight on vague and uncertain information contained in exclusion 
items shortly after earnings announcement date. In the longer term, as the information 
environment is enriched and investors digest information from various sources, investors 
may place extra weight on the more regulated GAAP earnings metrics. 
Overall, my findings provide insight into both short-term and long-term market 
reactions to analysts’ GAAP and non-GAAP earnings surprises in an international setting. 
It also provides additional evidence on the effect of measurement error on prior findings of 
investors’ preference for GAAP and non-GAAP earnings. This paper is of relevance to the 
understanding the true nature of the PEAD anomaly and finding the most effective form of 
earnings surprises in explaining the PEAD. Future research can investigate market reactions 
to alternative definitions of earnings surprises such as one defined by the difference between 
managers reported pro forma earnings and analysts’ non-GAAP forecasts. In addition, 
although this paper considers the effect of firm size, market to book ratio and market beta, 
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future research could further analyse the conditional effect of firm characteristics on the 
relative informativeness between non-GAAP and GAAP earnings metrics. Such 
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Tables of Chapter 3 
Table 3.1 Number of firm observations by financial year and country 
 
 
This table presents the number of firm observations by financial year and country. The full sample consists of 2,757 firms from 12 countries. The sample 






Year Austria Belgium Finland France German Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain United Kingdom Total 
2004 11 35 28 150 137 39 11 93 36 20 33 57 650 
2005 20 47 77 230 198 43 30 125 66 25 65 223 1149 
2006 30 55 76 277 237 48 30 139 71 22 69 250 1304 
2007 41 62 77 291 285 46 35 153 78 25 80 271 1444 
2008 42 66 80 306 289 47 34 143 78 31 85 295 1496 
2009 40 58 77 274 264 41 30 128 75 29 84 325 1425 
2010 33 63 76 276 251 33 28 150 72 28 87 331 1428 
2011 35 62 90 276 239 26 26 140 72 28 83 354 1431 
2012 34 51 69 276 222 23 23 123 67 25 81 341 1335 
2013 32 51 76 247 251 22 21 131 65 28 71 372 1367 
2014 34 52 79 265 286 22 25 117 65 25 69 375 1414 
2015 35 51 83 294 304 25 24 145 64 22 71 396 1514 
2016 35 49 90 314 308 24 23 140 67 20 74 420 1564 
2017 34 49 87 318 307 24 23 152 66 23 76 455 1614 
2018 20 32 90 127 143 4 16 45 44 8 74 321 924 
Total 476 783 1155 3921 3721 467 379 1924 986 359 1102 4786 20059 
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Table 3.2 Descriptive statistics 
 
Stats  N Mean S.D. Min Max P25 Median P75 
SUE_GAAP 20059 -0.030 0.141 -1.063 0.172 -0.014 -0.001 0.005 
SUE_NonGAAP 20059 -0.012 0.072 -0.512 0.133 -0.006 0.000 0.005 
SUE_GAAP_Error 20059 -0.036 0.155 -1.146 0.200 -0.021 -0.002 0.004 
EW_CAR 20059 0.008 0.058 -0.169 0.192 -0.022 0.005 0.036 
EW_PEAD 19492 0.036 0.174 -0.480 0.633 -0.056 0.033 0.124 
VW_CAR 19369 0.008 0.057 -0.167 0.189 -0.022 0.005 0.036 
VW_PEAD 18130 0.036 0.173 -0.469 0.629 -0.056 0.033 0.124 
Size  20059 6.353 2.064 2.163 11.146 4.784 6.230 7.809 
MTB  20059 2.483 2.633 -1.856 16.842 1.037 1.724 2.952 
Beta  20059 0.648 0.484 -0.353 2.067 0.285 0.611 0.959 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics with winsorisation. Extreme values are replaced with 1st 
and 99th percentile values. SUE_GAAP is the earnings surprise calculated using I/B/E/S actual GAAP 
EPS and I/B/E/S forecast GAAP EPS, scaled by the stock price no more than 30 days prior to the 
earnings announcement date. SUE_NonGAAP is the earnings surprise calculated using I/B/E/S 
actual Non-GAAP EPS and I/B/E/S forecast Non-GAAP EPS, scaled by the stock price no more 
than 30 days prior to the earnings announcement date. SUE_GAAP_Error is the earnings surprise 
calculated using I/B/E/S actual GAAP EPS and I/B/E/S forecast Non-GAAP EPS, scaled by the 
stock price no more than 30 days prior to the earnings announcement date. EW_CAR is the equally 
weighted cumulative abnormal return for the three-day window [-1,1] centred on the earnings 
announcement date. EW_PEAD is the equally weighted abnormal return on a stock, cumulated from 
2 trading days following the announcement to 64 trading days following the announcement. 
VW_CAR is the value-weighted cumulative abnormal return for the three-day window [-1,1] centred 
on the earnings announcement date. VW_PEAD is the value-weighted abnormal return on a stock, 
cumulated from 2 trading days following the announcement to 64 trading days following the 
announcement. Size is the natural logarithm of market value in millions of Euros at the end of the 
fiscal year. Market value is the share price multiplied by the number of ordinary shares in issue. MTB 
is the ratio of market capitalisation to book value of shareholders’ equity at the end of the fiscal year. 
Beta is the estimated coefficient on the market index return in a CAPM model regression for firms 
with daily returns in the 90 trading days before the earnings announcement date. All variable 





















Table 3.3 Univariate analysis of country-level short-window cumulative abnormal returns 




















This table presents a country level short-window CAR and subsequent quarter CAR regression. 
EW_CAR is the equally weighted cumulative abnormal return for the three-day window [-1,1] 
centred on the earnings announcement date. EW_PEAD is the equally weighted abnormal return on 
a stock, cumulated from 2 trading days following the announcement to 64 trading days following 
the announcement. VW_CAR is the value-weighted cumulative abnormal return for the three-day 
window [-1,1] centred on the earnings announcement date. VW_PEAD is the value-weighted 
abnormal return on a stock, cumulated from 2 trading days following the announcement to 64 trading 
days following the announcement. All variable definitions are presented in Appendix A3.1. *, **, 


























Austria  0.0065*** 0.0309***  0.0059***  0.0298*** 
Belgium  0.0023 0.0443***  0.0024  0.0399*** 
Finland  0.0006 0.0605***  0.0006  0.0577*** 
France  0.0090*** 0.0322***  0.0088***  0.0307*** 
Germany  0.0064*** 0.0349***  0.0066***  0.0356*** 
Greece -0.0012 0.0402*** -0.0012  0.0421*** 
Ireland  0.0208*** 0.0238*  0.019***  0.025** 
Italy  0.0105*** 0.0193***  0.010***  0.023*** 
Netherlands  0.0037 0.0520***  0.0029  0.055*** 
Portugal  0.0055** 0.0285***  0.0057***  0.0287*** 
Spain -0.0047*** 0.0139** -0.0049***  0.0162*** 
United Kingdom  0.0133*** 0.0300***  0.0133***  0.0315*** 
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This table presents regression result of short-window CAR on different measurement of earnings surprises. EW_CAR is the equally weighted cumulative 
abnormal return for the three-day window [-1,1] centred on the earnings announcement date. VW_CAR is the value-weighted cumulative abnormal return 
for the three-day window [-1,1] centred on the earnings announcement date. SUE_NonGAAP is the earnings surprise calculated using I/B/E/S actual Non-
GAAP EPS and I/B/E/S forecast Non-GAAP EPS, scaled by the stock price no more than 30 days prior to the earnings announcement date. SUE_GAAP is 
the earnings surprise calculated using I/B/E/S actual GAAP EPS and I/B/E/S forecast GAAP EPS, scaled by the stock price no more than 30 days prior to 
the earnings announcement date. SUE_GAAP_Error is the earnings surprise calculated using I/B/E/S actual GAAP EPS and I/B/E/S forecast Non-GAAP 
EPS, scaled by the stock price no more than 30 days prior to the earnings announcement date. All continuous variables are winsorised at the top and bottom 
1% of each distribution. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance levels (two-sided) of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
 
EW_CAR EW_CAR EW_CAR 
 
VW_CAR VW_CAR VW_CAR 
  
   SUE_NonGAAP  0.067***    0.070***   
  (11.76)    (10.90)   
SUE_GAAP   0.036***    0.039***  
   (12.09)    (12.53)  
SUE_GAAP_Error    0.033***    0.034*** 
    (12.03)    (11.99) 
Size  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000  -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* 
  (-1.51) (-1.52) (-1.57)  -(1.74) -(1.80) -(1.78) 
MTB  -0.001** -0.000*** -0.000***  -0.000** -0.000*** -0.001*** 
  (-2.52) (-2.94) (-2.99)  -(2.40) -(2.84) -(2.88) 
Beta  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001  -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
  (-1.52) (-1.13) (-0.99)  -(1.58) -(1.14) -(1.05) 
Constant  0.008** 0.007** 0.007**  0.007* 0.007* 0.007* 







1.58     
    
Country FE  Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Year FE  Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Observations  20059 20059 20059  19369 19369 19369 
R-squared  0.018 0.018 0.018  0.018 0.019 0.019 
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This table presents regression result of the short-window CAR on GAAP earnings surprises and 
forecast exclusions. DiffExclusions is the difference between the previously identified GAAP earnings 
surprises with measurement error (SUE_GAAP_Error) and the corrected GAAP earnings surprise 
(SUE_GAAP), identified as the forecast exclusions.  EW_CAR is the equally weighted cumulative 
abnormal return for the three-day window [-1,1] centred on the earnings announcement date. 
VW_CAR is the value-weighted cumulative abnormal return for the three-day window [-1,1] centred 
on the earnings announcement date. All variable definitions are presented in Appendix A3.1. All 
continuous variables are winsorised at the top and bottom 1% of each distribution. t-statistics are 






















    
SUE_GAAP 0.036***      0.039*** 
       (12.17)  (12.56) 
DiffExclusions 0.016***  0.011* 
       (2.65)      (1.69) 
Size      -0.000*     -0.000* 
       (-1.66)  (-1.89) 
MTB      -0.000***    -0.000*** 
       (-3.00)  (-2.88) 
Beta      -0.001     -0.001 
       (-0.98)  (-1.04) 
Constant       0.007**  0.007* 
       (2.01)      (1.84) 
    
    
Country FE Y  Y 
Year FE Y  Y 
Observations 20059  19369 
R-squared 0.018  0.019 
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Table 3.6 Regression of subsequent quarter CAR on different measurement of standardised 





This table presents the regression result of subsequent quarter CAR following the earnings 
announcement date on standardised earnings surprises.  EW_PEAD is the equally weighted abnormal 
return on a stock, cumulated from 2 trading days following the announcement to 64 trading days 
following the announcement. VW_PEAD is the value-weighted abnormal return on a stock, 
cumulated from 2 trading days following the announcement to 64 trading days following the 
announcement. Firms are ranked and classified into 10 portfolios for each country-year according to 
the earnings surprise SUE_NonGAAP, SUE_GAAP and SUE_GAAP_Error. SUE_NonGAAP_std, 
SUE_GAAP_std and SUE_GAAP_Error_std are standardised to the range [0, 1], and are futher 
subtracted by 0.5 for a median of 0. Other variables expect for the standardised earnings surprises 
are winsorised at the top and bottom 1% of each distribution. All variable definitions are presented 
in Appendix A3.1. t-statistics are reported in parentheses *, **, *** indicate significance levels (two-
sided) of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
VARIABLES EW_PEAD EW_PEAD  VW_PEAD VW_PEAD 
      
SUE_NonGAAP_std 0.016***   0.017***  
 (4.38)   (4.39)  
SUE_GAAP_std  0.020***   0.019*** 
  (5.31)   (4.99) 
Size 0.004*** 0.004***  0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (6.16) (6.08)  (4.77) (4.74) 
MTB -0.001** -0.001***  -0.001*** -0.002*** 
 (-2.47) (-2.74)  (-3.09) (-3.35) 
Beta -0.005* -0.004  -0.005** -0.005 
 (-1.80) (-1.59)  (-1.83) (-1.65) 
Constant 0.037*** 0.037***  0.042*** 0.042*** 
 (3.46) (3.50)  (3.90) (3.92) 
 
   
    
Country. FE Y Y  Y Y 
Year. FE Y Y  Y Y 
Observations 19492 19492  18130 18130 




Table 3.7 Number of firm-year observations by portfolio ranks and GAAP EPS loss  
 
  Number of observations  Number of observations 







Portfolio 1 672 1,363  Portfolio 1 521 1,513 
Portfolio 2 1,312 626  Portfolio 2 1,186 749 
Portfolio 3 1,663 316  Portfolio 3 1,573 387 
Portfolio 4 1,835 182  Portfolio 4 1,806 216 
Portfolio 5 1,809 134  Portfolio 5 1,817 116 
Portfolio 6 1,771 118  Portfolio 6 1,845 132 
Portfolio 7 1,796 127  Portfolio 7 1,787 80 
Portfolio 8 1,768 164  Portfolio 8 1,815 114 
Portfolio 9 1,670 293  Portfolio 9 1,761 201 
Portfolio 10 1,326 547  Portfolio 10 1,511 362 
Total 15622 3870  Total 15622 3870 
 
 
This table presents the number of firm-year observations by portfolio ranks and actual GAAP EPS loss. Loss is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 
if I/B/E/S actual GAAP EPS is negative, and otherwise 0. Firms are ranked and classified into 10 portfolios for each country-year according to the earnings 
surprise SUE_NonGAAP and SUE_GAAP. SUE_NonGAAP is the earnings surprise calculated using I/B/E/S actual Non-GAAP EPS and I/B/E/S forecast 
Non-GAAP EPS, scaled by the stock price no more than 30 days prior to the earnings announcement date. SUE_GAAP is the earnings surprise calculated 











Table 3.8 Market reactions to GAAP and non-GAAP earnings surprises for loss firms 
 










 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES 
EW_CAR  VW_CAR 
Profit firms Loss firms Profit firms Loss firms  Profit firms Loss firms Profit firms Loss firms 
         
SUE_NonGAAP    0.182***   0.027***    0.174*** 0.029***   
 (12.08)   (3.23)    (11.18) (3.42)   
SUE_GAAP   0.079***   0.021***    0.077*** 0.024*** 
   (7.74) (4.89)    (7.26) (5.31) 
Size   -0.002***   0.001 -0.002*** 0.001  -0.002*** 0.001 -0.002*** 0.001 
 (-7.12)   (1.30) (-7.1) (1.38)  (-7.48) (1.38) (-7.44) (1.48) 
MTB 0.000  -0.001** 0.000  -0.001***  0.000 -0.001** 0.000 -0.001*** 
 (0.34)   (-2.48) (0.2) (-2.87)  (0.5) (-2.49) (0.37) (-2.92) 
Beta 0.000   0.000 0.000     0.001  0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 (0.37)   (0.00) (0.37) (0.32)  (0.19) (0.24) (0.15) (0.58) 
Constant    0.012***   0.009 0.012*** 0.008  0.013*** 0.003 0.013*** 0.002 
 (3.05)   (0.79) (3.18) (0.74)  (3.29) (0.27) (3.39) (0.19) 
          
          
Country FE Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Observations 16113 3946 16113 3946  15616 3753 15616 3753 
R-squared 0.026 0.014 0.021 0.018  0.026 0.014 0.022 0.018 
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Table 3.8 (continued) 
 





 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES 
EW_CAR  VW_CAR 
Profit firms Loss firms Profit firms Loss firms  Profit firms Loss firms Profit firms Loss firms 
         
SUE_NonGAAP_std    0.013*** -0.009       0.016***   -0.013   
 (3.32) -(.94)    (3.93) -(1.38)   
SUE_GAAP_std       0.016***   -0.020*       0.016***  -0.022** 
   (3.95) -(1.92)    (3.83) -(2.02) 
Size 0.001   0.005** 0.001   0.005**  0.000  0.004* 0.000 0.003 
 (0.84) (2.36) (0.86) (2.13)  (0.07) (1.78) (0.11) (1.46) 
MTB 0.000  -0.002** 0.000 -0.002*  -0.001   -0.003** -0.001  -0.002** 
 (-0.62) (-1.99) (-0.71) (-1.73)  (-1.04) (-2.26) -(1.16) (-1.99) 
Beta 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001  -0.003 0.006 -0.003 0.006 
 (0.24) (-0.17) (0.29) (-0.17)  (-0.9) (0.88) (-0.86) (0.88) 
Constant    0.041***   0.085**     0.041***   0.084**     0.047***   0.084**    0.047***   0.085** 
 (3.96) (2.36) (3.97) (2.36)  (4.49) (2.29) (4.49) (2.34) 
          
          
Country FE Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Observations 15623 3870 15623 3870  14503 3628 14503 3628 
R-squared 0.125 0.135 0.126 0.135  0.14 0.141 0.14 0.142 
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Table 3.8 (continued) 
 











 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES 
EW_CAR  VW_CAR 
Profit firms Loss firms Profit firms Loss firms  Profit firms Loss firms Profit firms Loss firms 
         
SUE_NonGAAP_std     0.013*** -0.003     0.014*** -0.013   
 (3.52)   (-0.26)    (3.86) -(1.12)   
SUE_GAAP_std   0.016*** -0.014    0.016*** -0.021 
   (4.42) (-1.26)    (4.28) -(1.58) 
Size      0.001 0.005** 0.001 0.005**  0.000 0.004* 0.000 0.004 
 (0.86) (2.27) (0.90) (2.27)  (0.09) (1.78) (0.14) (1.62) 
MTB 0.000 -0.002** 0.000 -0.002*  -0.001 -0.003** -0.001 -0.002* 
 (-0.61) (-1.99) (-0.68) (-1.76)  (-1.03) (-2.23) (-1.13) -(1.95) 
Beta 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001  -0.003 0.006 -0.003 0.006 
 (0.23) -(0.17) (0.29) (-0.21)  (-0.91) (0.85) (-0.87) (0.82) 
Constant 0.042*** 0.088**  0.041*** 0.087**  0.048*** 0.086** 0.047*** 0.087** 
 (4.00) (2.44) (3.99) (2.42)  (4.53) (2.34) (4.51) (2.38) 
          
          
Country FE Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Observations 15623 3870 15623 3870  14503 3628 14503 3628 
R-squared 0.125 0.135 0.126 0.135  0.14 0.141 0.14 0.142 
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This table presents different market reactions to GAAP and non-GAAP earnings surprises for profit and loss firms. Panel A presents the regression result of 
short-window CAR on different measurement of earnings surprises for profit and loss firms separately. Panel B presents the regression result of subsequent 
quarter CAR on different measurement of standardised earnings surprises for profit and loss firms using independent sorting. Panel C presents the regression 
result of subsequent quarter CAR on different measurement of standardised earnings surprises for profit and loss firms using conditional sorting. Firms with 
negative actual GAAP EPS are classified as loss firms, otherwise are profit firms.  EW_CAR is the equally weighted cumulative abnormal return for the 
three-day window [-1,1] centred on the earnings announcement date. EW_PEAD is the equally weighted abnormal return on a stock, cumulated from 2 
trading days following the announcement to 64 trading days following the announcement. SUE_NonGAAP is the earnings surprise calculated using I/B/E/S 
actual Non-GAAP EPS and I/B/E/S forecast Non-GAAP EPS, scaled by the stock price no more than 30 days prior to the earnings announcement date. 
SUE_GAAP is the earnings surprise calculated using I/B/E/S actual GAAP EPS and I/B/E/S forecast GAAP EPS, scaled by the stock price no more than 30 
days prior to the earnings announcement date. Firms are further classified into 10 portfolios for each country year according to the earnings surprise 
SUE_NonGAAP and SUE_GAAP. SUE_NonGAAP_std and SUE_GAAP_std are standardised to the range [0, 1], and are futher subtracted by 0.5 for a median 
of 0. All continuous variables are winsorised at the top and bottom 1% of each distribution. All variable definitions are presented in Appendix A3.1. t-
























Table 3.9 Number of firm-year observations by exclusion groups and portfolio ranks  
 
 Number of observations   Number of observations 



















EPS > actual 
Non-GAAP EPS 
actual GAAP 
EPS = actual 
Non-GAAP EPS 
actual GAAP 
EPS < actual 
Non-GAAP EPS  
actual GAAP 
EPS > actual 
Non-GAAP EPS 
actual GAAP 
EPS = actual 
Non-GAAP EPS 
actual GAAP 
EPS < actual 
Non-GAAP EPS 
Portfolio 1 193 1,347 551  Portfolio 1 78 881 1,131 
Portfolio 2 217 1,245 532  Portfolio 2 105 925 961 
Portfolio 3 236 1,229 568  Portfolio 3 102 1,029 887 
Portfolio 4 262 1,176 642  Portfolio 4 94 1,198 790 
Portfolio 5 210 1,182 607  Portfolio 5 99 1,214 675 
Portfolio 6 223 1,051 669  Portfolio 6 138 1,370 524 
Portfolio 7 213 1,085 681  Portfolio 7 183 1,322 418 
Portfolio 8 178 1,081 733  Portfolio 8 292 1,310 386 
Portfolio 9 186 1,130 701  Portfolio 9 380 1,296 340 
Portfolio 10 152 1,109 670  Portfolio 10 599 1,090 242 
Total 2070 11635 6354  Total 2070 11635 6354 
 
This table presents the number of firm-year observations by exclusion groups and portfolio ranks. Firms are first ranked and classified into 10 portfolios for 
each country-year according to the earnings surprise SUE_NonGAAP and SUE_GAAP. SUE_NonGAAP is the earnings surprise calculated using I/B/E/S 
actual Non-GAAP EPS and I/B/E/S forecast Non-GAAP EPS, scaled by the stock price no more than 30 days prior to the earnings announcement date. 
SUE_GAAP is the earnings surprise calculated using I/B/E/S actual GAAP EPS and I/B/E/S forecast GAAP EPS, scaled by the stock price no more than 30 
days prior to the earnings announcement date. The whole sample is then classified into three groups according to whether the exclusion items is positive, 








Table 3.10 Market reaction to GAAP and non-GAAP earnings surprises by different exclusion groups 
 





 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 EW_CAR  VW_CAR  
 Positive exclusion 
items 




Zero exclusion items Negative exclusion 
items 
 actual GAAP EPS > 
actual Non-GAAP 
EPS 
actual GAAP EPS = 
actual Non-GAAP EPS 
actual GAAP EPS 
< actual Non-
GAAP EPS 
 actual GAAP EPS > 
actual Non-GAAP 
EPS 
actual GAAP EPS = 
actual Non-GAAP EPS 
actual GAAP EPS < 
actual Non-GAAP 
EPS 
VARIABLES       
SUE_NonGAAP 0.084***  0.068***  0.063***  0.079***  0.074***  0.066***  
 (4.03)  (9.86)  (5.39)  (3.69)  (10.18)  (5.41)  
SUE_GAAP  0.031**  0.039***  0.033***  0.035**  0.048***  0.039*** 
  (2.36)  (8.29)  (7.3)  (2.46)  (8.94)  (7.78) 
Size -0.002** -0.001* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002** -0.001* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001* 
 (-2.3) (-1.73) (-0.63) (-0.15) (-0.25) (-1.37) (-2.41) (-1.88) (-0.74) (-0.29) (-0.51) (-1.73) 
MTB -0.000 -0.000 -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000 0.000 
 (-0.41) (-0.27) (-4.34) (-4.32) (1.12) (0.66) (-0.37) (-0.2) (-4.19) (-4.18) (1.18) (0.64) 
Beta -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002* 0.000 0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002* 0.001 0.002 
 (-0.61) (-0.99) (-1.38) (-1.65) (0.07) (0.88) (-0.68) (-1.01) (-1.62) -(1.86) (0.27) (1.14) 
Constant 0.016 0.014 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.007 0.016 0.014 0.007 0.006 0.003 0.005 
 (1.21) (1.05) (1.38) (1.17) (0.47) (0.77) (1.25) (1.09) (1.36) (1.17) (0.31) (0.6) 
             
             
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 2070 2070 11635 11635 6354 6354 2023 2023 11154 11154 6192 6192 
R-squared 0.015 0.009 0.021 0.018 0.017 0.021 0.015 0.011 0.022 0.02 0.017 0.022 
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  Table 3.10 (continued) 





 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 EW_PEAD   VW_PEAD 
 Positive exclusion 
items 




Zero exclusion items Negative exclusion 
items 
 actual GAAP EPS 
> actual Non-
GAAP EPS 
actual GAAP EPS = 
actual Non-GAAP 
EPS 
actual GAAP EPS 
< actual Non-
GAAP EPS 
 actual GAAP EPS 
> actual Non-
GAAP EPS 
actual GAAP EPS = 
actual Non-GAAP 
EPS 
actual GAAP EPS < 
actual Non-GAAP 
EPS 
VARIABLES       
SUE_NonGAAP_std 0.013  0.02***  0.006  0.017  0.02***  0.007  
 (1.29)  (4.15)  (0.89)  (1.62)  (3.96)  (1.07)  
SUE_GAAP_std  0.031***  0.029***  0.017**  0.026**  0.029***  0.017** 
  (2.89)  (5.62)  (2.35)  (2.34)  (5.38)  (2.34) 
Size 0.001 0.001 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.001 0.001 
 (0.75) (0.49) (5.86) (5.66) (1.53) (1.27) (0.7) (0.54) (4.55) (4.36) (0.78) (0.55) 
MTB 0.001 0.001 -0.001** -0.001** -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.44) (0.59) (-1.96) (-2.09) (-1.09) (-1.31) (-0.22) (-0.1) (-2.61) (-2.72) (-0.91) (-1.13) 
Beta -0.009 -0.009 -0.002 -0.001 -0.01** -0.009* -0.01 -0.01 -0.003 -0.003 -0.008 -0.007 
 (-1.15) (-1.11) (-0.45) (-0.36) (-2.05) (-1.86) (-1.21) (-1.21) (-0.77) (-0.69) (-1.61) (-1.43) 
Constant 0.055 0.058 0.014 0.015 0.096*** 0.1*** 0.06* 0.061* 0.022 0.023 0.096*** 0.1*** 
 (1.56) (1.66) (0.96) (1.02) (4.15) (4.32) (1.73) (1.76) (1.49) (1.57) (4.14) (4.31) 
             
             
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 2008 2008 11361 11361 6123 6123 1848 1848 10486 10486 5796 5796 
R-squared 0.08 0.083 0.127 0.129 0.133 0.133 0.1 0.102 0.141 0.142 0.135 0.136 
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  Table 3.10 (continued) 






 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 EW_PEAD   VW_PEAD 
 Positive 
exclusion items 




Zero exclusion items Negative exclusion 
items 
 actual GAAP 
EPS > actual 
Non-GAAP EPS 
actual GAAP EPS = 
actual Non-GAAP 
EPS 
actual GAAP EPS 
< actual Non-
GAAP EPS 
 actual GAAP EPS 
> actual Non-
GAAP EPS 
actual GAAP EPS = 
actual Non-GAAP EPS 
actual GAAP EPS < 
actual Non-GAAP 
EPS 
VARIABLES       
SUE_NonGAAP_std 0.02**  0.022***  0.003  0.023**  0.02***  0.004  
 (2.00)  (4.48)  (0.44)  (2.2)  (3.88)  (0.59)  
SUE_GAAP_std  0.018*  0.028***  0.016**  0.017  0.028***  0.015** 
  (1.83)  (5.67)  (2.34)  (1.62)  (5.43)  (2.16) 
Size 0.001 0.002 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.001 0.001 
 (0.72) (0.79) (5.79) (5.81) (1.58) (1.12) (0.67) (0.76) (4.53) (4.50) (0.84) (0.44) 
MTB 0.001 0.001 -0.001** -0.001** -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.46) (0.63) (-1.98) (-2.05) (-1.1) (-1.37) (-0.21) (-0.04) (-2.64) (-2.67) (-0.91) (-1.16) 
Beta -0.009 -0.010 -0.002 -0.002 -0.010** -0.009* -0.010 -0.011 -0.003 -0.003 -0.008 -0.007 
 (-1.14) (-1.17) (-0.42) (-0.41) (-2.07) (-1.82) (-1.2) -(1.26) (-0.76) (-0.74) (-1.63) (-1.4) 
Constant 0.056 0.055 0.014 0.015 0.096*** 0.1*** 0.061* 0.058* 0.022 0.023 0.096*** 0.1*** 
 (1.6) (1.57) (1.01) (1.02) (4.15) (4.32) (1.75) (1.69) (1.52) (1.56) (4.14) (4.3) 
             
             
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 2008 2008 11361 11361 6123 6123 1848 1848 10486 10486 5796 5796 
R-squared 0.081 0.08 0.128 0.129 0.132 0.133 0.101 0.1 0.141 0.142 0.135 0.135 
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This table presents the different market reactions to GAAP and non-GAAP earnings surprises for different exclusion groups. Panel A presents the regression 
result of short-window CAR on different measurement of earnings surprises by exclusion groups. Panel B presents the regression result of subsequent quarter 
CAR on different measurement of standardised earnings surprises by exclusion groups using independent sorting. Panel C presents the regression result of 
subsequent quarter CAR on different measurement of standardised earnings surprises by exclusion groups using conditional sorting. The whole sample is 
classified into three groups according to whether the exclusion items is positive, zero or negative. Exclusion items is the difference between actual GAAP 
EPS and actual Non-GAAP EPS. For independent sorting, firms are first ranked and classified into 10 portfolios for each country-year according to the 
earnings surprise SUE_NonGAAP and SUE_GAAP, and the regression is then run within each exclusion group. For conditional sorting, firms are ranked and 
classified into 10 portfolios for each country-year according to the earnings surprise SUE_NonGAAP and SUE_GAAP within each exclusion group. 
SUE_NonGAAP_std and SUE_GAAP_std are standardised to the range [0, 1], and are futher subtracted by 0.5 for a median of 0. EW_PEAD is the equally 
weighted abnormal return on a stock, cumulated from 2 trading days following the announcement to 64 trading days following the announcement. VW_PEAD 
is the value-weighted abnormal return on a stock, cumulated from 2 trading days following the announcement to 64 trading days following the announcement. 
All continuous variables are winsorised at the top and bottom 1% of each distribution. All variable definitions are presented in Appendix A3.1. t-statistics 
























Appendices of Chapter 3 
  Appendix A3.1 Variable Definitions   
Variables Definition  Data Source 
SUE_GAAP 
Analysts’ GAAP earnings surprises calculated as I/B/E/S GAAP actual EPS minus 
the I/B/E/S last median GAAP forecast EPS, scaled by the stock price no more than 
30 days prior to the earnings announcement date 
 
Obtained from I/B/E/S 
SUE_GAAP_ERROR 
Previously identified GAAP earnings surprises with measurement error, calculated 
as I/B/E/S GAAP actual EPS minus the I/B/E/S last median non-GAAP forecast 
EPS, scaled by the stock price no more than 30 days prior to the earnings 
announcement date 
Obtained from I/B/E/S 
SUE_NONGAAP 
Analysts’ non-GAAP earnings surprises calculated as I/B/E/S non-GAAP actual    
EPS minus the I/B/E/S last median non-GAAP forecast EPS, scaled by the stock 
price no more than 30 days prior to the earnings announcement date 
 
Obtained from I/B/E/S 
SUE_GAAP_std 
Decile rank of analyst’ GAAP earnings surprises. Analysts’ GAAP earnings 
surprises (SUE_GAAP) is assigned into 10 quintiles, the quintile ranks are further 
scaled to a standardised quintile rank from 0 to 1 and subtracted by 0.5 for a mythical 
0 median. 
Obtained from I/B/E/S 
SUE_NONGAAP_std 
Decile rank of analyst’ non-GAAP earnings surprises. Analysts’ non-GAAP 
earnings surprises (SUE_NONGAAP) is assigned into 10 quintiles, the quintile 
ranks are further scaled to a standardised quintile rank from 0 to 1 and subtracted 
by 0.5 for a mythical 0 median. 
Obtained from I/B/E/S 
Size 
Natural logarithm of market capitalization in millions of Euros at the end of the 
fiscal year. 
Obtained from Datastream 
MTB 
The ratio of market capitalisation to book value of shareholders’ equity at the end 
of the fiscal year. 
Obtained from Datastream 
Beta 
The volatility of a stock, estimated by the coefficient on the market index return in 
a CAPM model regression for firm with daily returns in the 90 trading days before 
the earnings announcement date. 
Obtained from Datastream 
EW_CAR 
Equally weighted cumulative abnormal return for the three-day window [-1, 1] 
centred on the EAD. 
 
Obtained from Datastream 
VW_CAR 
Cumulative abnormal return for the three-day window [-1, 1] centred on the EAD, 
adjusted for value weighted market index return. 
 
Obtained from Datastream 
EW_PEAD Three month (2 trading days following the EAD though 64 trading days following Obtained from Datastream 
121 
 
the EAD) equally weighted cumulative abnormal return.  
VW_PEAD 
Three month (2 trading days following the EAD though 64 trading days following 
the EAD) cumulative abnormal return, adjusted for value weighted market index 
return. 
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This study investigates the relationship between dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts and future 
stock returns. Specifically, dispersion in analysts’ non-GAAP (General Accepted Accounting 
Principles) forecasts is separated into two components: dispersion in GAAP forecasts and dispersion 
in exclusions from GAAP. I find that both dispersion in non-GAAP forecasts and dispersion in 
GAAP forecasts are negatively associated with future stock returns. The reason is that current 
overpricing due to information asymmetry eventually leads to lower future stock returns, while 
another possibility is the uncertainty that increases the option value of the firm. However, the levels 
of disagreement on exclusions from GAAP forecasts are positively associated with future stock 
return. This may be due to the compensation required for higher uncertainty risk or investors may 
underreact to the information in earnings when analysts disagree about opinion. My findings suggest 
that analysts’ disagreement about managers’ accounting choice has important implication for 
investors. Future studies examining the link between analyst forecast dispersion and future return 








  4.1       Introduction 
It is a well-established result in the literature that higher dispersion in analysts’ earnings 
forecasts is associated with lower stock returns (Diether et al., 2002, Johnson, 2004, 
Veenman et al., 2020). The analysts’ forecasts being used to measure the dispersion in 
previous studies are almost exclusively I/B/E/S non-GAAP earnings forecasts. These 
forecasts are based on performance measures that typically deviate significantly from GAAP 
earnings through the exclusion of certain line items. Because analysts generally have more 
freedom in adjusting the non-GAAP figures, dispersion in their non-GAAP forecasts may 
not precisely capture the difference in investors’ opinions (Garfinkel, 2009), and may be 
biased due to analysts’ unique incentive structure (e.g. Doukas et al., 2006). For instance, 
analysts may choose to converge to the consensus non-GAAP forecasts numbers because of 
career concerns. In contrast, and as showed in chapter 2, analysts generally have less 
freedom in manipulating GAAP earnings.  
A recent study by Bratten et al. (2020) concludes that the variation in analysts’ forecast 
exclusions is associated with opportunism. Firms with more income-decreasing and 
recurring items generally have higher dispersion in analysts’ forecast exclusions, and 
analysts who are more experienced and have more resources tend to exclude less from their 
non-GAAP forecasts. Thus, the dispersion in analysts’ forecast exclusions may or may not 
contain information about future returns.  
The issue of biased analysts’ views and sources of the dispersion anomaly could 
partially be addressed by decomposing the non-GAAP forecasts into GAAP forecasts and 
forecast exclusions. Previous literature often neglects the GAAP forecasts as it was not 
available on I/B/E/S until 2004. Bradshaw et al. (2018), however, address the importance of 
GAAP forecasts and find that they are informative to investors and the credibility of non-
GAAP earnings is increased when GAAP forecasts are also provided. Because GAAP 
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earnings are more regulated and analysts are less likely to manipulate them, dispersion in 
analysts’ GAAP forecasts could a better proxy for differences in investors’ opinions. 
According to Miller’s (1977) overpricing hypothesis, in the case of strong disagreement 
between optimistic and pessimistic investors, stock prices will be biased upwards if 
pessimistic investors choose not to trade due to short-sale constraints. As a consequence, the 
current overpricing will eventually result in lower stock returns as stock prices revert to 
intrinsic value in the future. Diether et al. (2002) further explain that when rational and 
informed investors do not sell the overvalued stocks because of short-sale constraints, 
uninformed investors could subconsciously and erroneously assume that they agree with the 
market price. The stock price then remains upwardly biased, resulting in the lower future 
stock return. Combined with the findings of Bradshaw et al. (2018), these arguments suggest 
that higher dispersion in analysts’ GAAP forecasts are associated with lower future stock 
returns. Hence, GAAP figures, which have been found to enhance the credibility of the non-
GAAP data used in prior research, could provide new insights into the dispersion anomaly.  
For a large sample of U.S. firms for the period from 2004 to 2016, I find that 
analysts’ disagreement in non-GAAP forecasts and GAAP forecasts have a negative 
association with future stock returns. However, a higher level of disagreement on forecast 
exclusions is associated with higher future stock returns. This may be due to a compensation 
for higher measurement uncertainty. Alternatively, investors may be misled by analysts’ 
intentional manipulation in forecast exclusions, thus leading to mispricing in the divergence 
of analysts’ opinions. 
To further understand the underlying explanation for the positive association 
between disagreements on analyst’ forecast exclusions and future stock returns, I conduct 
two additional sub-sample tests. I first divide the sample into firms with and firms without 
intangible assets. This is because Barron et al. (2002) find that analysts’ dispersion is higher 
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for firms with higher levels of internally generated (and expensed) intangibles.23 In addition, 
R&D expense and restructuring costs are treated as expenses in the income statement under 
current accounting standards, and these costs may distort the informativeness of financial 
information (e.g. Zarowin, 1999). I find that the positive relationship between dispersion in 
forecast exclusions and future stock returns is most pronounced in the subsample of firms 
with non-zero intangible assets. This finding indicates that when GAAP earnings numbers 
do not fully convey the long-run performance of firms with high intangible assets, investors 
may obtain useful information from the disagreement on forecast exclusions, and this 
disagreement captures the uncertainty risk of firms with intangible assets. However, it is 
also possible that investors cannot fully unravel the opportunistic behaviour of analysts, thus 
misprice the divergent opinions on forecast exclusions.   
I then investigate the relationship of interest by partitioning the sample into firms 
with and without managers’ non-GAAP disclosures. Managers can report their own non-
GAAP figures in addition to analysts who issue non-GAAP forecasts. According to 
Bhattacharya et al. (2003) and Bentley et al. (2018), managers are not always consistent with 
analysts in reporting non-GAAP numbers. However, when they provide more explicit non-
GAAP earnings figures, it acts as a benchmark and limits the potential opportunistic 
behaviour of analysts, because investors are able to reconcile individual analysts’ forecast 
exclusions to actual firm disclosed exclusions. If investors still price the information from 
the disagreement on forecast exclusions, they might perceive it as capturing the fundamental 
uncertainty risk about firm value instead of accounting distortions, and require a 
compensation for bearing more risk. In the sub-sample tests, I find that dispersion in 
analysts’ forecast exclusions is positively associated with future stock returns for firms with 
   
23 Dinh et al. (2015) find that the capitalisation of development costs is significantly associated with higher 
forecast dispersion under IAS 38. IFRS does not apply in the U.S., however and development costs are 
generally not capitalised under US GAAP.  
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manager-reported exclusion earnings. This relationship becomes insignificant when firms 
do not have manager-reported earnings exclusions. This result suggests that the uncertainty 
risk effect seems to matter more for the dispersion in exclusions. 
This chapter contributes the literature on the analyst dispersion anomaly and 
analysts’ non-GAAP reporting. In particular, this is the first effort to decompose dispersion 
in non-GAAP forecasts into dispersion in GAAP forecasts and dispersion in the exclusions 
component. Prior evidence suggests that firms with high dispersion in analysts’ earnings 
forecasts earn significantly lower stock returns compared to firms with low dispersion 
(Diether et al., 2002; Johnson, 2020; Veenman and Verwijmeren, 2020). The analysts’ 
forecasts that they use to measure the dispersion are non-GAAP forecasts. However, 
analysts’ disagreement on non-GAAP forecasts may not be the most suitable proxy for 
different opinions among investors. The decomposition of non-GAAP forecasts into GAAP 
forecasts and forecast exclusions enables me to further explore the sources of the dispersion 
anomaly. In addition, I provide additional evidence on the implications of analysts’ forecast 
exclusions for capital market participants. Bratten et al. (2020) investigate individual 
analysts’ forecast exclusions and find that analysts’ exclusion behaviours are associated with 
opportunism. My study complements this by exploring whether and how investors respond 
to different opinions among analysts’ exclusions forecasts.  
The remaining of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the 
literature related to analysts’ non-GAAP and GAAP forecasts, and dispersion anomaly. 
Section 4.3 develops the hypotheses on the relationship between dispersion in analysts’ 
forecasts and future stock return. Section 4.4 describes the sample and research design. 





4.2       Literature review 
4.2.1    Sell-side analysts’ non-GAAP and GAAP earnings forecasts 
Over the past few decades, sell-side analysts’ earnings forecasts have been widely used to 
predict earnings in practice and in capital markets-based academic accounting research. 
Acting as intermediaries between companies and investors, analysts generally follow 
specific companies and issue earnings forecasts, as well as target price and stock 
recommendations (Bradshaw, 2011). They facilitate the distribution of financial information 
and provide valuable information to market participants (Womack, 1996; Kadan et al., 2009; 
Loh and Stulz, 2011). Analysts’ forecast revisions have been found to result in a significant 
market reaction (Gonedes et al., 1976; O’Brien, 1988; Philbrick and Ricks, 1991). Using the 
complete contents of Institutional Investor’s American analysts’ reports, Asquith et al. 
(2005) examine the market reaction to the release of analyst reports and confirm that analysts 
provide incremental explanatory information in addition to merely interpreting information, 
resulting in excess returns. Beyer et al. (2010) further assert that analysts’ forecasts account 
for 6.14% of the quarterly return. 
A significant proportion of analysts, especially those who utilise I/B/E/S earnings 
metrics, generally refer to analysts’ forecasts prepared on a non-GAAP basis. Analysts tend 
to adjust and exclude certain transitory items, such as gains and losses on disposals, when 
forecasting earnings, taking into consideration that non-GAAP earnings are more persistent 
than GAAP earnings (Bhattacharya et al., 2003) and are considered more useful for 
valuation purposes (Brown and Sivakumar, 2003). However, in principle, analysts could 
value a firm based on either or both GAAP and non-GAAP performance metrics. As a 
measurement basis that follows applicable accounting standards, GAAP earnings forecasts 
by analysts have received less attention, partly because of limited access to this information 
in earlier studies. In 2003, I/B/E/S started to include explicit GAAP earnings forecasts 
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(GPS), as stated in Thomson Reuters (2016): “the figure is calculated according to Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), which is reported in SEC filings”. As for the 
prevalence of GAAP forecasting, Bradshaw et al. (2018) found that for the period from 2003 
to 2015, nearly 70% of firms with a non-GAAP forecast available also have a GAAP 
earnings forecast, with this percentage increasing to nearly 90% for the period 2009-2015. 
Although GAAP forecasts are fairly new to the accounting literature, some previous 
studies have examined the items that analysts exclude from their non-GAAP forecasts. One 
branch of research has examined whether analysts simply mimic management to exclude 
items. Shane and Stock (2006) investigated whether analysts could correctly identify and 
interpret the temporary income effects of firms’ earnings management activities. In the 
context of the decline in the statutory tax rate enacted in the Tax Reform Act of 1996, 
managers’ income shifting behaviours refer to shifting income from fourth quarters in higher 
tax rate years to immediately following first quarters of lower tax rate years. Shane and Stock 
(2006) concluded that rather than consciously disregarding the income shifting behaviours, 
analysts are instead incapable of recognising transitory components of firm-reported 
earnings, and thus follow managers to exclude items as non-recurring. Chen (2010) 
examined whether analysts fully understand the persistence of non-GAAP exclusions, 
concluding that, whilst they, to a certain extent, acknowledge the persistence of exclusion 
items (items which managers exclude from non-GAAP earnings to meet or beat analysts’ 
earnings forecasts), they still underestimate the persistence of other exclusions. This 
tendency to underestimate improves in the post-Reg G period but remains a persistent 
phenomenon throughout the period examined.  
In contrast to these findings, other studies claim that analysts do not simply follow 
management to exclude items either because of opportunism or to provide investors with 
valuable information. For instance, Lambert (2004) argues that analysts’ decisions to 
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exclude certain items and forecast non-GAAP earnings are due to self-interest rather than 
for the benefit of investors.  Using detailed First Call footnote data on analysts’ exclusion 
decisions, Baik et al. (2009) found that analysts treat nonrecurring items differently for 
glamour stocks and value stocks. Analysts are more likely to exclude expenses for glamour 
stocks that should be included in non-GAAP earnings. In contrast, focusing on specific 
issues of recognising stock-based compensation expenses in response to SFAS 123R’s 
requirements, Barth et al. (2012) find that unlike managers who opportunistically exclude 
expense to increase or smooth earnings, the primary explanation for analysts excluding 
expenses is that it increases their predictive abilities. Gu and Chen (2004) argue that 
exclusion items are less persistent and there is no evidence showing that the pricing 
differential between included items and exclusion items leads to abnormal future returns. 
Nevertheless, using hand-collected data of other exclusions or a sub-sample, Whipple 
(2015) finds that the items excluded by analysts are informative and relate to non-cash items 
that are further discounted by investors.24 Among 563 firm-quarter observations with 963 
other exclusions that Whipple hand-collected, 22% are stock based compensation, 21% are 
amortization, 13% are investment gains or losses and 29% are one-time items or errors in 
the Compustat calculation of EPS effects of special items. 
Currently, debates concerning the motives and causal factors underlying analysts’ 
tendencies to exclude certain items, including the methodology and selection framework 
utilised in implementing such exclusions, persist. Most previous studies are limited to 
particular contexts or specific settings, such as stock compensation expenses. This could be 
because analysts’ exclusion items are ambiguous even in their reports. The dearth of explicit 
reconciliations between non-GAAP and GAAP earnings forecasts could also be a result of 
   
24 According to Whipple (2015), ‘other exclusions’ refer to the differences between I/B/E/S non-GAAP 
earnings and Compustat operating earnings (earnings prior to the influence of special items). These items are 
mainly comprised of recurring exclusion items. 
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an inability to identify and interpret certain items, or a reluctance to communicate private 
information truthfully. However, disaggregated forecasts have increased since the early 
2000s (Bradshaw et al., 2018), including forecasts of revenues, taxes and cash flows (Givoly 
et al., 2009). In addition, the availability of individual analysts’ GAAP forecasts on I/B/E/S 
further provides a chance to examine the difference between the GAAP and non-GAAP 
forecasts. Understanding the variation in analysts’ forecast exclusions can help to better 
understand the incentives of analysts, and forecast exclusions can be used to test market 
reaction and informativeness to items representing the difference between GAAP and non-
GAAP EPS.  
 
4.2.2    Discussion of dispersion in analysts’ forecasts and stock returns 
Prior studies provide conflicting evidence on the relationship between dispersion in 
analysts’ earnings forecasts and stock returns. Diether et al. (2002) and Johnson (2004) both 
find that there is a negative relationship between dispersion in analyst’s earnings forecasts 
and cross-sectional stock returns. The underlying interpretation for the same result, however, 
differs in these two studies. Diether et al. (2002) argue that the differences of opinions 
among analysts reflect information asymmetry and their results reject the explanation of 
dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts as a measure of risk.  
Consistent with Miller’s (1977) model conjecturing that stock prices reflect optimistic 
valuations when opinions diverge since pessimistic investors are prevented from selling the 
stock because of short-sale constraint and investors are assumed to be overconfident about 
the valuation. Diether et al. (2002) further explain that when rational and informed investors 
do not sell the overvalued stocks because of short-sale constraints, uninformed investors 
could subconsciously and erroneously assume that they agree with the market price. The 
stock price then remains upwardly biased, resulting in the lower future stock returns. Thus, 
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the underlying assumption is that any frictions, including the unique incentive structure of 
analysts that prevent the release of negative information will lead to a negative relationship 
between dispersion in analysts’ forecast and stock returns. However, while Diether et al. 
(2002) view dispersion in analysts’ non-GAAP forecasts as a proxy for differences of 
opinion among investors, Garfinkel (2009) argue that analysts’ forecast dispersion is a poor 
measure of different opinions among investors. Instead, this measure could be biased by 
analysts’ complex incentive structures including career concerns (Hong and Kubik, 2003), 
the drive to curry favour with management (Lim, 2001), and increasing investment-banking 
business (Ljungqvist et al., 2006). Thus, GAAP earnings which are under strict regulation 
and standards may better coincide with investors’ views and analysts have less freedom on 
playing this number. 
Different from Diether et alia’s (2002) interpretation, Johnson (2004) provides a 
risk-based explanation for the dispersion anomaly based on option-pricing theory. He argues 
that dispersion reflects uncertainty and proxies for the unsystematic risk (idiosyncratic risk) 
of a firm regarding the unobservable part of the underlying firm value. Using Fama and 
MacBeth (1973) regressions of monthly stock returns on forecast dispersion, Johnson (2004) 
also demonstrates a negative relationship between dispersion in analysts’ forecasts and stock 
returns. His pricing model indicates that the option value will increase as the idiosyncratic 
risk of a firm increases. The dispersion levels reflect this risk and explains why firms with 
higher dispersion in analyst’s earnings forecasts earn lower returns. Avramov et al. (2009) 
provide another interpretation of dispersion anomaly. They find that higher forecast 
dispersion is related to higher financial distress, and the lower future stock returns are 
associated with correspondingly weak credit ratings.  
Following the theoretical model and empirical proxies developed by Barron et al. 
(1998), Barron et al. (2009) decompose the dispersion level into two components: 
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uncertainty and information asymmetry. The uncertainty part is represented by the errors in 
the mean forecasts. The information asymmetry part is represented by the variation in 
individual forecasts around the mean forecast. They further confirm that uncertainty rather 
than information asymmetry drives the negative relationship between dispersion in analysts’ 
forecasts and stock return. However, it is noteworthy that Barron et al. (2009) measure the 
uncertainty part using the mean squared differences between individual analysts’ forecasts 
(non-GAAP EPS forecast) and reported earnings per share (GAAP EPS). The error in the 
mean forecasts could be either non-GAAP forecast error (∑ (𝐹𝐶𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑖 − 𝐸𝑃𝑆)
2𝑛
𝑖=1 /𝑛) or 
GAAP forecast error (∑ (𝐹𝐶𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑖 − 𝐸𝑃𝑆)
2𝑛
𝑖=1 /𝑛). It is plausible that the misalignment 
between non-GAAP earnings forecasts and actual GAAP earnings numbers and 
measurement error may bias these results. Abarbanell and Lehavy (2007), Berger (2005) 
and Bradshaw et al. (2018) put forward this research design issues associated with some 
studies, especially, the GAAP expectation error, which results from the fact that researchers 
generally use I/B/E/S adjusted or unadjusted actual earnings forecasts as a proxy for GAAP 
earnings expectations. Cohen et al. (2007) document that the misalignment between GAAP 
earnings with non-GAAP earnings forecasts could lead to a downward bias in GAAP 
earnings response coefficients (ERCs). The “errors in variables” problem caused by 
measurement errors in GAAP earnings surprise could contaminate the ERC divergence 
result significantly by overstating the difference between the GAAP and Street ERCs. 
However, similar to prior studies, they do not have access to directly assess GAAP forecasts. 
Christensen (2007) argue that we still do not fully understand the impact of measurement 
error on prior findings.  
While Barron et al. (2009) corroborate the uncertainty risk explanation of dispersion 
anomaly, a recent study by Veenman and Verwigmeren (2020) supports the investors’ 
mispricing of earnings expectations as an explanation for the dispersion anomaly. They 
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argue that investors’ inability to unravel differences in firms’ propensity to meet earnings 
expectations explains the negative association between dispersion in analysts’ forecasts and 
stock returns. Specifically, when firms seek to meet analysts’ exceptions by managing 
earnings (Jackson and Liu, 2010) or the information set provided to analysts (Gryta et al., 
2016), they are more likely to increase the precision of analysts’ information (Cotterr et al., 
2006). In addition, analysts are likely to issue short-term pessimistic forecasts that allow 
firms to handily meet the expectations (Veenman and Verwijmeren, 2018). Bissessur and 
Veenman (2016) find that analysts are more able to do so when the level of disagreement is 
low. Thus, forecast dispersion is expected to be negatively related to firms’ propensity to 
meet earnings expectations. However, investors cannot fully unravel analysts’ opportunistic 
behaviours and this strategic interaction between managers and analysts. They misprice the 
earnings expectations thereafter, especially for firms with a high propensity to meet 
analysts’ expectations (Veenman and Verwigmeren, 2020). Nevertheless, this novel 
interpretation is subject to certain limitations. In particular, the meet-or-beat classification 
is determined by the difference between actual EPS and mean consensus forecast EPS from 
I/B/E/S. Both are analysts’ non-GAAP earnings measures. However, the appropriateness of 
using I/B/E/S data to proxy for managers’ non-GAAP reporting is under question (Easton, 
2003; Berger, 2005). For instance, Bentley et al. (2018) report that managers’ and analysts’ 
non-GAAP disclosures differ in systematic ways.  
Previous research on the relationship between stock returns and dispersion in 
analysts’ forecast generally use I/B/E/S non-GAAP performance measures that usually 
deviate substantially from GAAP earnings by excluding certain items, to calculate the level 
of dispersion. Typical exclusions are one-time items including gain and losses on disposal 
and extraordinary items. These are usually excluded to provide investors with more 
persistent and sustainable earnings (Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Nichols et al., 2005). 
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However, there is an increasing trend that analysts also exclude recurring items such as 
amortization and stock compensations (Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Whipple, 2015; Black et 
al., 2018) 
Johnson (2004) raises a question that whether the assumed unbiased analyst’s views 
are subject to perturbations is still on doubt. Thus, the dispersion level itself may be a 
function of analyst’s incentive structures. Analysts may choose to converge to forecast 
consensus or optimistically increase their forecast earnings due to career concerns. This 
phenomenon is especially noteworthy since analysts have more discretion with non-GAAP 
performance measures. Though it is generally acknowledged that analysts provide 
proportionately reliable and informative non-GAAP performance measures as their 
performance is intimately entwined with the incentive of maximizing the value of their 
forecast to investors, analysts are not obliged to fully communicate their private information 
to investors. Empirical studies have found evidence that analysts sometimes distort their 
reports.  
Examining analysts’ affiliation with management, Dugar and Nathan (1995) find 
that analysts could bias their earnings forecasts to maintain a positive relationship with 
management, and those analysts who do not have an affiliation with management make more 
accurate forecasts. Michaely and Womack (1999) confirmed this by concluding that 
recommendations by affiliated analysts show significant evidence of bias, and the market 
does not recognise the full effect of this bias. Other studies attempt to recognise analysts’ 
incentives by looking at the determinants of their performance evaluation. Hong et al. 
(2000a) find that analysts are less likely to gain a promotion and more likely to leave the 
I/B/E/S database if issuing a less accurate forecast, an effect that is more prominent for 
analysts who are less experienced. After controlling for forecast accuracy, Hong and Kubik 
(2003) document that there is a higher probability for analysts who issue an optimistic 
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earnings forecasts to move to a top tier brokerage house. Overall, therefore, analysts’ non-
GAAP forecasts that previous literature often uses to calculate dispersion could be distorted 
due to analysts’ incentives and may bias previous results.  
The issue of biased analysts’ views could be scrutinised by separating the non-GAAP 
earnings forecasts into two components: GAAP earnings forecasts and forecast exclusions. 
Bratten et al. (2020) directly examine the relationship between analysts’ characteristics and 
exclusion behaviours on an individual analyst level. They obtain data from 2004 to 2016 
and test the association between variation in analysts’ forecasted exclusions and various 
excluded GAAP earnings items. The results show that analysts’ exclusions are associated 
with opportunism, and analysts who are more experienced and with more resources tend to 
exclude less from their non-GAAP forecast, especially income-decreasing and recurring 
items. The underlying assumption is that analysts with more experience and resources are 
less concerned about currying favour with management, and thus exclude fewer items than 
inexperienced analysts. Furthermore, GAAP forecast accuracy decreases as the magnitude 
of analysts’ forecast exclusions increases. This is consistent with Doyle et al. (2003) who 
argue that special items and one-time items are more defendable and justifiable while the 
motivation for excluding recurring items by analysts is less clear. Nevertheless, the negative 
future cash flow is related to recurring exclusion items.  
Although Bratten et al. (2020) provide insight into analysts’ forecast exclusions, 
whether the market can properly identify this opportunism and whether investors are misled 
by different opinions in analysts’ forecasted exclusions remains unknown. As Doyle et al. 
(2003) state, there is a chance that investors are misled by opportunistically adjusted 
earnings figures. Beyer et al. (2010) also indicate that due to insufficient information about 
analysts’ incentives, users of analysts’ reports are generally unable to fully anticipate the 
bias in these reports. However, they do to a certain extent take analysts’ incentives into 
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consideration when making inferences about firm performance. Thus, the role of dispersion 
in analysts’ GAAP forecasts and dispersion in exclusions in predicting the cross section of 
future returns is worthy of further examination.  
 
4.3       Hypothesis Development 
As GAAP earnings forecasts are produced according to a comparatively rigid set of 
accounting standards and analysts are assumed to have less freedom to choose their own 
accounting definitions, consistent with Diether et al. (2002), my first hypothesis views 
dispersion in GAAP forecasts as a proxy for differences of opinion among investors.  
Miller (1977) argues that short-sale constraints prevent pessimistic investors from 
selling the stock when opinions diverge, and optimistic demand pushes stock prices up. This 
further results in lower stock returns when stock price is eventually adjusted downwards. 
Diether et al. (2002) further develop this idea and argue that any friction that prevents the 
release of negative opinions will produce the negative relation between dispersion in 
forecasts and future returns since the market price will be upwardly biased.  
Though Miller’s (1977) underlying assumption of “optimistic investors” indicates 
they may be overconfident, Diether et al. (2002) claim that investors who are not 
overconfident may erroneously interpret the behaviours of informed investors. Specifically, 
the informed investors may not be able to trade to correct for the mispricing because of 
trading cost and short-sale constraints, but other investors may assume that the informed 
investors agree with the current price and thus do not revise valuation downwardly. This 
eventually results in the current market price not incorporating negative information 
correctly and is upwardly biased. In another aspect, unfavourable news is usually not 
disclosed to a full extent (Hong et al., 2000b) though analysts disagree more on this negative 
news (Ciccone, 2003). Possible reasons could be that analysts choose to stop covering the 
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stock (McNichols and O’Brien, 1977) when they are extremely pessimistic, or they are often 
reluctant to communicate negative news with investors due to the incentive to please 
managers. In either case, for firms associated with higher divergence of opinions, the current 
market prices may not fully reflect the negative information but are upwardly biased, which 
eventually result in lower return.  
The recent study by Bradshaw et al. (2018) addresses the importance of GAAP 
forecasts and suggests that the credibility of non-GAAP earnings is increased when GAAP 
forecasts are also provided. In addition, Cain et al. (2020) warn that dispersion in analysts’ 
non-GAAP forecasts may be correlated with managers’ non-GAAP reporting, while 
managers are likely to mis-classify recurring expenses as non-recurring. As discussed above, 
dispersion in GAAP forecasts can be a proxy for differences of opinion among investors, 
thus, I assume that firms with higher dispersion in analysts’ GAAP forecasts will have lower 
future stock returns. My first hypothesis is stated as follows: 
H4.1: Stocks with higher dispersion in analysts’ GAAP forecasts have lower future 
returns. 
In consideration of the forecast exclusions, currently there is little literature 
exploring this question. It is still unclear whether the dispersion in forecast exclusions 
reflects the uncertainty or the disagreement on accounting regime. It could also result from 
the fact that some analysts may opportunistically adjust earnings numbers. Bratten et al. 
(2020) find that the variation in exclusions is associated with analyst opportunism. Their 
evidence also shows that firms with more income-decreasing and recurring items have 
higher dispersion in analysts’ forecast exclusions. Analysts may choose not to fully and truly 
report and communicate their private information with investors due to their unique 
incentive structure. Specifically, analysts may ignore or discount private information 
because of career concerns (Trueman, 1994), incentives to curry favour with managers (Lim, 
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2001) and incentives to increase investment banking business (Richardson et al. 2004). In 
this case, some analysts may choose to issue more favourable or bearable street earnings 
forecasts through excluding more income-decreasing items. As found by Bratten et al. 
(2020), those analysts who have greater resources and are more experienced are less likely 
to be associated with income-decreasing and recurring excluding items since they are less 
concerned about currying favour with management. Therefore, different from the underlying 
assumption of hypothesis 4.1, the dispersion in forecast exclusions may not act as a proxy 
for differences of opinion among investors in this situation but may act as a proxy for analyst 
opportunism. If investors are aware of this opportunistic exclusion behaviour and are not 
misled by earnings measures that are adjusted by analysts, the current stock price and future 
stock returns could be independent from the current level of disagreement about the 
exclusion items.  
However, if the dispersion in analyst’ forecast exclusions reflects the uncertainty 
risk or investors simply underreact to the information for firms with higher dispersion in 
exclusion, it could result in a positive relationship between dispersion in analyst’ forecast 
exclusions and future return. It is possible that dispersion in exclusions could capture 
uncertainty risk and investors require compensation for future stock return. The uncertainty 
and imperfection of the market could lead to the appearance of risk premium. Merton 
(1987)’s model predicts a positive relationship between stock returns and idiosyncratic risk 
and Fu (2009)’s empirical evidence further supports this. Furthermore, it is also plausible 
that investors underreact to the information for firms with higher dispersion in exclusion as 
analysts disagree more. The current stock price could then be downwardly biased, further 
resulting in a higher future return when stock price eventually corrects upward. To test this 
prediction, my second hypothesis, stated in the null form is as follows: 




4.4       Research Design 
4.4.1    Data and sample characteristics 
The sample begins in January 2004 since GAAP earnings forecasts became available in 
Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) in 2003 and the sample period is from 
January 2004 to December 2016. The statistics include NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq stocks. 
The data on individual analyst’ GAAP forecasts and non-GAAP forecasts are taken from 
I/B/E/S Detailed History. Stock return is acquired from CRSP and fundamental accounting 
information including market value and book value of equity are acquired from 
COMPUSTAT. To be included in my final sample, the firm is required to have data available 
on I/B/E/S, CRSP and COMPUSTAT and is covered by at least two analysts. The final 
sample consists of 202,666 firm-month observations on U.S. firms 
Exclusions are calculated using non-GAAP earnings forecasts minus GAAP 
earnings forecast. Individual analyst’ forecasts are retrieved from Detail History file of 
I/B/E/S. As Diether et al. (2002) identify, the forecast data from Summary History file is 
adjusted historically for stock splits to provide smooth time series earnings forecast. Using 
detail forecast data is more suitable for this research especially, the average and standard 
deviations of individual forecasts are calculated each month.  
I use individual forecasts from Detailed History I/B/E/S file to calculate the 
dispersion measures. If analysts make more than one forecasts in a given month, only the 
latest forecast is retained. Each analyst record includes a revision date which is the date that 
the forecast was last confirmed. I extend the current forecast until its revision date. For 
example, if a forecast is made in January and the revision date is in March and if there is no 
updated forecast by the same analyst for the firm of interest during this period, this forecast 
number will be used in the computation of dispersion for January, February and March. 
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However, in some records, the gap between forecasts announcement date and revision date 
is too long (for example, more than 360 days). Therefore, I only retain the forecast to 
calculate dispersion for up to six months from the date the forecast is issued. In cases of an 
error in I/B/E/S that a revision date precedes the forecast date, I follow Diether et al. (2002) 
to use the earnings forecasts only for the month it is issued.    
 
4.4.2    Regression analysis 
Following Diether et al. (2002), Johnson (2004) and Barron et al. (2009), I use regression 
models to examine the relationship between stock returns and dispersion in analysts’ non-
GAAP forecast, dispersion in analysts’ GAAP forecasts and dispersion in analysts’ forecast 
exclusions respectively. 
Specifically, stocks are assigned to portfolios (five quantiles) based on 
characteristics including dispersion in non-GAAP forecasts, dispersion in GAAP forecasts, 
dispersion in forecast exclusions, size and book to market ratio. After variables are assigned 
into quintiles, the quintile ranks are further scaled to a standardised quintile rank from 0 to 
1 following Barron et al. (2009). All variables are winsorised at level 1% and 99%.  
Following Johnson (2004) and Barron et al. (2009), I use monthly Fama-Macbeth 
regressions (1973) of stock returns on measures of analysts forecast dispersion, size and 
book to market ratio quintile rank. The Fama-Macbeth method estimates the betas and risk 
premia for any risk factors that are expected to determine asset prices. The dependent 
variable is the monthly stock returns following the month in which forecast dispersion and 
its components are measured. Stocks in each month are assigned quintiles based on 
dispersion, size and book to market ratio independently. Measures are transformed into 
standardised ranks and are used for all the independent variables in the regression. Size and 
book to market ratio are measures at the end of the prior fiscal year-end. Fama- Macbeth 
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cross-sectional regressions are estimated every month from January 2004 through December 
2016. All variable definitions are presented in Appendix A4.1 
 
4.5       Results 
4.5.1    Descriptive statistics  
Table 4.1 reports the descriptive statistics for the whole sample from January 2004 to 
December 2016. All variables require non-missing data from I/B/E/S, COMPUSTAT and 
CRSP database. The sample consists of 202,666 firm-month observations on U.S. firms. 
According to Table 1, the average monthly stock return is 1% and the standard deviation of 
stock returns is 11.4%. Half of the firms in this sample earn a monthly return lower than 
0.9%. This sample includes relatively large firms with mean market value of $8,522 million 
and a median market value of $1,910 million. This size bias is due to the requirement of the 
data belonging to the intersection of CRSP, COMPUSTAT and I/B/E/S. The average book 
to market ratio is 0.529 with a minimum of -0.291 and maximum of 2.551. Regarding the 
variables of interest, the mean value of dispersion in analysts’ non-GAAP forecasts 
(Dis_nonGAAP) is 0.021, indicating that on average, the standard deviation of analysts’ one 
year ahead adjusted earnings per share (EPS) forecasts is 2.1% of stock price. In comparison, 
the mean value of dispersion in analysts’ GAAP forecasts (Dis_GAAP) is slightly higher, at 
0.026 or 2.6%. The median is 0.003, which is also higher than the median of Dis_nonGAAP 
(0.002). This is reasonable: when making GAAP forecasts, analysts are supposed to consider 
the potential exclusions that are more difficult to forecast.    
The dispersion in forecast exclusions (Dis_Ex), with mean value of 0.01 and median 
of 0.001, is smaller than the dispersion in non-GAAP or GAAP earnings forecast. This could 
result from the fact that exclusions are largely attributable to non-recurring items (Bradshaw 
and Sloan, 2002), and recurring items generally occupy a small part proportion of earnings. 
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The mean adjustment (Meanadj), which is the difference between non-GAAP earnings 
forecasts and GAAP earnings forecasts scaled by stock price, has a mean value of 0.01 and 
median value of 0.000. This suggests that on average, analysts’ non-GAAP forecasts are 
greater than GAAP forecast, with a difference of around 1% of stock price. This average 
upward adjustment may provide investors with more valuable information on operational 
performance (Chen, 2010), but may also be consistent with Baik et alia’s (2009) study, 
which finds that analysts announce higher non-GAAP performance metrics because of the 
opportunistic incentives such as currying favour with managers.   
In order to explore the association between stock returns and dispersion in analysts’ 
forecasts, I first adopt a standard approach in asset pricing pioneered by Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993). Specifically, each month, I assign stocks to five portfolios (D1 to D5) based 
on dispersion in analysts’ forecasts as of the previous month. Stocks with the highest 
dispersion are assigned to group D5 and stocks with the lowest dispersion are assigned to 
group D1. I then compute the equally weighted monthly buy and hold stock returns for each 
portfolio.  
Table 4.2 reports the mean portfolio returns by dispersion in analysts’ forecasts. The 
first column (1) of table 4.2 shows that when ranking by dispersion in analysts’ non-GAAP 
forecasts, the difference between the average monthly stock return of D5 group and that of 
D1 is -0.5%, and is statistically significant at 1 percent. When ranking the portfolios based 
on dispersion in analysts’ GAAP forecasts and dispersion in forecast exclusions, this return 
difference on the D5-D1 strategy for column (2) and (3) is -0.49%, and -0.25% respectively, 
and both are statistically significant at the 1% level. Thus, a portfolio in the highest rank of 
dispersion in analysts’ forecasts underperforms a portfolio in the lowest rank of dispersion 
in analysts’ forecasts. This indicates that there is a negative relationship between stock 
returns and dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts. However, this evidence does not take 
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into consideration other risk characteristics that can affect stock returns (for example, the 
common measures of risk that are well documented in the literature include firm size and 
book to market ratio (Fama and French, 1995; Barber and Lyon, 1997)).  
 
4.5.2    Stock returns and dispersion in analysts’ forecasts 
In this section, following Johnson (2004) and Barron et al. (2009), I further analyse the 
relationship between stock return and dispersion in non-GAAP forecasts, dispersion in 
GAAP forecasts and dispersion in forecast exclusions respectively using Fama and MacBeth 
(1973) regressions. Size and book to market ratio are introduced as control variables here 
and are measured as the end of the prior year. Consistent with Barron et al. (2009), I assign 
stocks to quintiles based on dispersion, size and book to market ratio separately and further 
scale it to the [0, 1] range. The monthly return is regressed on dispersion and other control 
variables in the prior month. The whole sample consists of 202,666 observations and 156 
months from January 2004 to December 2016.  
Table 4.3 presents the correlation matrix for the variables used in the regressions. 
Consistent with hypothesis 4.1, the correlation between Ret and Dis_GAAP_qr is 
significantly negative (-0.0145). The significant negative correlation between Ret and 
Dis_nonGAAP_qr (-0.0148) is consistent with previous findings that stocks with higher 
dispersion in analysts’ non-GAAP forecasts earn lower future stock returns. Size_qr is 
significantly and negatively correlated with Dis_nonGAAP_qr (-0.2915) and Dis_GAAP_qr 
(-0.2059), indicating that larger firms generally have lower dispersion in analysts’ forecasts. 
Because larger firms have more publicly available information (Bhushan, 1989) and more 
analysts following them, these firms have relatively lower information asymmetry (Yohn, 
1998), thus the magnitude of disagreement among analysts’ forecasts is smaller. With the 
exception of Dis_nonGAAP_qr and Dis_GAAP_qr being highly correlated (0.7376), other 
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correlations suggest that multicollinearity is not likely to be a serious problem in the 
regression. 
Table 4.4 presents the Fama-MacBeth regression results. The coefficients are time-
series mean coefficients. In column (1), the coefficient on the quintile rank of dispersion in 
non-GAAP earnings forecasts (Dis_nonGAAP_qr) is -0.0086. This negative coefficient is 
consistent with the evidence in Diether et al. (2002), Johnson (2004) and Barron et al. (2009) 
that there is a negative relationship between stock returns and dispersion in analysts’ non-
GAAP forecasts.  
In column (2), the coefficient on the quintile rank of dispersion in GAAP earnings 
forecasts (Dis_GAAP_qr) is -0.0076 and significant at 1% level. This result is consistent 
with hypothesis 4.1 and indicates that larger differences in opinions on GAAP earnings 
forecasts are also associated with lower future stock returns. When separately including only 
the quintile rank of dispersion in exclusions (Dis_Ex_qr) as independent variable in column 
(3), the coefficient becomes insignificant. This could be driven by the fact that forecast 
exclusions are usually considered together with the fundamental GAAP forecasts. 
Dispersion in forecast exclusions itself may reflect less information and the association with 
future stock returns becomes insignificant. In column (4), the coefficients on Dis_GAAP_qr 
remains negative (-0.0090) and the coefficients on forecast exclusions becomes positive 
(0.0032) and significant at 5% level. The R2 changes modestly from 3.4% in column (2) to 
3.8% in column (4), reflecting that though very small, dispersion in forecast exclusions has 
an incremental explanatory power for the variation in stock price.  
Consistent with Barron et al. (2009), coefficients on size quintile rank (Size_qr) and 
book to market ratio quintile rank (BTM_qr) are insignificant in four models.  This could 
result from the requirement that the sample has both GAAP and non-GAAP forecasts and 
satisfies the requirement of other data availability, so the sample consists relatively large 
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firms with mean market value $8,522 million and lower book to market ratios. Another 
possibility is that dispersion factors subsume these size and book to market factors. 
The positive coefficient on Dis_Ex_qr in column (4) can be consistent with the 
argument that divergent opinions on forecast exclusions captures the uncertainty risk and 
idiosyncratic volatilities on the firm. Investors generally do not hold diversified portfolios 
in reality and require a return compensation for bearing higher idiosyncratic risk. Merton’s 
(1987) model predicts this positive relationship between stock returns and idiosyncratic risk 
and Fu’s (2009) empirical evidence further supports this using EGARCH model to estimate 
the idiosyncratic volatilities. Earnings exclusions generally include more one-time items and 
items that are more difficult to forecast and could reflect analysts’ evaluation of firm’s future 
potential uncertainty. Nevertheless, there is also another possibility, namely that investors 
simply underreact to the information in earnings when analysts’ opinions diverge as they 
could be uncertain about the reliability of the information, especially when analysts have 
more freedom in adjusting forecast exclusions. In this case, undervalued current stock price 
could lead to higher future return as stock price corrects upward. Therefore, the findings 
regarding dispersion of exclusions could be consistent with both uncertainty risk and 
mispricing arguments. It is also important to note that this result is not necessarily 
contradictory to Bratten et al.’s (2020) finding that exclusions are associated with 
opportunism. The reason is that higher variation in exclusions could be caused by some 
analysts excluding more income-decreasing items due to career concerns or unique 
incentives. This could be viewed by investors as uncertainty and they may also underreact 




4.5.3   The effect of firm characteristics on the relationship between stock returns and 
dispersion in analysts’ forecast 
To further understand the underlying explanation for the positive association between 
disagreements on analyst’ forecast exclusions and future stock return, I divide the sample 
into two groups according to firm characteristics, specifically intangible assets. Srivastava 
(2014) documents the decline in earnings quality over past 40 year and ascribe this to 
possible higher intangible intensity. Lev and Gu (2016) also argue that traditional financial 
reports become less useful over years and recent studies show that this is especially for 
companies that hold large intangibles. The underlying reason is that current accounting 
standards do not allow firms to capitalise intangible investments and such investment as 
R&D expense and restructuring costs are treated as expense on income statement. Lev and 
Zarowin (1999) argue that these are not matched with the revenues in later years and 
consequently distort the informativeness of financial information. However, analysts in their 
forecasted non-GAAP earnings numbers can exclude items such as restructuring charges, 
stock-based compensation and they may have more disagreement when treating these items 
for firms with intangible assets. According to Barron et al. (2002), analysts’ dispersion is 
positively associated with the levels of firms’ intangibles. In addition, intangible assets 
usually contain more complex information and are more difficult to value due to the high 
uncertainty (Gu and Wang, 2005). Therefore, it is expected that the exclusion dispersion-
return relationship is stronger among firms with higher intangible assets. 
Table 4.5 presents the analysis for sub-samples. Columns (1) and (3) in Table 4.5 
present results for firms without intangible assets and columns (2) and (4) show the results 
for firms with intangible assets. When regressing the stock returns on dispersion in analysts’ 
non-GAAP forecasts, the coefficient on Dis_nonGAAP_qr is significantly higher (i.e., less 
negative) (-0.0059) in column (1) compared to the coefficient (-0.0222) in column (2), 
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indicating that the negative relationship between stock returns and dispersion in analysts’ 
non-GAAP forecasts is stronger for firms without intangible assets compared to firms with 
intangible assets.25 Compared to the insignificant coefficients on Dis_Ex_qr in column (3) 
(0.0010), the coefficient is 0.0039 in column (4) and significant at the 5% level. This 
indicates that when GAAP earnings numbers may not fully convey the long-run 
performance of firm with high intangible assets, investors could obtain useful information 
from the disagreement on forecast exclusions, and this disagreement captures the uncertainty 
risk of firms with intangible assets. However, I cannot completely rule out the possibility 
that investors may be misled by analysts’ intentional manipulation on forecast exclusions. 
 
4.5.4   The effect of managers’ reported exclusion earnings on the relationship between stock 
returns and dispersion in analysts’ forecast 
In this section, I explore whether the positive relationship between stock returns and 
dispersion in analysts’ forecast exclusions is affected by managers’ choices to report 
exclusion earnings. Analysts can have different opinions on whether certain components of 
GAAP earnings should be included or excluded from non-GAAP earning (Baik et al., 2008) 
and these decisions are often subjective (Gu and Chen, 2004). Managers, however, can 
report their own non-GAAP figures and this can differ from analysts’ non-GAAP earnings 
data available on I/B/E/S (Berger et al., 2010). Bhattacharya et al. (2003) find that managers 
disagree with I/B/E/S reported non-GAAP earnings for one-third of their hand-collected 
sample.  Bentley et al. (2018) further explore this important question by creating the first 
large-sample data set of managers’ non-GAAP earnings disclosure. They find that although 
managers’ and analysts’ non-GAAP figures overlap, 23% of the I/B/E/S non-GAAP metrics 
   
25 In untabulated analysis, the chow test is used to test whether the coefficients on Dis_nonGAAP_qr of column 




are not explicitly reported by managers. Because analysts mainly receive information from 
managerial disclosures and detailed earnings disclosures allow analysts to filter out certain 
earnings components, managers’ reported non-GAAP performance metrics act as a 
benchmark and further limits the potential opportunistic behaviour of analysts. This 
motivates my analysis of sub-samples of managers’ exclusion disclosures. The publicly 
available data on managers’ non-GAAP reporting from Bentley et al. (2018) allows me to 
identify whether managers’ report exclusion earnings in the sample periods.  
Table 4.6 reports the regression results. I introduce a dummy variable Mgr_Exl that 
takes the value of 1 if manager reports exclusion earnings, and otherwise 0. Columns (1) 
and (3) in Table 4.6 present the analysis for firms without managers’ non-GAAP disclosures 
and columns (2) and (4) show the results firms with managers’ non-GAAP disclosures.  
The coefficient on Dis_nonGAAP_qr in column (1) is -0.0099 and significant at the 
1% level and -0.0059 in column (2) and significant at the 10% level, indicating that when 
firms report non-GAAP earnings, the association between analysts’ disagreement on non-
GAAP earnings forecasts and future stock price is weaker.  
This could be ascribed to the lower information asymmetry when managers provide 
information on excluded earnings components. When regressing the future stock returns on 
Dis_GAAP_qr and Dis_Ex_qr, the coefficient on Dis_Ex_qr is insignificant (0.0020) in 
column (3) but significantly positive (0.0068) at the 10% level in column (4). This result 
provides suggestive evidence on the uncertainty risk effect of dispersion in forecast 
exclusions. When firms provide non-GAAP earnings disclosures, investors are able to 
reconcile analysts’ forecast exclusions to managers’ excluded earnings components and the 
benchmark role of managers’ exclusion disclosures could help to lower the risk of analysts’ 
opportunistic behaviour. If investors still price the information from the disagreement on 
forecast exclusions, they might perceive it as capturing the fundamental uncertainty risk 
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about firm value instead of accounting distortions, and require a compensation for bearing 
more risk.  
 
4.6       Conclusion 
Prior research indicates that the divergence of opinion between analysts is negatively 
associated with future stock returns (Abarbanell, Lanen and Verrecchia, 1995; Johnson, 
2004; Doukas et al., 2006; Barron et al., 2009). The analysts’ forecasts being used to 
compute the dispersion in previous studies refers to the non-GAAP earnings forecasts. This 
chapter separates the dispersion in analysts’ non-GAAP forecasts into dispersion in analysts’ 
GAAP forecasts and dispersion in exclusions’ forecasts, and evaluates the association 
between dispersion in analysts’ forecasts and future stock returns. The availability of GAAP 
forecasts on I/B/E/S since 2004 enables me to provide more insights into analysts’ GAAP 
forecasts and forecast exclusions. I find that both dispersion in non-GAAP forecasts and 
dispersion in GAAP forecasts are negatively associated with future stock returns. Because 
analysts have less freedom in adjusting the GAAP numbers, dispersion in GAAP forecasts 
could better proxy for differences of opinion between investors. When opinions diverge, 
stock prices are currently overpriced due to information asymmetry (Miller, 1977; Diether 
et al., 2002), and this leads to future lower stock return.  
In addition, I find that the levels of disagreement on exclusions from GAAP forecasts 
are positively associated with future stock return. This may result from the compensation 
required for higher uncertainty risk or mispricing of divergence of analysts’ opinion. In 
additional sub-sample tests of the effect of managers reported exclusion earnings on the 
relationship between stock returns and dispersion in analysts’ forecast exclusions, the 
evidence suggests that disagreement on forecast exclusions may capture the uncertainty risk. 
Overall, my findings suggest that analysts’ disagreement about managers’ accounting choice 
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has important implication for investors. I also provide further evidence on the role of 
dispersion of analyst’ GAAP forecasts and dispersion of exclusions in predicting the cross-
sectional future returns. The differences between GAAP and non-GAAP forecasts should 
be emphasized in future studies aiming to investigate the analysts’ forecasts dispersion. 
However, the findings could be limited as the control variables applied in the return 
predictability tests include only firm size and book to market ratios. Future research may 
add more control variables such as market beta, momentum factor and analysts’ coverage to 
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 Tables of Chapter 4 
Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
 N Mean S.D. Min Median Max 
Ret 202,666 0.01 0.114 -0.326 0.009 0.382 
Size 202,666 8522.32 20566.96 55.672 1910.154 144684.2 
Ln_size 202,666 7.633 1.674 4.019 7.555 11.882 
BTM 202,666 0.529 0.45 -0.291 0.423 2.551 
Dis_nonGAAP 202,666 0.021 0.09 0.000 0.002 0.772 
Dis_GAAP 202,666 0.026 0.11 0.000 0.003 0.934 
Dis_Ex 202,666 0.010 0.038 0.000 0.001 0.314 
Meanadj 202,666 0.010 0.038 -0.044 0.000 0.302 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the full sample with winsorisation. Extreme values are 
replaced with 1st and 99th percentile values. Ret is the one-month ahead monthly stock return. Size is 
total market value at the end of the prior fiscal year. Ln_size is the natural logarithm of total market 
value (in $m) at the end of the prior fiscal year. BTM is book to market ratio calculated as book value 
divided by market value. Book value is the total stockholders’ equity at the end of the prior fiscal 
year. Dis_nonGAAP is dispersion in analysts’ non-GAAP forecasts measured as the standard 
deviation of analyst’s non-GAAP forecasts scaled by stock price at the end of the prior month. 
Dis_GAAP is dispersion in analysts’ GAAP forecasts measured as the standard deviation of analysts’ 
GAAP forecasts scaled by stock price at the end of the prior month. Dis_Ex is dispersion in analysts’ 
forecast exclusions measured as the standard deviation of analysts’ forecast exclusions scaled by 
stock price at the end of the prior month. Meanadj is analysts’ average forecast exclusions calculated 
as the mean value of forecast exclusions divided by stock price at the end of the prior month. All 




Table 4.2 Mean portfolio returns by dispersion in analyst’ forecasts 
 
 
This table reports the mean portfolio returns by dispersion in analysts’ forecasts. Each month, stocks 
are sorted into five groups based on dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts for the previous month. 
Stocks with highest dispersion are assigned to group D5 and stocks with lowest dispersion are assigned 
to group D1. Mean portfolio return is the equally weighted one-month buy and hold return. Dispersion 
in analysts’ forecasts is defined as the standard deviation of analysts’ forecast scaled by stock price at 
the end of the prior month.  t-statistics are reported in parentheses *, **, *** indicate significance 
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D1 (low) 0.0111  0.0110  0.0106 
D2 0.0115  0.0120  0.0105 
D3 0.0117  0.0110  0.0102 
D4 0.0097  0.0102  0.0105 
D5 (high) 0.0061  0.0061  0.0081 
      
D5-D1 -0.0050***  -0.0049***  -0.0025*** 




Table 4.3 Correlation matrix 
 
Variables Dis_nonGAAP_qr Dis_GAAP_qr Dis_Ex_qr Size_qr BTM_qr 
Ret -0.0148*** -0.0145*** -0.0064*** -0.0101*** 0.0124*** 
Dis_nonGAAP_qr  0.7376*** 0.1771*** -0.2915*** 0.2499*** 
Dis_GAAP_qr   0.3752*** -0.2059*** 0.2223*** 
Dis_Ex_qr    0.1706*** 0.0731*** 
Size_qr     -0.2081*** 
 
This table reports the Pearson correlation matrix for the variables used in the regressions. Ret is the 
monthly stock returns following the month in which forecast dispersion is measured.  
Dis_nonGAAP_qr is the quintile rank of analysts’ dispersion in non-GAAP forecasts. Dis_GAAP_qr 
is the quintile rank of analyst’ dispersion in GAAP forecasts. Dis_Ex_qr is the quintile rank of 
analysts’ dispersion in forecast exclusions. Dispersion in analysts’ forecasts is measured as the 
standard deviation of analyst’ forecasts scaled by stock price at the end of the prior month. Size_qr 
is the quintile rank of firm size. Firm size is measured as the total market value at the end of the prior 
fiscal year. BTM_qr is the quintile rank of book to market ratio. The book to market ratio is calculated 
as book value divided by market value. Book value is the total stockholders’ equity at the end of the 















(1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Dis_nonGAAP_qr -0.0086***    
 (-3.16)    
Dis_GAAP_qr  -0.0076***  -0.0090*** 
  (-3.11)  (-3.62) 
Dis_Ex_qr   -0.0005 0.0032** 
   (-0.31) (2.15) 
Size_qr -0.0003 0.0007 0.0019 - 0.0000 
 (-0.11) (0.25) (0.66) (-0.01) 
BTM_qr 0.0007 0.0003 -0.0012 0.0001 
 (0.27) (0.11) (-0.45) (0.05) 
     
     
Constant 0.0113** 0.0106** 0.00768 0.0103** 
 (2.34) (2.14) (1.46) (2.08) 
     
Observations 202,666 202,666 202,666 202,666 
R-squared 0.036 0.034 0.029 0.038 
Number of groups 156 156 156 156 
 
 
This table presents the Fama-Macbeth regression results of regressing monthly stock returns on 
dispersion in analysts’ forecasts. Fama-Macbeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions are run every 
month from Jan 2004 to Dec 2016. Stock return is regressed on quintile rank of dispersions in 
analysts’ non-GAAP forecasts, dispersions in analysts’ GAAP forecasts, dispersions in analysts’ 
forecast exclusions, size and book to market ratio. The sample consists of 202,666 firm-month 
observations. The dependent variable is monthly stock return following the month in which forecast 
dispersion is measured. All stocks are assigned a quintile rank based on Dis_nonGAAP, Dis_GAAP, 
Dis_Ex, Size and BTM. These quintile ranks are further scaled to 0 to1 and used for all variables in 
the regressions. All variable definitions are presented in Appendix A4.1. t-statistics are reported in 






Table 4.5 Fama-Macbeth regression results-- Two groups based on Zero/Non-zero intangible 




This table presents the Fama-Macbeth regression results of regressing monthly stock return on 
dispersion in analysts’ forecasts for firms with intangible assets and without intangible assets. Fama-
Macbeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions are run every month from Jan 2004 to Dec 2016. Stock 
return is regressed on quintile rank of dispersions in analysts’ GAAP forecasts, dispersion in 
analysts’ forecast exclusions, size and book to market ratio. The sample consists of 29,584 for firms 
without intangible assets, and 170,048 for firms with intangible assets. The dependent variable is 
monthly stock return following the month in which forecast dispersions are measured. Intangible is 
a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if firms have intangible assets, and otherwise 0. All stocks 
are assigned a quintile rank based on Dis_GAAP, Dis_Ex, Size and BTM. These quintile ranks are 
further scaled to 0 to1 and used for all variables in the regressions. All variable definitions are 
presented in Appendix A4.1. t-statistics are reported in parentheses *, **, *** indicate significance 






Intangible=0 Intangible=1 Intangible=0 Intangible=1 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Dis_nonGAAP_qr -0.0222*** -0.0059**                        
 (-2.76) (2.34)                        
Dis_GAAP_qr   -0.0143** -0.0078*** 
   (-2.15) -(3.29) 
Dis_Ex_qr   0.0010 0.0039** 
   (0.22) (2.65) 
Size_qr 0.0059 -0.0008 0.0031 -0.0014 
 (0.85) (-0.32) (0.49) -(0.52) 
BTM_qr 0.0005 -0.0001 0.0080 -0.0006 
 (0.06) (-0.05) (1.17) -(0.26) 
     
     
Constant 0.0097 0.0112** 0.0077 0.0108** 
 (1.10) (2.35) (1.04) (2.17)  
     
Observations 29,584 170,048 29,584 170,048 
R-squared 0.109 0.036 0.134 0.037 































This table presents the Fama-Macbeth regression results of regressing monthly stock return on 
dispersion in analysts’ forecasts for firms with manager reported exclusion earnings and firms 
without manager reported exclusion earnings. Fama-Macbeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions are 
run every month from Jan 2004 to Dec 2016. Stock return is regressed on quintile rank of dispersion 
in analysts’ non-GAAP forecasts, dispersions in analysts’ GAAP forecasts, dispersions in analysts’ 
forecast exclusions, size and book to market ratio. The sample consists of 77,990 observations for 
firms with manager reported exclusion earnings, and 82,567 observations for firms without manager 
reported exclusion earnings. The dependent variable is monthly stock return following the month in 
which forecast dispersion is measured. Mgr_Exl a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if 
manager reports exclusion earnings, and otherwise 0. All stocks are assigned a quintile rank based 
on Dis_nonGAAP, Dis_GAAP, Dis_Ex, Size and BTM. These quintile ranks are further scaled to 0 
to1 and used for all variables in the regressions. All variable definitions are presented in Appendix 
A4.1. t-statistics are reported in parentheses *, **, *** indicate significance levels (two-sided) of 














Mgr_Exl=0 Mgr_Exl=1 Mgr_Exl=0 Mgr_Exl=1 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Dis_nonGAAP_qr -0.0099*** -0.0059*   
 (3.12) (1.73)   
Dis_GAAP_qr   -0.0010*** -0.0077** 
   (3.40) (2.21)  
Dis_Ex_qr   0.0020 0.0068* 
   (-1.36) (1.91) 
Size_qr 0.0008 -0.0019 0.0004 -0.0012 
 (0.25) (0.63) (0.13) (0.37) 
BTM_qr 0.0012 -0.0009 0.0011 -0.0014 
 (0.36) (0.30) (0.34) (-0.48) 
     
     
Constant 0.0100* 0.0115** 0.0099* 0.0093* 
 (1.92)  (2.20) (1.80) (1.68) 
     
Observations 82,567 77,990 82,567 77,990 
R-squared 0.048 0.052 0.051 0.058 
Number of groups 149 148 149 148 
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Appendices of Chapter 4 
Appendix A4.1 Variable Definitions 
  Variables Definition  Data Source 
Ret Monthly stock return following the month in which the forecast dispersion is measured. Obtained from CRSP 
Dis_nonGAAP 
Dispersion in analysts’ non-GAAP forecasts measured as the standard deviation of 
analysts’ non-GAAP forecasts scaled by stock price at the end of the prior month. 
Obtained from I/B/E/S 
Dis_GAAP 
Dispersion in analysts’ GAAP forecasts measured as the standard deviation of analysts’ 
GAAP forecasts scaled by stock price at the end of the prior month. 
Obtained from I/B/E/S 
Dis_Ex 
Dispersion in analysts’ forecast exclusions measured as the standard deviation of 
analysts’ forecast exclusions scaled by stock price at the end of the prior month. 
Obtained from I/B/E/S 
Size   Total market value at the end of the prior fiscal year. Obtained from Compustat 
BTM 
Book to market ratio calculated as book value divided by market value. Book value is 
the total stockholder’s equity at the end of the prior fiscal year. 
Obtained from Compustat 
Meanadj 
Analysts’ average forecast exclusions calculated as mean value of forecast exclusions 
divided by stock price at the end of the prior month. 
Obtained from I/B/E/S 
Dis_nonGAAP_qr 
The quintile rank of analyst’ dispersion in non-GAAP forecast. Dispersion in analysts’ 
non-GAAP forecasts is assigned into 5 quintiles, the quintile ranks are further scaled to 
a standardised quintile rank from 0 to 1 
Obtained from I/B/E/S 
Dis_GAAP_qr 
The quintile rank of analyst’ dispersion in GAAP forecast. Dispersion in analysts’ GAAP 
forecasts is assigned into 5 quintiles, the quintile ranks are further scaled to a 
standardised quintile rank from 0 to 1 
Obtained from I/B/E/S 
Dis_Ex_qr 
The quintile rank of analyst’ dispersion in forecast exclusions. Dispersion in analysts’ 
forecast exclusions is assigned into 5 quintiles, the quintile ranks are further scaled to a 
standardised quintile rank from 0 to 1 
Obtained from I/B/E/S 
Size_qr 
The quintile rank of firm size. Size is assigned into 5 quintiles, and the quintile ranks are 
further scaled to a standardised quintile rank from 0 to 1.  
Obtained from Compustat 
BTM_qr 
The quintile rank of book to market ration. Book to market ratio is assigned into 5 
quintiles, and the quintile ranks are further scaled to a standardised quintile rank from 0 
Obtained from Compustat 
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to 1.  
Intangible 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if firms have intangible assets, and otherwise 
0. 
Obtained from Compustat 
Mgr_Exl 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if manager reports exclusion earnings, and 
otherwise 0. 
Obtained from Bentley et 
al. (2018) managers’ non-
GAAP earnings 


















































   5.1       Summary of findings 
The thesis seeks to assess the practical implications of equity analysts’ non-GAAP and 
GAAP earnings reporting to different capital market participants. This starts by noting the 
analysts’ disagreement on non-GAAP actual earnings measures and how this discrepancy 
affects past inferences on analysts’ forecast rationality and overreaction (Chapter 2). Chapter 
3 then analyses the links between non-GAAP and GAAP earnings surprises and stock 
market’s short-term and long-term reaction in an international setting. Finally, I look at 
analysts’ disagreement on GAAP earnings forecasts and forecast exclusions, and their 
relationship with future stock returns in the U.S. market in Chapter 4.  
Chapter 2 examines analysts’ actual and forecast GAAP and non-GAAP earnings 
per share (EPS) from a sample of analysts’ reports for large European banks. In this chapter, 
I document significant variation among sell-side analysts’ non-GAAP actual earnings 
measures. In contrast, this disagreement is not evident for GAAP actual earnings measures. 
This is interesting because prior assessments of analysts’ forecast accuracy, informativeness 
and persistence of non-GAAP and GAAP measures are based on I/B/E/S, which reports a 
single actual non-GAAP earnings figure for each firm year. Using my unique dataset, I also 
find that analysts’ forecasts appear more accurate and more biased compared to the results 
using I/B/E/S actuals. My findings support the argument that the GAAP system provides an 
important disciplining role that previous literature may have underestimated.  
Chapter 3 studies the relative informativeness at the earnings announcement date and 
post earnings announcement drift (PEAD) associated with GAAP and Non-GAAP earnings 
surprises. Due to the unavailability of GAAP forecasts data before 2004, prior studies on 
the informativeness of different earnings definitions and PEAD calculate GAAP earnings 
surprise using the difference between GAAP actuals and non-GAAP forecasts. This 
measurement error problem has led to concerns about the comparability of the earnings 
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metric and the potentially contaminated existing results. This chapter overcomes this issue 
by measuring GAAP earnings surprises as the difference between GAAP actuals and GAAP 
forecasts from I/B/E/S. My findings show that investors still perceive non-GAAP earnings 
to be more informative than GAAP earnings at the earnings announcement date. However, 
previously identified GAAP earnings surprises downwardly bias market responses to GAAP 
earnings. In addition, after correcting the measurement error, I find that the GAAP-based 
PEAD is higher than the non-GAAP based PEAD, indicating that investors may not use the 
information contained in GAAP earnings as efficient as non-GAAP earnings. 
Chapter 4 studies analysts’ disagreement on GAAP earnings forecasts, forecast 
exclusions and their relationship with future stock returns. Prior studies have established 
that dispersion in analysts’ non-GAAP forecasts is negatively associated with stock returns 
but have often neglected GAAP forecasts on the grounds that they were unavailable on 
I/B/E/S until 2004. In this chapter, the non-GAAP forecasts are separated into two 
components: GAAP forecasts and exclusions forecasts. My results indicate that both 
analysts’ disagreement on non-GAAP forecasts and disagreement on GAAP forecasts have 
a negative association with future stock return. Dispersion in analysts’ GAAP forecasts seem 
to capture similar information as dispersion in non-GAAP forecasts, but it is a more 
appropriate measure of divergence of investors’ opinion as GAAP forecasts are subject to 
less potential manipulation by analysts. However, a higher level of disagreement on forecast 
exclusions is associated with higher future stock returns. The results of the sub-sample tests 
suggest that dispersion in forecast exclusions reflects the firm idiosyncratic risk and the 
uncertainty of fundamental firm value. This chapter provides additional evidence on the 





5.2       Limitations and Recommendation for Future Research 
Like any research, this thesis is subject to certain limitations that researchers may consider 
when interpreting my results and designing new studies. First, in Chapter 2, I use manually 
collected data from analysts’ reports. The sample consists of 4 UK banks and 5 European 
banks. Although I chose the banking sector on the grounds that it is very large, neglected in 
academic research terms and also economically important, this choice comes at the expense 
of generality. I therefore caution readers to interpret the results carefully when generalising 
to non-financial corporate sectors. Further research could determine the extent of 
disagreement between analysts about the actual earnings of less complex companies. 
Moreover, I am unable to ascertain whether analysts opportunistically adjust actual non-
GAAP measures ex post to justify their earlier forecasts, or whether they try to signal their 
superior skills of processing accounting information through more extensive adjustments. 
Thus, future studies may also explore reasons why analysts report different actual non-
GAAP EPS.  
Secondly, in Chapter 3, whilst my dataset is extracted for an international sample 
consisting of firms from the UK and 10 Eurozone countries, it is still important to see the 
samples from other countries where different institutional environments may influence 
analysts’ disclosure of non-GAAP financial measures. In addition, I only examine GAAP 
and non-GAAP earnings surprises in this chapter, so future research can investigate market 
reactions to alternative definitions of earnings surprises, such as those defined by the 
difference between managers’ reported pro forma earnings and analysts’ non-GAAP 
forecasts. Furthermore, future studies can also investigate how different institutional factors 
affect the short-term market reaction and long-term PEAD associated with GAAP and non-
GAAP earnings surprises across these countries. 
Finally, there are more interesting issues to be examined following the results 
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reported in Chapter 4. In Chapter 4, the negative association between dispersion in GAAP 
forecasts and future stock returns can be ascribed to either information asymmetry or 
uncertainty. However, I do not fully differentiate which components explains the negative 
relationship between disagreements on analyst’ GAAP forecasts and future stock returns. In 
addition, I find that dispersion in analysts’ forecast exclusions are positively associated with 
future stock returns. Evidence suggests that this could be ascribed to the fundamental 
uncertainty risk about firm value. Future research may explore other explanations by 
separating analysts’ forecast exclusions into special items (non-recurring components) and 
other exclusions (recurring components).  
  
 
